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1. Death as a Paradox 
I don't mind the idea of dying. I just don't want to be 
there when it happens. 
-Woody Allen 
This book about death is more about life and how facing the 
fact of our mortality can allow us to live with less anxiety, more 
freedom. In exploring the possible rewards of a greater accep- 
tance of death in society, I will examine implications of Paul 
Tillich's question: "If we cannot accept death, can we really 
live?" Throughout, I will deal in various ways with one central 
irony: whereas the subject of death has been avoided in our 
culture lest it rob life of meaning and contentment, confront- 
ing death may be crucial for us, individually and as a society, to 
affirm life and even, in the nuclear age, to survive. 
In the last two decades, significant developments have be- 
gun to challenge our culture's denial of death. These include 
the burgeoning literature on death and dying, the hospice 
movement, greater frankness of physicians in discussing 
death, the demand for organ donation, and, of most signifi- 
cance, a growing awareness of the immense peril that the 
world faces in the nuclear arms race. These developments 
provoke questions about the changes society would undergo if 
the subject of death were let out of the closet, yet the treatment 
of death in our culture remains one of denial. 
This denial is sometimes self-conscious and elaborate, as in 
the cryogenic freezing of bodies to be rehabilitated in the 
future, or the "tasteful" services at the Forest Lawn Cemetery 
Chapel, or the assigning of death and dying to professionals in 
nursing homes, hospitals, and funeral homes. Geoffrey Gorer 
has summarized our culture's attitude toward mortality by 
pointing to "the pornography of death." He argues that where- 
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as our Victorian predecessors regarded death as a regular, 
frequent part of life but treated sex with delicacy and denial, 
magically finding babies under cabbages, we are casual and 
cavalier about sex but treat death with avoidance and magical 
explanations.' 
Our avoidance of death is not always in word. We sometimes 
talk about death in a metaphoric and unthreatening context as 
if to convince ourselves that death need not be intimidating. 
The terminology of sports, which represents one of the major 
preoccupations in our culture, is full of references to death. We 
speak of runners "dying on base," of a batter getting a "new 
life," and of games ending in "sudden death." These metaphors 
on one level seem to disarm death, to trivialize it, for we know 
that there is life after sudden death in athletics. 
An important part of our absorption in spectator sports, 
reflected by billions of dollars in television revenues, may be 
traced to the image of control and mastery that exquisite 
athletic expertise conveys. An artfully executed touchdown 
pass can be appreciated for its beauty and skill, but it is also an 
invitation to hope that this triumph is a figure of control over 
the uncertainties and ambiguities that being mortal imposes 
upon us. Sports free us from ambiguities: every event is autop- 
sied with endless statistics; the final figures on the scoreboard 
are what count regardless of which team has actually played 
better; referees never reconsider judgment calls; and everyone 
hates a tie. Sports function as a release from many of life's 
pressures, but the effort to relieve the uncertainty and threat of 
the mortality we seldom consciously confront may be one of 
sports' chief missions. 
Because Americans do break the taboo against speaking 
about death, whether in discussing sports, crimes, or war, 
some question whether we do not give death's reality its due. 
Our avoidance of death is not total, but one would have to 
ignore a vast part of our culture to miss the extraordinary 
lengths to which we go to hide from death. Among empirical 
studies of our avoidance, A.E. Christ's shows that 87 percent of 
a population of acute geriatric patients never discussed death 
or dying; and Richard Kalish's studies document how much 
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slower hospital nurses were in responding to the call lights of 
terminal patients as opposed to nonterminal patients.* But 
the modern avoidance of death is even more convincingly 
described in a comprehensive evaluation by historian Philippe 
Aries. 
Aries describes this century's treatment of death in Western 
culture, aside from the rather sudden increase of studies in the 
last twenty years, as one of silence: "It is strange how the 
human sciences, so outspoken regarding family, work, politics, 
leisure, religion, and sex, have been so reserved on the subject 
of death. Scholars have kept silent. . . . Their silence is only a 
part of this great silence that has settled on the subject of death 
in the 20th ~entury ."~  He indicts Western society in this cen- 
tury for depriving the dying person of his or her death. In 
earlier times, a patient "insisted on participating in his own 
death, because he saw in his death the moment when his 
individuality received its ultimate form." The patient "was 
master over his life only insofar as he was master over his 
death" (139). The deathbed was the place and time at which last 
spoken wishes became sacred to the survivors: "For his part, 
the dying man was satisfied that he could rest in peace on the 
word of his close ones. This trust that began in the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries and was developed in the nineteenth 
century, has in the twentieth turned into alienation. As soon as 
serious danger threatens one member of a family, the family 
immediately conspires to deprive him of information and thus 
his freedom" (140). 
Physicians, until recently, were a key part of this conspiracy 
of silence, and many still are. Until the twentieth century, Aries 
notes, medical ethics made it obligatory to inform patients of 
their conditions. "A papal document of the Middle Ages made 
this a task of the doctor, a task he for a long time carried out 
unflinchingly" (136-37). 
Where the modern physician has left off in the denial of 
death, the funeral industry has taken over. Jessica Mitford, 
among others, details how American funeral customs mask 
the reality of death. Featured among a selection of caskets are 
those made of solid copper-"a quality casket which offers 
THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
superb value to the client seeking long-lasting protection." 
Casket manufacturers like Elgin offer a "perfect posture bed" 
or a Colonial Classic line with some caskets "equipped with 
foam rubber, some with inner spring mattresses." Richard 
Dumont and Dennis Foss describe the funeral industry's 
"willing compliance with the public's desire to make the 
corpse appear to be quite a l i ~ e . " ~  
To some extent, the avoidance of death simply fits the Amer- 
ican national experience. Ours is a young country unencrusted 
by traditions and unimpressed by genealogy charts. Preoc- 
cupied with pushing back frontiers, we learned to value heart- 
iness and self-reliance. Old age and death have seemed un- 
American from the start on a continent that demanded and 
rewarded belief in possibilities rather than an appreciation of 
limits. A people who found it expedient to expropriate the 
lands of Native Americans would not be likely to dwell on the 
debts of one generation to another. A nation so profusely, al- 
most profligately, endowed by nature in its geography has 
found little time to be attentive to nature's control of the life 
span. 
Our mindset to see nature not so much as a tutor but as a 
challenge has led us to extraordinary heights of technological 
achievement. This dominance in technology has been abetted 
by our not being strapped to tradition or constraints in the 
market of ideas and investments. The challenge of tech- 
nological development in this century helped to maintain the 
frontier mentality long after the geographic frontier was gone. 
Inevitably, with so much of our national history reinforcing 
a belief in progress, death became for us not a natural and 
necessary part of life but an embarrassment, a rebuke to our 
faith in the future. For many, death represented just another 
obstacle to conquer or, at the very least, to avoid with grace 
and pretense. The fight to defeat cancer, for example, repre- 
sents for some a campaign against death. Sociologist Robert 
Blauner summarizes this clash of values in observing that "the 
dead and their concerns are simply not relevant to the living in 
a society that feels liberated from the authority of the past and 
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orients its energies toward immediate preoccupations and 
future po~sibilities."~ 
John Stephenson agrees that "death is antithetical to the 
American image of what is important in life." He says death 
represents failure to us, failure of science and failure of the in- 
dividual, who is supposed to be master of his or her own fate. 
The stasis that characterizes death clashes with the American 
ideal of progress and activity. "There is, as a result, a tinge of 
guilt upon the state of being dead in Ameri~a."~ Stephenson 
echoes the theme of "death as pornography" that was first 
raised thirty years before by Gorer: "And so we react to the 
reality of death with dread. The subject is obscene; it is por- 
nographic. It is not polite to speak easily of death. We are too 
uncomfortable with it. Institutions are created to contain 
death, and emphasis is placed upon youth, for to grow old is to 
exemplify the decay of the body."6 
Stephenson's treatment of the theme of death as pornogra- 
phy provides an excellent answer to those who ask how it can 
be alleged that our culture shuns death when death is a con- 
stant theme on television and in news reports. Some of this 
public acknowledgment should be taken at face value as an 
indication that the denial of death, although pervasive, is not 
universal in society. Robert Kastenbaum and Ruth Aisenberg 
observe that one factor driving the new surge of interest in 
death is that with television we are less isolated from violent 
death, as was certainly the case during the Vietnam War.7 
Stephenson, however, convincingly argues that much of our 
public treatment of death actually confirms the link to pornog- 
raphy. With help from Gorer, he deepens the parallel between 
the Victorian treatment of sexuality and contemporary death 
attitudes: "The repression of sexuality brought with it a flour- 
ishing of pornography. The attempt to deny the existence of 
death by repressing the subject has brought about a popular 
fascination with violence. The similarities go further. As with 
sexual pornography, the pornography of violent death de-em- 
phasizes feelings. . . . In sexual pornography there is little or 
no caring, tenderness, or love. In necrography (violent pornog- 
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raphy), people are 'wasted' or 'blown away.' The emphasis in 
both cases is upon the sensational." Necrography, he tells us, 
serves as a form of substitute gratification, "allowing us to 
meet death and remain unscathed, and our feelings of grief and 
mourning are replaced by the thrill of pseudo-terror at the 
violent act" (40). 
Thus much of the overt image of death in our society is part 
of our denial. We continue to hide from the reality of our 
natural and unavoidable mortality by exposing ourselves to 
the more bizarre and violent manifestations of death. As 
Stephenson puts it, "authentic presentations of taboo subjects 
are prohibited, but more indirect (and perhaps perverse) pres- 
entations are acceptable" (40). Also, Kastenbaum and Aisen- 
berg remind us that "overemphasis upon accidental fatalities 
is a way of reinforcing our belief that death is some place else." 
Death is seen as an external act that may befall us but is not 
within ourselves. They suggest the notion of death as acciden- 
tal can be interpreted as an inclination to remain within the 
child's universe of causality. "Children tend to see death 
threats as being closely related to concrete circumstances. 
Avoid those circumstances and one avoids death" (200). 
A final distinction needs to be made in perceiving the avoid- 
ance of death in American culture. While observing that "the 
overwhelming majority of investigators argue that Americans 
seek to evade death," Stephenson notes that if the denial were 
total, chaos would develop when death occurred. Therefore we 
are ambivalent toward death: "we both deny and accept 
death-we deny when we can, and accept when we must." We 
need, he concludes, to distinguish between extrinsic death-the 
death represented by mortality tables and statements such as 
"all living things must diep'-and existentialdeath, which refers 
to our personal death. It is primarily existential death against 
which contemporary men and women are "bereft of any sym- 
bolic or theological armament," Stephenson says: "From ear- 
liest childhood on, we are taught not to think of death; to do so 
is morbid and unacceptable. As a result, we numb ourselves to 
death's existence, allowing it into our consciousness only as 
distant, nonthreatening, abstract death. . . . Our internal con- 
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fusion and lack of symbolic referents for the reality of personal 
~ - 
death [lead] us to dkfensive actions, such as avoidance, in order 
to deal with it" (43-44). 
On the other hand, the growth of life insurance sales and 
pre-need funeral plans evidence that "on some levels extrinsic 
death is affirmed by Americans" (44). This dualistic nature of 
our reactions to death, as emphasized by Stephenson, is a 
crucial part of a response to those who question whether 
Americans avoid the subject. Our culture does allow such 
discussion, but it tends to be about the abstract, nonthreaten- 
ing, extrinsic sides of death. Taboos against discussing person- 
al death are under attack by many but remain prevalent in our 
society. 
However, whether we like it or not, whether we face it or not, 
we live always in death's presence. We strive for "normalcy" by 
assigning goals to our lives that seem to skirt death's signifi- 
cance. Our economy constantly goads us in a quest for more, as 
if that were all that life is for. But though we laugh at the few 
heroic neurotics like Woody Allen who keep pushing death on 
our consciousness, we can never fully insulate ourselves from 
stories of what happens to others. We seek out details about 
those singled out by death in the hope that we don't know 
them, in the hope that if they have no connection to us they do 
not signal our connection to death and vulnerability. But 
sooner or later we realize that nothing separates us from others 
who are touched by death, and, sooner or later, we will be 
touched as well. 
The tragedy of the January 1986 explosion of the space shut- 
tle Challenger reached almost inconsolable depths throughout 
the United States because it was totally unexpected and be- 
cause the crew included a bright, effervescent teacher and 
mother who represented the public as the first private citizen 
in space. When, within an instant on live television, what was 
to be a glorious, fortunate flight for someone selected from 
among thousands and with whom we were proud to identify, 
was terminated by accident, error, fate, death, we knew we had 
no place to hide. 
The great irony of our effort to hide from death and human 
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vulnerability is not that it is so unavailing, but that we would 
be miserable if we succeeded. Only in confronting human 
mortality can we appreciate the limitedness and the precious- 
ness of life. It is not death we fear as much as it is annihilation 
and the absurdity of a meaningless life. The paradox of death is 
that it is a spur to put aside the inducements we have all 
around us for a meaningless life and to find significance and 
permanence in the effect we have upon other people's lives. 
Nothing confirms our identity with other mortals and our 
mutual dependence as powerfully as death does. Death visits 
us with great grief and pain, but it also highlights our connec- 
tion with all other people and the power we have to continue 
life in others. 
Since this perspective is the key insight pursued throughout 
this book, it is obvious that this book is about change as well as 
- 
death. The acceptance of death argued for here is not limited to 
a religious view. Many people assume that it is impossible to 
confront death without the support of religion, and that those 
who are not religious must necessarily be cynical or shallow. 
Ernest Becker declares that "since there is no secular way to 
resolve the primal mystery of life and death, all secular so- 
cieties are lies." Glenn Tinder seems to agree: "If a person is not 
immortal, he tends to sink back into nature and in some 
circumstances may be regarded, like any other natural being, 
as a means rather than an end." These philosophical doubts 
about how serious secular people can be about death and life 
have a significant political impact. In one of his first inter- 
views after taking office in January 1981, President Ronald 
Reagan said that one reason there was little hope for common 
understanding between the onited States and the Soviets is 
that "they don't believe in after-life."8 
The fact that so many churches in America participate in 
death-denying funeral customs, like concludingthe gaveside 
service before burial, suggests that difficulty in coping with 
death is not confined to secular people. Surely one important 
factor behind the appeal of cults and some fundamentalist 
sects is the simple, almost automatic victory over death they 
hold out. But this escape from the pressures of mortality and 
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vulnerability is accompanied by an abandonment of reason 
and an irresponsible indifference to moderation in the face of a 
nuclear Armageddon. If ever it were important to see how 
mortality can be confronted and accepted on purely human 
terms, this is such a time. This book supports those people- 
secular and religious-who reject the self-interested approach 
to God as an escape from death and who see dignity and unity 
in people simply because they share the gift of life. If death is 
seen as confirming, rather than threatening, this dignity and 
unity, then a greater acceptance of death in our culture should 
have a powerful impact on our social, political, and religious 
attitudes. 
The effort to promote greater democracy would be vig- 
orously advanced by a less defensive response to death, for 
acknowledging our common mortality seems to be a catalyst 
to taking equality and community more seriously. Likewise, 
business as usual in our economic life would be challenged, for 
the incentive of merely getting "more" would not hold up 
against the lessons death teaches about limits in life and the 
need to set priorities. The ballooning of one's ego by manic 
acquisition is pricked by candor about death. 
The issue where changed attitudes about death have their 
most significant and urgent impact is the crisis we face in the 
nuclear arms race. Perhaps a major reason so many of us are 
oblivious to the danger of nuclear war and have given policy 
makers such a free hand in rattling nuclear sabers since Hiro- 
shima is that we strive to be oblivious to death. If we were to 
confront our mortality and realize that our life has a perma- 
nence and value in our ability to give life to others in the long 
chain of human interaction, we would realize what an un- 
speakable crime against the future is represented by the threat 
of nuclear war. We would give our policy makers a very short 
leash in their maneuvering of the arms race, and we would 
evidence a popular consciousness on this issue previously not 
thought possible. 
Of course, this consciousness has already begun to form. 
Even while reaffirming his description of the Soviet Union as 
an "evil empire," President Reagan negotiated significant cuts 
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in our missile arsenal. To the extent that the increasing public 
pressure for movement away from nuclear confrontation has 
been spurred by the immensity of the crisis rather than by new 
attitudes about death, we can see how these two changes are 
mutually reinforcing. People who take seriously the threat of 
nuclear arms must necessarily transcend the denial of death 
and begin to gain some perspective on their individual deaths. 
At the very least, they will realize how minor their deaths are 
compared to the death of all humanity. Concern for human life 
in any context may begin in self-interest, but it never ends 
there; a concern for protecting humanity against nuclear arms 
engenders the attitudes and values that support people in 
accepting their individual deaths. 
The kinds of changes this book explores-greater participa- 
tion in our politics, less self-interested appeals in our economy, 
greater concern for the reality of nuclear peril in our national 
security policies-are large and momentous, but so are the 
provocations to these changes. Since in the nuclear age, for the 
first time in human history, we have the power to put an end to 
life on this planet, why should we be surprised that humanity 
might now develop a new consciousness about interdepen- 
dence and the necessity to restrain nationalism and individual 
ego in order to survive? On the personal level, as we realize the 
price we pay in unreality and insecurity for the denial of death, 
why should we be surprised that people will refuse to devote 
their lives to a preoccupation with wealth and power? 
Even without the urgency about change that nuclear weap- 
ons force upon us, can we not expect that the emptiness of 
spending a life trying to impress others or even oneself, par- 
ticularly when it is done to ward off intimations of mortality, 
will increasingly arouse people's demand for meaning in life? 
With the urgency for new priorities in the nuclear era glaring 
at us and with the personal need to deal with death in order to 
deal honestly with life, we begin to realize that we are living at 
a time when the status quo is no longer an option. We will as a 
society either harden ourselves to the nuclear peril we face and 
buttress this choice with greater nationalism, greater arms, 
greater danger, or we will seek out the basis for human soli- 
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darity and act to save our common world. We will, as individu- 
als, either spend our lives running from death and seek a lonely 
and futile refuge in narcissism, or we will acknowledge our 
limits and restructure our priorities with a new appreciation 
of life's preciousness and our power to share life with others. 
On both societal and personal levels, if we choose to face 
reality we will find that accepting our mortality and vul- 
nerability will be our most valuable aid in moving to greater 
solidarity and harmony with other cultures and persons. 
In uncovering the irony of how acknowledging our mor- 
tality does not rob life of meaning but rather prompts us to 
find meaning in life, this book will first consider and respond 
to the arguments of Ernest Becker and Jacques Choron that the 
denial of death is natural and inevitable. The third chapter will 
examine the case presented by Robert Jay Lifton that, whereas 
there are modes of immortality that liberate us from the denial 
of death, these modes are rendered impotent by the threat of 
nuclear war. The fourth chapter is the linchpin for the whole 
book, for it will lay out the ways by which we can accept death 
without a dependence upon, but not necessarily in opposition 
to, religious beliefs. The focus of this chapter is on how our 
impact on other people's lives is not negated by the grief and 
suffering that are the companions of death and how this im- 
pact assures meaning in life. 
In the first of four chapters on the political and social results 
of a great acceptance of death in our culture, chapter five 
argues that there is a serious collision between the respect for 
limits that death teaches and the encouragement in capitalism 
to acquire more and more. In exploring this clash, chapters 
five and six examine the ideas of John Locke, Michael Novak, 
Daniel Bell, and Christopher Lasch. Chapter seven looks at the 
implications of a new perspective on death for the prospect of 
greater participatory democracy in our society. Confronting 
our mortality is seen here to have great force as a catalyst to 
finding shared values in a pluralistic society. Chapter eight 
confronts and tests the treatment of death and life in this book 
with the awesome peril of nuclear war. Building on a helpful 
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but incomplete foundation laid by Johnathan Schell, this 
chapter sees the acceptance of personal death as a powerful 
motivation to action against nuclear death. The conclusion 
reemphasizes how accepting death directly conflicts with and 
undermines economic and political appeals based on a narrow 
concept of self-interest. Mirroring the paradoxes that run 
throughout this book, our greatest self-interest-to live freely 
without the pervasive anxiety that death threatens us with 
extinction and absurdity-is seen to be achievable only by a 
commitment to the common interest and a mutual sharing of 
life with other people. It is in this respect that this book about 
death necessarily becomes a study of our capacity for living. 
2. Surmounting the Denial 
of Death 
No philosophy, religion, or overall way of life can be 
judged complete or adequate unless it includes a 
definite position on whether or not the human 
personality can surmount the crisis called death. 
-Corliss Lamont 
More open attitudes toward death in our society can serve as a 
catalyst for a wider acceptance of the social values of equality 
and community. This proposition is shared by several authors 
who have weighed the social impact of people coming to terms 
with their mortality. Herman Feifel has argued that an accep- 
tance of death would lessen the need to project the fear of death 
outside ourselves and would mute some of the violence of our 
times, "perhaps even fortifying man's gift for creative splendor 
against his genius for destruction." Corliss Lamont also em- 
phasizes the social implications of changing attitudes toward 
death: "The social meaning of death . . . has its positive as- 
pects. For the occurrence of death brings home to us the com- 
mon concerns and the common destiny of all men everywhere. 
It draws us together in the deep-felt emotions of the heart and 
dramatically accents the ultimate equality involved in our 
ultimate fate. The universality of death reminds us of the 
essential brotherhood of man that lies beneath all the bitter 
dissensions and conflicts registered in history and contempo- 
rary affairs."' 
Similar arguments about the social repercussions of the 
consciousness of death are made by Charles Wahl, Peter 
Koestenbaum, Leon Kass, Norman Cousins, H. Tristham En- 
glehardt, and Robert Jay L i f t ~ n . ~  First, however, we need to 
consider why so many more social scientists and theorists on 
14 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
politics remain under the sway of La Rochefoucauld's conten- 
tion that human beings "cannot look directly at either the sun 
or death." These writers argue that the avoidance of the subject 
of death is both natural and necessary. 
In spite of the dramatic movement in the last two decades to 
reverse the shunning of death in our culture, this movement is 
vigorously challenged by the insistence that the only alter- 
native to a religious belief in immortality is a firm and per- 
vasive denial of death. This argument is made with special 
intensity by theologians, of whom Paul Ramsey is perhaps the 
best-known representative. Ramsey scoffs at the effort to speak 
of death with dignity and insists that death is not natural to 
human life and that "a true humanism and the dread of death 
seem to be dependent  variable^."^ He sees no philosophical 
basis for a secular acceptance of death and assumes that a 
movement aimed at such a goal avoids the denial of death only 
by emasculating death's reality and tragedy: "To deny the 
indignity of death requires that the dignity of man be refused 
also. The more acceptable in itself death is, the less the worth 
or uniqueness ascribed to the dying life" (90). 
The obstacles to facing death without the consolation of the 
promise of spiritual immortality are equally imposing to other 
authors. Vivian Rakoff wonders if the belief in an afterlife may 
not be the only way to allay "primordial anguish." William E 
May believes people "evade death because they recognize in 
the event an immensity that towers above their resources for 
handling it." Robert Fulton and Gilbert Geis see the increasing 
tendency in contemporary society to assign to professional 
functionaries the responsibility for traditional family roles 
regarding the dead as permitting us "to avoid close and dis- 
turbing confrontations with the inconsistencies inherent in 
the traditional theological explanations and the emerging sec- 
ular viewpoints." A critic of these attitudes, Yeager Hudson, 
notes the "quiet desperation" in many lives totally intimi- 
dated by death unsoftened by religion. For many, "the bleak 
fact of death has given rise to a hedonistic attitude which 
amounts to an attempt to wring out of our few brief days such 
pleasure as they may be made to yield." These attitudes, he 
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concludes, "seem to presuppose that no matter how good a 
man's life is, unless it is eternal it is in the final evaluation dust 
and as he^."^ 
The conviction that the consciousness of death is not tolera- 
ble for the nonreligious receives its most scholarly recent sup- 
port from French philosopher Jacques Choron. More than any 
other author on the subject in the last twenty years, he has 
given to the study of attitudes toward death a philosophical 
depth and comprehensive analysis. His two major works, 
Death and Western Thought and Death and Modem Man, exam- 
ine the difficulty Western philosophy has had since the Renais- 
sance in giving meaning to life in the shadow of death. 
Especially in the latter book, largely composed of Choron's 
commentaries on arguments of major philosophers sum- 
marized in the former work, he comes reluctantly but firmly to 
the conclusion that, on its own terms, life seems an enigma 
that denies perspective and significance. 
Early in Death and Modem Man, Choron identifies the core 
of the human dilemma as stemming not from the fear of death 
but the fear of extinction: "It is the prospect of not being 
anymore that makes most men abhor death."5 The conviction 
expressed by Shelley and echoed by poets and philosophers 
throughout Choron's book that "there is something in man at 
enmity with nothingness and dissolution" (80) leads Choron to 
review what he considers the most important attempts to 
uncover the meaning of life. He first criticizes the position that 
the purpose of life is to be found in "growth and self-fulfill- 
ment, the achievement of emotional maturity, of moral stat- 
ure, and of intellectual excellence, the becoming a 'rounded 
personality."' He also argues that "no matter how desirable 
these are in themselves none of them can be the ultimate 
meaning of life as long as it is not related to something endur- 
ing but remains an end in itself and not a means to a higher 
end" (171). It is clear that, for Choron, "endurance" is an essen- 
tial precondition for life or its activities to have meaning. For 
this reason, he finds even the life "spent in the pursuit of 
goodness and beauty" vulnerable to W.W. Dixon's despair: "If, 
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indeed, existence offers any values it can only be to the individ- 
ual beings who have a share in existence. If there be any good, 
and if there be any beauty it is in them and their perceptions of 
such things. Where else could it be? The rest is but mud and 
motion. And since if the valuators perish, all values, truth, 
goodness and the rest, go with them into everlasting night, no 
theological or metaphysical twitterings can rebut the demon- 
strable hollowness of life, its inherent futility" (172). 
The inability to find meaning in some enduring dimension 
to life leads Choron to bleak language in this dispassionate 
treatise: "The death of the good and wise, when moral charac- 
ter and spiritual greatness, painfully acquired through the 
years, disappear like smoke, only underscores the absurdity of 
death and the futility of all human striving" (172). One hears 
the echo in this search for meaning in the face of annihilation 
of Ecclesiastes ("Time and chance happeneth to them all") and 
the long-standing warning in Christian contemplative writing 
about the "vanity of vanities." James Joyce could not have 
portrayed more poignantly the melancholy of secularism that 
was denounced by his Jesuit educators. 
Choron next considers the argument that "loving and being 
loved constitute the meaning of life." But like Freud in Civiliza- 
tion and Its Discontents, Choron quickly focuses on the height- 
ened vulnerability of lovers to what Shakespeare described as 
"love-destroying death." Choron is impressed by the biological 
effect of love at least to limit death's power; he finds that "to 
have progeny is possibly the only meaning of life." But he 
convincingly rejects biological immortality as the answer to 
the meaning of life because "there are too many 'absurd' 
deaths left": those who are childless or who die in their youth. 
For the same reason, he rejects the claim that the meaning of 
life can be found in creative work. "Can we accept as an answer 
to the meaning of life that which can be applicable only to a 
few privileged individuals? Even with these persons there is no 
question that their creations, although often spoken of as 'im- 
mortal,' are not everlasting" (172-73). 
Again, we see that Choron's critical criterion for finding 
meaning in the face of death is endurance beyond death and 
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time. It is almost by necessity that he finds humanity a victim 
of "the melancholy truth of the perishability of all that the skill 
of human hands and the flight of human spirit has brought 
forth." His rejection of the final, and perhaps most common, 
claim for transcendent significance in life-contributing to 
humanity-seems inevitable: 
Even "serving causes," making one's country or the world "a better 
place to live in" by striving to eliminate suffering and injustice and 
preserve peace-in spite of being the loftiest goals mortal man can 
strive for--cannot be considered as an answer to the question of the 
ultimate meaning of life. For it is not enough that the "cause" be 
outside of the individual human life; it must also be "above man- 
kind." And this-because of the possibility, and perhaps even the 
inevitability, of eventual cessation not only of Western civilization, 
but of all life on the planet, and the disintegration of the earth itself- 
becomes a doubtful possibility. [I741 
The cumulative effect of Choron's denial of the efficacy of 
these attempts at consolation and meaning in the path of 
annihilating death is to give reluctant but vigorous support to 
the proposition that the denial of death in our secular culture is 
not an aberration. It is the only straw left at which one can grab 
to avoid the numbing sting of awareness of impending obliv- 
ion. That this should be the conclusion of a writer with 
Choron's composure and scholarship is a formidable challenge 
to those who would argue that death-denying behavior in our 
society is both pathological and unnecessary and that the 
confrontation and ultimate acceptance of death is not only 
possible but portends vast changes in the quality of life in 
society. 
This challenge also finds substantial and spirited reinforce- 
ment in the recent work of Ernest Becker. If Choron's is the 
most scholarly of contemporary studies on the inevitability of 
the denial of death, Becker's last two books are clearly the most 
startling and dramatic in their presentation of this theme and 
in sketching its far-reaching implications for the individual 
and for society. His extraordinary pessimism about the possi- 
bility of finding either equanimity or meaning in the face of 
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human mortality was detailed in 1973 in his Pulitzer Prize- 
winning The Denial o f  Death. The equally bleak social reper- 
cussions of this view were described in Escape from Evil, pub- 
lished in 1975 just after Becker's death. 
Becker sees people as having no choice but to deny death 
because they are hopelessly caught in the dilemma of having 
magnificent illusions of power in a decaying, vulnerable body. 
He is simply awed by how completely and miserably the 
human animal, from infancy on, is undercut in its narcissistic 
sense of magical omnipotence, uniqueness, and creativity by 
the absurdity of mortality: 
This is the paradox: he is out of nature and hopelessly in it; he is dual, 
up in the stars and yet housed in a heart-pumping, breathgasping 
body that once belonged to a fish and still carries the gillmarks to 
prove it. His body is a material and fleshy casing that is alien to him in 
many ways-the strangest and most repugnant way being that it 
aches and bleeds and will decay and die. Man is literally split in two: 
he has an awareness of his own splendid uniqueness in that he sticks 
out of nature with a towering majesty, and yet he goes back into the 
ground a few feet in order blindly and dumbly to rot and disappear 
forever. It is a terrifying dilemma to be in and to have to live with.6 
So grotesque is the human fate of consciousness of both 
one's symbolic self, "a creature with a name, a life history," and 
one's "fundamental expendability in nature" (52), that Becker 
is convinced "a full apprehension of man's condition would 
drive him insane" (27). The only way around the terror of death 
and the absurd dualism of life and death is to deny mortality, 
and thus "man lives by lying to himself about himself and 
about his world" (51). Rather than breeding anxiety and 
thwarting a reconciliation with nature and other people, as 
some claim, the denial of death is the prime requirement of the 
conviction that "the individual has to repress globally, from the 
entire spectrum of his experience, if he wants to feel a warm 
sense of inner value and basic security" (52). 
The psychological urgency of denying death leads necessari- 
ly to a rejection of the advice from Abraham Maslow and 
others about "enjoying one's full humanness." As Becker sees 
Surmounting the Denial of Death 19 
it, a therapeutic enterprise that encourages honesty about the 
lies that are essential for sanity leads to a Pyrrhic victory: "The 
person gives up something restricting and illusory, it is true, 
but only to come face to face with something even more awful: 
genuine despair. Full humanness means full fear and trem- 
bling, at least some of the waking day. When you get a person to 
emerge into life, away from his dependencies, his automatic 
safety in the cloak of someone else's power, what joy can you 
promise him with the burden of his aloneness? . . . What 
would the average man do with a full consciousness of absurd- 
ity?" (59). 
These provocative ideas and strong language, drawn from 
The Denial of Death, lead directly to Escape from Evil and its 
equally stark explanation of the social and political effects of 
each person's harrowing dualism. Becker's argument gives 
vigorous support to the much-neglected relevance to political 
attitudes of attitudes toward death. Unfortunately, this con- 
nection is not a happy one for the democratic ideals of liberty 
and equality. Precisely because people cannot tolerate the du- 
alism of life and death discussed in The Denial of Death, they 
cannot tolerate freedom. They are quite prepared, Becker ar- 
gues, to leave a political freedom that offers no protection 
against the bondage of mortality and to gather in the shadow 
of a forceful leader whose power in human events symbolizes a 
power against the great enemy, death. 
Becker is not alone in this posture. Against the optimistic 
assumptions of primitive equality and liberty encased in 
Rousseau's famous dictum that "Man was born free, and every- 
where he is in chains," Becker's mentor, Otto Rank, had in- 
sisted that "every human being is also equally unfree, that is 
we are born in need of authority and we even create out of 
freedom a prison." And in Life Against Death, Norman 0 .  
Brown had argued: "If there is a class which has nothing to 
lose but its chains, the chains that bind are self-imposed, 
sacred obligations which appear as objective realities with all 
the force of a neurotic delusion." Becker weaves these earlier 
arguments in support of his central proposition that "men 
fashion unfreedom as a bribe for self-perpetuation" and to 
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support the inference that such effort is necessary because 
death is an idea with which it is not possible to cope.' 
Becker qualifies Choron's description of the great human 
fear as the fear of extinction and describes it as the fear of 
"extinction with insignificance." The job of any culture thus 
becomes a sacred and religious one: to assure in some way the 
perpetuation of its members. Culture must "raise men above 
nature, to assure them that in some ways their lives count in 
the universe more than merely physical things count" (4). 
Becker is convinced, however, that this mission of all 
cultures is doomed to failure and that the symbolic denial of 
mortality is "a figment of the imagination for flesh-and-blood 
organisms" (85). Since the terror of death remains underneath 
the cultural repression, the fear of death is shifted to the higher 
level of cultural perpetuity, and with disastrous consequences: 
Since men must now hold for dear life onto the self-transcending 
meanings of the society in which they live, onto the immortality 
symbols which guarantee them indefinite duration of some kind, a 
new kind of instability and anxiety [is] created. And this anxiety is 
precisely what spills over into the affairs of men. In seeking to avoid 
evil, man is responsible for bringing more evil into the world than 
organisms could ever do merely by exercising their digestive tracts. It 
is man's ingenuity, rather than his animal nature, that has given his 
fellow creatures such a bitter earthly fate. [5] 
The unhappy consequences of people's inability to accept 
their mortality are particularly apparent for Becker in the way 
we treat competition and wealth: "importance equals du- 
rability equals life" (13). This simple formula, he says, locks us 
into competitive jousts with the rest of humanity that are 
deadly serious: "To be outshone by another is to be attacked at 
some basic level of organismic durability. To lose, to be second 
rate, to fail to keep up with the best and the highest sends a 
message to the nerve center of the organism's anxiety: 'I am 
overshadowed, inadequate; hence I do not qualify for con- 
tinued durability, for life, for eternity, hence I will die'" (11-12). 
This vulnerability, he argues, is also what makes the pursuit 
of gold so universally compelling: "The thing that connects 
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money with the domain of the sacred is its power. . . . It abol- 
ishes one's likeness to others" (81). Competition and gold, then, 
are signs of the human need and quest for inequality and the 
hero's power. However dispiriting this Hobbesian scenario is, 
it is the unavoidable cost of our unavoidable terror of death. 
Because Becker's inventory of human pretension, villainy, 
and despair in response to the absurdity of death is so vast and 
unqualified, I respond first to him and assert the possibility 
and value of admitting death 'to our consciousness, before 
turning to the more modulated arguments of Choron. 
It is very difficult to deal with, much less refute, Becker's 
scintillating but largely undocumented psychological as- 
sumptions in The Denial of Death. As he becomes more con- 
crete and specific in his arguments in Escape from Evil, 
however, problems with his assumptions and perspective be- 
gin to come into focus and pose substantial questions about his 
general thesis that people cannot tolerate the consciousness of 
death. Considering only the two examples of death-denying 
behavior, competition and the pursuit of wealth, one is struck 
by how selective is Becker's panorama of the human condition. 
Is it simply true, as Becker says, that people are everywhere 
crushed by the fact of losing and the awareness of being "sec- 
ond-rate"? Without resorting to the uplifting proverbs of Eng- 
lish schoolchildren, may one not inquire of Becker whether 
instances of people drawing satisfaction from having done as 
well as they could are not sufficient to cast doubt on what he 
identifies as a consistent pattern in human behavior? Losers 
and also-rans have the psychic incentive to perceive the 
greater importance of effort in a contest over the message of a 
scoreboard, and this "consolation prize" can be more enduring 
than the trophies and illusions of the victors. 
The result of competition and the "diminishment" of being 
surpassed by others become important only in those contests 
played for ultimate stakes, and which represent a quest for 
some kind of perfection. This does seem to be what Becker has 
in mind when he deals with competition among people, be- 
cause he speaks in various places in his book about how people 
defeat themselves by trying to bring absolute purity and good- 
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ness into the world and about the attempt "to achieve a perfec- 
tion on earth, a visible testimonial to . . . cosmic importance" 
(168,136). It is crucial to ask whether the delusions of purity or 
perfection of a Robespierre or a Hitler, alluded to here as the 
source of evil in the world, are in any way common to human- 
ity in general. Becker nowhere provides evidence that this is 
the case. It is also critical to note how circular his argument 
has become. He introduces the fact of competition among 
people in general as evidence of an inability to cope with their 
mortality, but competition supports his point only in those 
egregious and pathological instances where the competition 
involves a neurotic quest for perfection. One may inquire 
whether this fierce competition is an effect of the denial of 
death or leads to that denial. 
This crucial point can be seen more clearly in Becker's 
description of the pursuit of unlimited acquisition as a result 
of the denial of death. He is convincing when he attributes the 
lure of money beyond one's needs to its power to establish 
distinctions among people. In this regard he confirms the 
success of John Locke and Adam Smith in holding up pos- 
sessive individualism as a goad to "the rational and the indus- 
trious" to test and proclaim their superiority. Becker is 
considerably less convincing, however, in his subsequent argu- 
ments that wealth has some efficacy in relieving the dread of 
death and achieving an ersatz immortality. He asserts that 
"money is the human mode par excellence of coolly denying 
animal boundness" by radiating its power even after one's 
death, "giving one a semblance of immortality as he lives in 
the vicarious enjoyments of his heirs that his money continues 
to buy, or in the magnificence of the art works that he commis- 
sioned, or in the statues of himself and the majesty of his own 
mausoleum" (81-82). Becker allows that in this acquisitive 
search for endurance modern man "might feel self-pity and 
bitterness about the one-dimensionality of his immortality," 
but "in matters of eternity you take what you can get" (86). 
What is remarkable about Becker's treatment of the quest 
for immortality through money is that he takes it as seriously 
as he does and does not deal with it as a pitifully empty and 
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pathological pretension. That he describes a stately mausole- 
um as "one-dimensional immortality," rather than as void in 
all dimensions, certainly belittles the significance of immor- 
tality and reveals what may be the central error in his thesis. 
Becker's uncritical description of seeking immortality 
through acquisitiveness derives from his conviction that it 
would be even more absurd to perceive the total vulnerability 
and ultimate futility of the human enterprise and not to try to 
hide from it. His attitude and perspective here, as throughout 
his work, rest on the assumption that the consciousness of 
death is intolerable. 
It is possible, however, to take a very different perspective 
on this obsession that Becker sees as only testifying to how 
desperate humans are in their denial of death. Precisely be- 
cause acquisitiveness is so bankrupt as a means of denying 
death, is it not reasonable to question whether the denial of 
death is a cause or an effect of acquisitiveness? In other words, 
are the frantic efforts at feigning permanence by a lead casket 
and stately mausoleum representative of the desperation of 
humanity in general, or of that part of humanity in mate- 
rialistic cultures whose emphasis on competition and ine- 
quality creates awesome roadblocks to coming to terms with 
the enigma of death? Becker describes the demand for heroism 
and inequality in societies as a result and manifestation of 
each person's helplessness before the dualism of life and death. 
What he fails to realize is that he limits himself to confirming 
evidence at the very beginning of his argument when he simply 
presumes that the effort of all cultures to embody "the tran- 
scendence of death in some form" and to achieve symbolic 
immortality by "self-transcendence" was necessarily doomed 
to failure (4). 
This assumption is so damaging to Becker's portrait of the 
hopelessness of a human response to death because it is pre- 
cisely the social dimension of life that seems to be central to 
any secular attempt to affirm the value of our mortal human 
existence. Robert Jay Lifton argues that throughout the histo- 
ry of both secular and religious cultures the fear of death has 
been symbolized by separation, but that experiences of con- 
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nection with other people can achieve the very symbolic im- 
mortality that Becker assumes no culture can deliver. At the 
very least Lifton reveals how Becker has neglected those hu- 
man experiences that most directly challenge his assumption 
that death totally obliterates human effort and meaning. The 
difference one's sense of connection with other people makes in 
one's perspective on death also reinforces the argument that 
Becker may be seriously mistaking causes for effects. If it is 
true that a person needs interpersonal relationships in order to 
achieve a genuine sense of self-transcendence, then Becker's 
central thesis that the necessity of the denial of death causes 
widespread inequality, unfreedom, and social catastrophe 
might properly be stood on its head. We might conclude with 
the same data Becker cites that the inequality and social insec- 
urity he portrays in highly competitive societies lead to, rather 
than stem from, the denial of death. In order to support ac- 
quisitiveness without regard to need, competitive societies 
must avoid at all costs the critical senses of proportion and of 
limits that the confrontation with human mortality provokes. 
To turn to Jacques Choron's arguments against the possibil- 
ity of reconciling human significance and death is not really to 
leave Ernest Becker's arguments, for they both see the mean- 
ing of life as undone by the impermanence of all human en- 
deavors. Just as Becker's central flaw stems from his unques- 
tioned assumptions about the solipsistic character of the quest 
for meaning, Choron's central flaw lies in the assumption that 
endurance is necessary for one's acts to have meaning. It is 
surprising how vigorously and expansively Choron applies the 
test of permanence to attempts at meaning in the face of death 
without ever considering whether life may have significance 
quite apart from the assurance of endurance. When he argues 
that neither self-fulfillment, nor moral stature, nor intellectual 
excellence "can be the ultimate meaning of life as long as it is 
not related to something enduring but remains an end in itself 
and not a means to a higher end," he offers no justification 
either for the requirement of endurance or for the necessity of 
one ultimate meaning of life.8 
With endurance as his prime criterion, Choron's search for 
Surmounting the Denial of Death 2 5 
meaning is doomed from the start precisely because human 
beings are not enduring creatures and have no way of testing 
the permanence of their mark on the world. A concern for 
endurance in perceiving the significance of life is productive of 
despair, however, not only because permanence is an unat- 
tainable goal but also because it is such a smoke screen against 
perceiving the more viable and more important ways in which 
a person's life "counts for something." Equating significance 
with permanence pushes the perspective on an assessment of 
one's life beyond one's lifetime and makes one's "immortality" 
dependent on the opinion of others. Conversely, disowning 
permanence has the momentous effect of manifesting how 
irrelevant external appearances and opinions are and how 
essential for meaning in life is one's personal assessment of the 
quality of one's life. In seeking to conquer the time dimension 
that death imposes, the search for endurance negates the ob- 
vious power every person has to affect the lives of other people, 
to reach beyond oneself, and to have an influence on the quality 
of human life that is not extinguished by one's death. 
To speak of finding the meaning of life in the social dimen- 
sion of our existence is, of course, to suggest the same response 
to and to emphasize the same oversight in both Choron's and 
Becker's case for the inevitability of denying death. It is impor- 
tant to see how these preliminary considerations reveal the 
incomplete perspective on human life that motivates Choron's 
absorption with endurance. To return briefly to his examples 
described earlier, we perceive clearly how much difference it 
makes when one dares to look at life without searching for the 
elusive security of permanence in human affairs. The linkage 
emphasized above between a concern for endurance and the 
reliance upon an external appreciation of one's deeds is at the 
heart of Choron's despair of finding meaning in even the "good 
life." He contends: "The often-heard argument that only a life 
devoted to the pursuit of pleasure and of material goods is 
rendered meaningless by death misses the point. For even the 
life spent in pursuit of goodness and beauty is so affected. It is 
true that 'changing one's life' might make dying 'easier,' but it 
does not dispose of the problem of the futility of even the good 
26 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
life, which death proclaims." Then Choron cites for support 
W.W. Dixon's conclusion that "since if the valuators perish, all 
values, truth, goodness and the rest, go with them into ever- 
lasting night, no theological or metaphysical twitterings can 
rebut the demonstrable hollowness of life, its inherent futility" 
(172). Choron and Dixon are content to draw the obvious con- 
clusion that the endurance of deeds and values as achieve- 
ments of a particular individual is dependent upon the 
endurance of mortal "valuators," but they never question, in 
the first place, why a person needs such immortality as a 
particular individual in order to have the reassurance that one's 
life "counts for something." 
Why should a person who has contributed one jot to good- 
ness and beauty in the world have to meet any test of time in 
order to feel that death does not simply eradicate the efforts of 
one's life? It is evident here how much Choron, with much 
similarity to Becker, is possessed by a "monument" theory of 
human significance. Life for them does not have significance if 
the result of one's acting and creating is not objectified and 
made permanent in order to memorialize its mortal creator. 
The emphasis in this assessment of human endeavor is com- 
pletely on the inert result of one's action, rather than the vital 
act of creating itself, and upon the reaction of external obser- 
vers-the "valuators"-rather than the satisfaction of the actor 
himself or herself. It seems only a matter of common sense, 
however, that the issue of whether a person's existence is sim- 
ply a mirage in a vast desert where death presides has to be 
weighed according to very different criteria. 
Certainly the most important point to realize about a per- 
son's search for significance in life is that the only judgment 
about significance that ultimately matters is that of the indi- 
vidual. It is curious that both Becker and Choron recognize so 
keenly how each individual's identity and equanimity are 
threatened by death but then focus their search for signifi- 
cance on the attitudes other people have about one's life and 
work. The same finality and unselectivity that make death a 
challenge to the meaning of each person's life are also what 
make it necessary for each person to be the sole arbiter of 
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meaning in his or her life. Once we realize that it is senseless to 
be concerned about impressing other people with the value 
and importance of our life, when it is we who must be con- 
vinced that death does not make our having lived fruitless and 
pointless, then the evaluation of our activities changes dramat- 
ically. 
With the chronicling or memorializing of events seen to be 
irrelevant, attention can be focused on the human actions 
themselves and the critical fact that, for the participant, the 
effort behind these actions is far more significant than their 
success or failure. While the performance of average people in 
almost any activity will be ignored by Choron's chroniclers, in 
the eyes of the actors the performance can have great signifi- 
cance if it represents what, for those people and their abilities, 
is a real accomplishment. Surely for them the only relevant 
standard of success need be whether they achieved all that 
they were capable of achieving. 
Critics may respond unappreciatively to one's "accomplish- 
ments," but it is not the critics who have to come to terms with 
this person's mortality and who have to find meaning in this 
person's life. It is only each individual's judgment that matters 
as to whether actions have extended or transcended that per- 
son's being, so that death-with its sweep of erosion-still does 
not make it a matter of inconsequence that such a person has 
ever lived. Facing death itself is probably much more a test of a 
person's most significant talents than the acclaim of any crit- 
ics. As Anatole Broyard reminds us, "in the last analysis, every 
death is ~opyrighted."~ 
Turning to the social context of the search for meaning may 
help to make this abstract point more comprehensible. As 
mentioned in the analysis of Becker's ideas, certainly the most 
important way in which people can be creators and reach 
beyond themselves is in the effect their actions have on the 
lives of other people. While Choron suggests that it is in the 
province of a very small elite to have their deeds remembered 
beyond their deaths, if he had less concern for people being 
memorialized by others he might note the obvious fact that 
there is not a person who has lived who has not had an impor- 
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tant effect on the life of another person. One of the prime 
lessons of death is that we are all dramatically affected, for 
better or worse, by the actions of others. When we consider 
how capriciously we die-at various ages, of various causes- 
we also get a glimpse of how capriciously we live and how 
much the actions of others affect both our life and death. The 
illusion of rugged individualism is undone by noting the multi- 
tude of advantages and disadvantages people have that are 
completely gratuitous and beyond their control. We can make 
critically important decisions about priorities in our lives, but 
we need to be modest about presuming totally to create our 
personal welfare and to realize that these decisions take place 
within the context of our social existence and themselves have 
a social impact. 
To recognize the necessary influence we have on others' lives 
is to perceive the vast opportunity each person has to find 
meaning in life by adding to the quality of others' lives. It is 
important to note how different is the "immortality" that 
stems from one life touching another and that which Choron 
sees as the great and futile human quest for ego permanence. 
One who brings life to others does not live on in succeeding 
generations by being remembered as a particular individual. 
Rather, the effect that a person has had upon another con- 
tinues in that other person to affect, in turn, still others so that 
the spirit or life force of a person lives on as a permanent 
contribution to the human community. Each of us alive today 
has been shaped by countless ancestors as well as by specific 
contemporaries. 
For an appreciation of the significance of this sharing of life, 
the number of people one's life affects or whether this influence 
is perceived and remembered by others are largely irrelevant 
considerations. How long one lives or the number of one's rela- 
tionships are unimportant compared to the quality of those 
relationships. The publicizing or memorializing of the effect 
people have had on others' lives is trivial, compared to the 
question of whether those people appreciate and value their 
power to affect others' lives and know that this expansion of 
life cannot be eradicated by death. 
Surmounting the Denial of Death 
How far this perspective on life and on death diverges from 
Choron is most clearly seen when he considers human love in 
the search for a meaning of life. "Biologically speaking," he 
allows, "love appears indeed as the only means, if not to defeat 
death, at least to limit its power; and to have progeny is 
possibly the only meaning of life.""' It is so obvious here how 
much his equation of meaning with some form of physical 
endurance obscures from him the simple fact that a love rela- 
tionship, with all its pain and vulnerability, creates new life in 
the lovers, regardless of whether it issues in progeny, and this 
is an event that death can bring to a close but cannot eradicate. 
The same lack of vision is found in Choron's final argument 
that we cannot find the meaning of life in such causes as 
"striving to eliminate suffering and injustice and preserve 
peace," because "although we can devote our life to 'human- 
ity,' humanity itself is perishable" (174-75). In Robert Jay Lift- 
on, Choron has impressive company in this observation, but 
the point nevertheless only serves to emphasize how pervasive 
is the confusion of "legacy" and "meaning." 
It is true that the continuation of human life cannot be taken 
for granted. Some scientists and doomsday theorists assert 
that our planet is statistically overdue for a collision with a 
supernova that could put an end to all forms of life. But this 
threat of annihilation need not, as Choron implies, deprive of 
their meaning actions aimed at improving the lot of humanity; 
such actions confirm in the present that people can reach 
beyond themselves and change the world as they find it. If they 
have no assurance that this world will exist indefinitely, they 
do know that they have left a mark on the human effort to treat 
people as ends rather than means, and this act of self-transcen- 
dence is a fact regardless of the eventual fate of this planet. 
Yeager Hudson grasps this point clearly: "A finite life is a unit. 
When it is finished, its quality is fixed for all times. It will 
always be a fact that I lived, even if no one remembers this fact. 
I may, by appropriate effort, constitute it a fact that I lived 
nobly. If I do, what does it matter that I live no more and that no 
one remembers? What matters is that while I live, I live well. 
And that really does matter."l 
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Only an insistence on the primacy of outside valuators in 
perceiving human significance would lead one to minimize 
the assurance people can find in acts of genuine sharing with 
others that their lives "count" and have had an impact on the 
human effort, even if the end of that effort is never achieved. 
The purpose of this critique has not been to suggest that 
facing death is easy. Precisely because confronting death is not 
easy under any circumstance and takes remarkable struggle 
and courage, I have argued that the foremost error in Becker 
and Choron is the failure to see both living and dying in the 
social context. Becker in particular misses the connection 
between the need to deny death, which he ascribes to all 
people, and the fact that the terrified people he describes are 
trapped in a competitive, atomistic existence. Becker's fateful 
assumption is that the fear of death leads to aggression and 
competition among people, and he never considers that the 
causal relationship may be the reverse, that the desperate 
death-denying behavior he describes might be altered by a 
sense of connection and significance to other people that can 
be provided by genuinely supportive relationships. Similarly, 
Choron's obsession with permanence as a prime criterion in 
finding the meaning of life shows a lack of appreciation for the 
richness that experiencing the mutual support of mutually 
vulnerable people can bring to life. 
If it does nothing more, an analysis of the views of those who 
see the denial of death as a necessity confirms the importance 
of arguments about the social ramifications of the con- 
sciousness of death. We can now see that social consciousness 
and death consciousness are not just tangentially related but 
are significantly dependent upon each other. To face death 
honestly is to perceive not only one's vulnerability but one's 
identity and equality with others and one's need for connec- 
tion in the broader human community. To yoke one's ego and 
still value the contribution one can make to enrich others' 
lives, which the sense of community provides, is to have the 
support to face death knowing that one's life has counted for 
something. Given the emptiness of the individualistic exist- 
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ence eloquently described by Becker, we might see death not as 
something to be denied but as a felix culpa in the human 
condition that prods people to discover the satisfaction of 
living in harmony with nature and their fellow mortals. 
Yet this argument against the denial of death and for finding 
connection with humanity in general is most gravely tested 
today by the threat of nuclear war, which presents new and 
unavoidable reasons for denying death. The next chapter ex- 
amines this issue. 
3. The Denial of Death 
in the Nuclear Era 
Believing what we don't believe does not exhilarate. 
-Emily Dickinson 
The thinker who most insightfully and eloquently describes 
the avenues by which culture supports a person in accepting 
death paradoxically also describes a scenario in which all at- 
tempts to find significance in life can be undone by expanding 
nuclearism. Robert Jay Lifton is one of the most respected and 
authoritative thinkers now analyzing attitudes about death 
and the ways in which various cultures deal with human 
mortality. Lifton describes modes of symbolic immortality by 
which individuals find connection beyond their biological 
mortality. He develops in a score of books a perspective on 
death and life that persuasively counters the view that death 
condemns secular people to the sullen grasp of absurdity. But 
as one of the chief chroniclers of the physical and psychologi- 
cal devastation of Hiroshima and the threatening holocaust of 
the nuclear arms race, Lifton sees the threat of death from 
nuclearism as endangering the sense of connection and sym- 
bolic immortality that provides reassurance and meaning for 
each person in the face of "plain old death." 
The progression of Lifton's arguments has set him and the 
rest of us up for a fall. He first provides moving perspectives of 
hope and equanimity in the face of death, but then he demon- 
strates how vulnerable these perspectives are to the very exist- 
ence of nuclear weapons. Although it is Lifton's hope in his 
recent book with Richard Falk, Indefensible Weapons, that this 
vulnerability to absurdity will move people throughout the 
world to reject nuclearism, we appear to be back at square one 
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with the absurdity of death rehabilitated by the quest for 
weapons of ultimate destruction. In the face of such total 
destruction, the average citizen experiences a psychic numb- 
ness that mutes protest and silences the demand for disarma- 
ment. Since we might hope that coming to terms with death 
not only would be abetted by the nuclear peril but could 
provide the incentive and vision for eventually freeing our- 
selves from that peril, it is important to examine Lifton's 
arguments in detail. In the end, in spite of huge debts to him 
for innumerable insights, I will suggest that an incomplete- 
ness in his modes of symbolic immortality limits our view of 
how meaning perseveres in the midst of nuclear threat and of 
how "ordinary death" can teach us to renounce nuclear death. 
More effectively than any other writer on the subject, Lifton 
counters Freud's famous position on death and immortality 
that has encouraged so many to assume that the denial of 
death is inevitable. Freud argued: "It is indeed impossible to 
imagine our own death: and whenever we attempt to do so we 
can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators. 
Hence the psychoanalytic school could venture on the asser- 
tion that at bottom no one believes his own death, or, to put the 
same thing in another way, that in the unconscious every one of 
us is convinced of his own immortality."' 
As opposed to Freud's rationalist rejection of all images of 
immortality as nothing but the denial of annihilation, Lifton 
cites Jung's view that death's annihilation is less significant 
than the enriching value and persistence of symbolism of life 
after death. Lifton argues that Freud too quickly dismisses the 
symbolic significance of the universal imagery of immortality 
and that Jung fails to distinguish between the symbolic truth 
of the imagery and the literal idea of an afterlife. Charting a 
third position, Lifton accepts both Freud's insistence on con- 
fronting death as the annihilation of the self and Jung's in- 
sistence on the psychological importance of mythic imagery of 
immortality. Lifton focuses on the symbolizing process around 
death and immortality "as the individual's experience of par- 
ticipation in some form of collective life-continuity." A sense of 
immortality reflects "a compelling and universal inner quest 
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for continuous symbolic relationship to what has gone before 
and what will continue after our finite individual lives." Ac- 
cording to Lifton, "that quest is central to the human project, 
to man as cultural animal and to his creation of culture and 
history. The struggle toward, or experience of, a sense of im- 
mortality is in itself neither compensatory nor 'irrational,' but 
an appropriate symbolization of our biological and historical 
connectedness" (17). For him, then, death does bring about 
biological and psychic annihilation, but "life includes sym- 
bolic perceptions of connections that precede and outlast that 
annihilation" (18). 
Lifton sees this sense of immortality expressed in five gener- 
al modes: the biological, the theological, the creative, the 
natural, and the experiential transcendental. The biological 
mode of immortality is epitomized by family continuity, living 
on through one's children and their children, with images of an 
unending chain of biological attachment. He describes this as 
the most fundamental and universal of all modes. The mys- 
tique of filial piety in Confucianism and the role of the Roman 
paterfamilias, who was both family monarch and priest of the 
family ancestor cult, are classic expressions of this mode. This 
mode is also extended outward from the family to tribe, organ- 
ization, and nation. Lifton sees the restless search for life on 
other planets partially as a struggle for the extension of this 
mode. An encompassing vision of biosocial immortality, he 
says, "would provide each individual anticipating death with 
the image: I live on in humankind" (20). 
The theological or religious mode of symbolic immortality 
need not rely on a literal vision of immortal soul or afterlife. 
The common thread in all great religions, Lifton argues, is the 
spiritual quest and realization of the hero-founder that enable 
that person to confront and transcend death and to provide an 
example for generations of believers to do the same: "The lives 
of Buddha, Moses, Christ, and Mohammed came to encompass 
various combinations of spirituality, revelation, and ultimate 
ethical principles that could, for themselves and their fol- 
lowers, divest death of its 'sting' of annihilation. The basic 
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spiritual principle, with or without a concept of afterlife or 
immortal soul, is the ancient mythological theme of death and 
rebirth. One is offered the opportunity to be reborn into a 
timeless realm of ultimate, death-transcending truths" (20). 
The key to the theological mode is a sense of spiritual power 
derived from "a more than natural force" that can triumph 
over death. 
Lifton's third mode of symbolic immortality is the creative 
"whether through great works of art, literature, or science, or 
through more humble influences on people around us" (21). An 
example of creative immortality is Malraux's perception that 
the artist participates in "the continuity of artistic creation" 
and that "art escapes death." Also, each scientific investigator 
becomes part of an effort larger than himself, limitless in its 
past and future continuity. Lifton relates the scientific enter- 
prise and the previous mode by observing that the great histor- 
ical transition from religion to science refers to a major shift in 
the imagery through which large numbers of people in general 
experienced the continuity of human existence. "Our psycho- 
logical relationship to each of these world views lies not so 
much in the virtues of the one or the other as in the extent to 
which the vitality of either gives way to a dogmatic literalism 
that limits feeling and suppresses imagination" (22). 
At a more concrete level of human intercourse, any kind of 
service or care can enter into this creative mode of continuity. 
Lifton explains: "Physicians and psychotherapists, for in- 
stance, associate their therapeutic efforts with beneficent in- 
fluences that carry forward indefinitely in the lives of patients 
and clients and their children or posterity. . . . These issues are 
germane to more humble everyday offerings of nurturing or 
even kindness in relationships of love, friendship, and at times 
even anonymous encounter. Indeed any form of acting upon 
others contains important perceptions of timeless conse- 
quences" (22). 
The fourth mode of symbolic immortality is that associated 
with nature itself, the perception that the natural environment 
about us, limitless in space and time, will endure. Lifton de- 
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scribes the importance to the survivors of Hiroshima of the 
ancient saying, "The state may collapse but the mountains and 
rivers remain." He cites as other examples of this mode the 
ideology of nineteenth-century European romanticism, the 
American cult of the "great outdoors," and the traditional 
Anglo-Saxon preoccupations with vigorously confronting the 
infinite dimensions of nature and with "cultivating one's gar- 
den." Then he notes that as "our perceptions of nature 
change-to include outer space, the moon, other planets-we 
continue to seek in those perceptions an ultimate aspect of our 
existence" (23). 
Lifton describes the fifth mode of symbolized immortality, 
that of experiential transcendence, as of a different order from 
the others. This mode depends entirely upon a psychic state 
that is so intense and all-encompassing that time and death 
disappear. Associated with expanded consciousness from ex- 
periences such as mysticism, this state can also occur in song, 
dance, battle, sexual love, childbirth, athletic effort, mechan- 
ical flight, or in the contemplation of artistic beauty or intel- 
lectual elegance. Ecstatic transcendence is characterized by a 
sense of extraordinary psychic unity, perceptual intensity, inef- 
fable illumination, and insight. It overcomes the confusions 
associated with the passage of time and blends all in transtem- 
poral harmony. 
Lifton asserts that the special state of experiential transcen- 
dence is the indicator of the other four modes of symbolic im- 
mortality-"wildly or gently, one must psychologically travel 
outside oneself in order to fuel one's participation in the larger 
human processw2 
The five modes of symbolic immortality that provide a 
sense of connection for people and power over extinction are 
momentously threatened, in Lifton's view, by the specter of 
nuclear warfare. Lifton is by no means the first to see the 
undoing of human meaning and significance by the threat of 
nuclear arms. Hans Morgenthau, for instance, in an essay on 
"Death in the Nuclear Age" argues: "A secular age, which has 
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lost faith in individual immortality in another world and is 
aware of the impending doom of the world through which it 
tries to perpetuate itself here and now, is left without a remedy. 
Once it has become aware of its condition, it must despair. It is 
the saving grace of our age that it has not become aware of its 
condition."3 Lifton, however, has probably commented more 
extensively than any other writer on the dissolution of mean- 
ing posed by the nuclear threat. In a chapter ominously titled 
"A Break in the Human Chain," he sees the imagery of extinc- 
tion undoing the imagery of connection most obviously in its 
effect on the biological mode. Our sense of radical futureless- 
ness dispels visions of living on in one's descendents. "We are 
in doubt about the future of any group-of one's family, geo- 
graphical or ethnic confreres, people or nation. The image is 
that of human history and human culture simply terminat- 
ing.'I4 
Lifton believes the image of biological severance already 
has vast ramifications. Losing our future, we question our 
past. Generational relationships, especially between parent 
and child, are undermined as both parent and child doubt the 
capability of providing security. With nuclear subversion of 
parental authority, "the ambivalence from both sides, always 
present in any case, can be expected to intensify and perhaps 
subvert feelings of love" (68). 
Concerning the nuclear impact on the theological mode, 
Lifton draws on experience with Hiroshima survivors and 
relates that the magnitude of the experience seemed to defy the 
religious precepts-Buddhist, Shinto, Christian-that were 
available to the victims. Considering fundamentalist religious 
revival as compensatory and escapist, he sees religion "faced 
with the perhaps irresolvable contradiction of promising spir- 
itual continuity beyond individual death in an imagined world 
with no one (or virtually no one) among the biologically liv- 
ing." In this contradiction, Lifton finds the essence of the 
spiritual corrosion bound up with the existence of nuclear 
weapons. "Once more the weapons tarnish and taint; spir- 
itually they destroy and kill, even without being used" (71). 
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Lifton then argues that the mode of work and works is even 
more affected by nuclear threat. He acknowledges that sen- 
sitive human beings have always viewed man's works as essen- 
tially ephemeral, but the new ephemeralism envisions the 
destruction of everything, the end of human culture. "What we 
anticipate is on the order of a reversal of the evolutionary 
process-a loss of our status as the only cultural animal. We 
sense that survivors, should they exist, will be, by accepted 
evolutionary criteria, no longer human" (71). 
In like fashion, hopes that our lives will be immortalized in 
the unending and undaunted stream of life sustained by nature 
are also vulnerable to the bomb. Mao Tse-tung's lyricism 
about "nature continuing" after hydrogen bomb tests over the 
Bikini Islands in 1953 has proved to be unfounded. And it is 
doubtful that nature, even in the long run, would survive the 
full onslaught of nuclear war. The impact of this realization 
ought to be devastating: "Destroying most or all of human life 
is, to say the least, an extreme transgression. But to destroy 
nature itself in the process is a still further transgression 
around which we experience a quality of dread, hidden guilt, 
and nothingness-these emotions frequently amorphous and 
beyond our grasp, but on the order of ultimately deadly sin" 
(76). 
The effect of imagery of extinction on the fifth mode, that of 
the experience of transcendence, is of a different order. The 
experience of this mode is sought in times of crisis and vul- 
nerability as an alternative to extinction. In the shadows, 
however, Lifton sees the irredeemable image of the nuclear 
explosion as the ultimate "high state." The sense of awe and 
transcendent power of bomb tests suggest that, for some, the 
bomb represents an enticement to experience the inexperien- 
ceable. This could mean "overcoming one's imagery of extinc- 
tion and radical futurelessness by means of what may be 
perceived as the only form of transcendence worthy of the age, 
that provided by the weapon itself" (77). Lifton sees this mode 
as both threatened and threatening, an example of how a need 
"created, or at least intensified, by imagery of extinction can in 
turn make that actual process of extinction more likely." He 
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sums up the implications of being "meaninglessly doomed" 
from the various impairments to human continuity as follows: 
It would be psychologically naive to dismiss these impairments as 
trivial or to assume that they do not affect character formation or the 
emerging sense of self. From early life, relationships between self and 
world take on a fundamental insecurity, within a context of confusion 
around the threat of death (including the already-mentioned merging 
of 'plain old death' with grotesque, absurd death). Every attitude and 
human tie becomes colored by a constellation of doom, which in- 
cludes, in varying degrees, fear, expectation, and embrace of that fate. 
There is widespread resort to psychological maneuvers designed to 
diminish feeling, but underneath that numbing are struggles with 
anger and rage along with every other kind of suppressed passion. 
Deep confusion and absence of meaning bedevil both one's emerging 
self-definition and one's larger aspirations toward human connec- 
tion. [78] 
As compelling as Lifton's description of the impact of nu- 
clearism is in its perceptive and sweeping explanation of dis- 
ruptions in areas from art to marriage, there are holes in his 
description that suggest a basic flaw in his categories. First of 
all, it is obvious that the threat of nuclear termination of life 
debilitates the five modes of immortality in markedly dif- 
ferent degrees. Certainly a sense of connection built on biolog- 
ical succession would be obliterated by nuclear devastation, 
and the very danger of such an outcome fatally impairs in the 
present the pursuit of significance and immortality on that 
basis. Similarly, Lifton is convincing in describing the vul- 
nerability of hopes for continuation and connection based 
primarily on nature or on created works. One's relationship to 
either of these modes is only as secure as the thread of security 
against nuclear devastation. It is not surprising that hopes for 
connection through these modes would be seriously strained 
in a time of tense international relations and would lead to 
psychological dislocation and despair. 
Lifton is less convincing, however, in showing the impair- 
ment of the theological and experiential transcendental 
modes. He discourses brilliantly on sources of the death-of- 
God theology and the ironic temptation of a "nuclear high," 
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but Lifton does not succeed in showing how the threat of 
nuclear destruction undermines these modes. He asserts that 
the promise of spiritual continuity beyond individual death in 
an imagined world where no one remains among the biolog- 
ically living contains an "irresolvable contradiction." But why 
are the biologically living a prerequisite for spiritual con- 
tinuity, especially for those religions that have long anticipated 
a cataclysmic end to earthly existence? The ethereal existence 
they celebrate may not be attractive to Lifton or many of the 
rest of us, but the mode of continuity they pursue does not 
seem to be contradicted or even impaired by the threat of 
nuclear devastation. As for experiential transcendence, Lifton 
acknowledges that, with its stress on connection in an ecstatic 
moment, this mode has only been popularized by the threat of 
nuclearism. 
Does this mean that these modes of immortality provide a 
refuge from the despair and absurdity associated with the 
threatened destruction of the world? Not necessarily, for each 
of these modes, as Lifton describes them, has limitations. The 
theological mode has the flexibility of encompassing positions 
that do and do not espouse an afterlife, but depends upon a 
sense of spiritual power derived from a "more than natural 
force" that can triumph over death. This mode receives its 
protection of meaning against the destruction of the human 
world from a faith in the supernatural. Unfortunately, this 
mode is therefore limited to those people of the requisite faith 
or delusion, depending on one's point of view, and is not gener- 
ally available to all people, which would seem to be a require- 
ment for a viable mode of connection in a secular age. 
The experiential transcendental mode is, by its nature, tran- 
sitory and affords deliverance from the sense of separation and 
limitation for only a brief period. It is this transitory quality 
that underlies the nuclear danger Lifton sees in this mode. 
Some people might find in a nuclear high the same attraction 
that some lovers see in joint suicide: to eternalize the moment 
and put an end to the inevitable descent that accompanies 
every ecstasy. 
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The ambiguities in Lifton's treatment of these two modes 
should prompt us to reconsider the adequacy of all of his 
modes of immortality in expressing human continuity. The 
five modes are useful in describing various ways in which 
people seek to reach beyond themselves, but they tend to 
compartmentalize experiences that may be essentially related 
to each other and may together provide the motivation and 
sustenance to labor to remove the causes of nuclear war, even 
while the threat of that war hangs ominously over our heads. 
As argued in the critique of Becker and Choron, the key to a 
sense of human continuity in the face of both individual death 
and nuclear.catastrophe is the opportunity every person has to 
contribute to the lives of others. Lifton does not ignore this 
opportunity, but he treats it as just one example of ways of 
connecting in the creative mode. More important, he appears 
to ignore this vital activity completely when he assesses the 
impairment of the creative mode by the threat of nuclear 
destruction. His treatment implies that personal interaction is 
vulnerable to Armageddon in the same ways as other creative 
artifacts: if the result of one's creative efforts is threatened 
with destruction, one's reflection in that result can be shat- 
tered and the sense of continuity and connection broken. 
.Lifton is not wrong in seeing human relationships as cre- 
ative, but the most significant error in his whole treatment of 
the mode of connection is not to see how the effect we have on 
others' lives is related to all of the modes, particularly that of 
experiential transcendence. He does not appear to see that this 
is the most important image of human continuity, an image 
that is not defeated by the threat of nuclear destruction, and an 
image that is the central hope of bringing an end to nu- 
clearism. 
A concern for sharing life with others relates to the biolog- 
ical mode in its vision of a human family with indirect but real 
biological and psychological linkages. This same vision finds 
connections with nature the sustainer of all people. This vision 
is not theological as such and is not dependent on the super- 
natural, but it can be considered a spiritual quest "to confront 
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and transcend death" and celebrate rebirth. Finally, the image 
of immortality afforded by the effect one has on others' lives 
relates importantly to the mode of experiential transcendence. 
The experience of sharing life seldom has the peak intensity or 
time-stopping oceanic feeling that Lifton attributes to this 
mode, yet there is clearly an empowering sense in thepresent of 
transcending the limits of ego and individual mortality. 
The experience of creating and transcending that can come 
in times of close connection with other people points up the 
key flaw in Lifton's compartmentalized and rather one-dimen- 
sional modes of continuity. He sees the biological, theological, 
creative, and natural modes as providing only a linear con- 
tinuity that reaches into and is dependent upon and vulnera- 
ble to the future. It is not clear why Lifton views only the mode 
of experiential transcendence as providing an assurance of 
connection without regard to the future, but this conclusion 
dramatically limits his perspective on the viability of some of 
the symbols of continuity he describes and their role in invig- 
orating the opposition to nuclearism. 
Every person alive or who has ever lived has had an impact, 
for better or worse, on someone else's life. Human society and 
culture are products of millennia of interpersonal exchange 
and development. Without being presumptuous about the sig- 
nificance of one person's impact upon another's life, an indi- 
vidual can know that he or she has touched another's life, and 
the sense of mutual joy, or awe, or expansiveness from that 
experience is a powerful reassurance that one's life is not 
simply an indifferent event in an absurd universe. 
That our actions affect others is not a choice but a given. To 
attempt to make that impact as mutually beneficial as possi- 
ble is, as Lifton acknowledges, to be creative, but the product 
of that creativity is not just an improvement in another per- 
son's life but an expansion and improvement in our own. It is 
not hubris to recognize and value how needy human beings are 
of each other and how much we enrich each other's lives. In 
experiencing this interpersonal connection and creativity, we 
are not dependent upon the future in order to feel that our lives 
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are worthwhile and have made a difference in the world. Even 
perceiving the possibility of our world being obliterated in 
spite of our best efforts, the value and significance of our lives 
would still be affirmed. 
This is not to suggest that we can ever be indifferent to the 
future. Obviously the modes of connection Lifton describes do 
extend into the future and do exist in the present. I have tried to 
argue that the value of life is not held hostage by the future. 
Nevertheless, anyone who values human connection has an 
enormous stake in the future and must envision the threats of 
nuclearism to the human future as unspeakable crimes. This 
commitment to the future stems from a commitment to the 
present and a connection to all human beings, living, dead, 
and as yet unborn. This attitude toward the future and toward 
nuclearism is still undeveloped in the populace at large, yet it 
poses a hopeful alternative to the dour conclusion that nu- 
clearism condemns one's life, and everyone else's, to total 
absurdity. 
The best evidence of the possibilities of the more helpful 
response to nuclearism comes in Lifton's analysis in Indefensi- 
bb  Weapons, but it comes in the chapter after his treatment of 
the impairment of the modes of connection. He earlier de- 
scribes at length the frozen numbness that results from the 
impairment of the modes of immortality and that keeps us 
from protesting the mad war games and war plans of our 
leaders. But he also glimpses, near the end of his analysis, the 
burgeoning response to nuclearism that stems from the capac- 
ity to "imagine the real" and to "join with others in moving 
from shame and helplessness to responsibility" (120). Lifton's 
analysis of the possibilities of anti-nuclearism is made with 
striking insights and perception. Only the origins of that move- 
ment are somewhat unclear for him, but those origins, I be- 
lieve, lie in the embers of the modes of symbolic immortality 
that have more life than he realizes. 
This discussion has begun the exploration of ways to come 
to grips with our mortality, but its focus so far has been on 
refuting arguments that the denial of death is either natural or 
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necessary. Only when this denial is seen as not inevitable is 
there any point in exploring the possible political results of a 
greater acceptance of mortality. But it is one thing to reject the 
necessity of the denial of death and quite another to find ways 
actually to accept, and even affirm, what seems to so many an 
absurd flaw in the human condition. The question now be- 
comes how can all people, whether religious or not, accept 
death and contradict the portrait of life as absurd? 
4. Accepting Death 
The Benefits of Human 
Vulnerability 
The dark background which death supplies brings out 
the tender colors of life in all their fullness. 
-Santayana 
Writings about "accepting death" are often religious tracts or 
pieces of quiet stoicism with counsels on avoiding pain and the 
absorption in life that sets one up for grief. This chapter pur- 
ports to be neither. In exploring the ways that we can accept 
our mortality, I shall not rely on supernatural beliefs since they 
are not shared by most of humanity, nor ignore the suffering 
that is a frequent companion of death, a part of every life. 
We must acknowledge that it is with substantial provoca- 
tion that most people flee the subject of death. A glance at any 
daily newspaper reacquaints us with the floods, the accidents, 
the murders, and acts of human savagery that seem to belittle 
life. Accounts of human violence are the most unsettling be- 
cause such violence seems to mock fairness, decency, and the 
fragile concepts we rely on to perceive life as whole, depend- 
able, meaningful. On the large scale of violence are the ac- 
counts of one country and another sending their bright-eyed 
young men off to die for this or that cause whose shining 
nobility seems to a distant reader nothing but a ploy of death's 
agents. To read of a commercial airliner with over four hun- 
dred peaceable people sent to the bottom of the Irish Sea to 
make a terrorist's point is to feel the thinness of the line 
between life and death and how death is ever ready to undo any 
expectations about "normalcy" in life. 
On the smaller scale, the local level, a glance at obituary 
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pages does nothing to lessen death's image as the capricious 
intruder and conveyor of anxiety, suffering, and grief. The 
pictures and stories give brief sketches of lives that, despite 
being disparate in age, status, race, and ethnic origins, all have 
traces of innocence and earnestness undeserving of death's 
rebuke and separation. We instinctively seek differences in 
these faces and biographies that separate them from us and 
our loved ones, that make their accidents or illnesses more 
appropriate for them than for us. But deep down, like Tolstoy's 
Ivan Ilyitch, we know that these stories will sooner or later 
touch us closely, and we will relate more personally to the 
plight of the relatives who place those memorial notices at the 
bottom of the obituary page-melancholy poems, plaintive, 
turgid, and unconsoling. 
Our only recourse sometimes seems to be in playing the 
percentages-we can put off worrying about death until old 
age, because the really scary things that we read about in the 
newspapers happen only to a few unfortunate people. Chances 
are our lives will be perfectly normal and, for a long time, 
unperturbed by death's icy hand. But the quickened heartbeat 
at a midnight telephone ring shatters our reliance on the 
percentages. And try as we may to separate ourselves and our 
families from those unfortunate people to whom dreadful 
things happen, try as we may to find differences between us 
and them that could keep us from identifying with them and 
could assure us that suffering and early death are somehow 
more appropriate in their cases, we can't quite pull it off. For 
how can we not identify with the victim of the drunk driver, or 
the child who has disappeared, or the vibrant, "normal" per- 
son in whom cancer cells suddenly start multiplying? The 
patients in the children's hospital have personalities and po- 
tentials and agonies that are universal; they could be any- 
body's children. And if these awful things don't happen to us- 
if a child that is the light of our lives is not snatched away-we 
yet live with the knowledge that these things could happen, 
and thus we live with the knowledge of how exposed we are. 
With this reminder of the formidable challenge before us in 
coming to terms with death and human vulnerability in gener- 
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al, let us consider how people can approach an acceptance of 
their mortality. In the process of making the point that human- 
ity is not locked into a death-denying posture, either by human 
nature or the awesome threat of nuclearism, we have consid- 
ered ways in which people could affirm life in spite of death 
and are sometimes aided by the reality of death. In enlarging 
upon those earlier arguments, I challenge religious assertions 
that death can be tolerated only as a gateway to an afterlife, 
and I seek to make the affirmation of mortal life stand on its 
own feet. Nevertheless, I also argue that these perspectives on 
death are not anti-religious and are compatible with many 
theological positions that do not simply use the fear of death as 
a trump card. 
In trying to come to terms with our mortality, we might first 
consider that our species could not survive without death. As 
humanity is accustomed to taking its obvious blessings for 
granted, perhaps it also takes its seeming curses for granted 
and misses the paradox of how much death contributes to life. 
One important way of accommodating ourselves to the fact of 
death is to imagine the fulfillment of our fantasy of immunity 
to death. If we were not to become quickly enmeshed in a stag- 
gering population explosion and a static gerontocracy we 
would have to fantasize as well about an end to aging and to 
reproduction. With no reproduction, we would have no genetic 
change or renewal and, thus, would have to be satisfied with 
humanity's current level of development and an end to the 
dynamism in nature that spurs civilizational change. Would 
avoiding the vulnerability, suffering, and grief surrounding 
death be worth the cost of losing the challenge and joy of 
creating new life and experiencing growth in ourselves and 
others? 
Talcott Parsons, Renee Fox, and Victor Lidy argue that 
death is an "important mechanism enhancing the adaptive 
flexibility of the species through the sacrifice of individuals; 
i.e., it makes certain that the bearers of newly emergent genet- 
ic patterns will rapidly succeed the bearers of older ones." 
Death is critically important, they continue, for supporting 
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genetic change: "We may regard death as a major contributor 
to the evolutionary enhancement of life, and thereby it be- 
comes a significant part of the aggregate 'gift of life' that all 
particular lives should end in death. That is why it cannot be a 
rational pursuit of modern medicine to try to end or even 
minimize the inevitable aspect of death."' 
Psychiatrist Jordan M. Scher argues that "death provides a 
liberation of life stuff, permitting the renaissance and re- 
juvenation of the race." He finds that the phrase "The king is 
dead, long live the king" is an "ancient formula to represent 
rebirth through death." John Donne's famous admonition "Do 
not ask for whom the bell tolls, it tolls for thee" means, 
according to Scher, "not simply that a part of you has died in 
the dying of others, but more importantly that a part has come 
into life or greater life through death." Similarly, Leon R. Kass, 
physician and professor of bioethics, points out that "mor- 
tality, like taxation, is both certain and indispensable for the 
common good, and the common good is, needless to say, a good 
from which each individual benefits." Another physician, 
Robert S. Morison, supports this observation by noting that "if 
Ponce de Leon and his colleagues had ever found the Fountain 
of Eternal Youth, it would have soon shown itself a pool of 
stagnation." To rage with Dylan Thomas at the injustice of 
death, Morison argues, "is to rage at the very process which 
made one a human being in the first p l a ~ e . " ~  
It is obvious, however, that the benefit of death for society or 
for the progress of civilization is hardly adequate to convince 
the individual who awakens at night with a premonition of 
nothingness that the fact of death can not only be acknowl- 
edged without illusions but even affirmed. After all, it is com- 
monly asserted that plagues and wars and natural disasters 
serve a positive function for the survival and renewal of the 
species, but individuals experience these "helpful" events only 
as bitter catastrophes. The key to the individual's acceptance 
of death is a series of new perspectives on mortality. These new 
perspectives would emphasize the importance of death to a 
person's life in promoting honesty, a release from egoism, and 
an appreciation of the value of limits. 
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Just as society could not survive without death, the same 
paradox applies to the individual. We are so accustomed to 
lamenting and disdaining our curse of mortality that we sel- 
dom stop to imagine what our existence would be like, were we 
granted our unreflective wish never to die. We are instinctively 
enthralled by the idea of life without death, for we would be 
spared grief and anxiety at the loss of loved ones and the 
annihilation of creative endeavors. We seek surcease from the 
intimation of extinction, of passing from this world like an 
illusion, of its making no difference eventually to anyone that 
we ever lived. As Ernest Becker has described it, we seek relief 
from the terrifying dualism of being intelligent, emotional, 
productive creatures destined to obliteration. We know what 
we don't like about our mortality, but we seldom consider 
whether we might dislike immortality even more. 
The very boon that the escape from death represents is also 
its torment, and this has a fearsome aspect of a higher order 
than human mortality. When we bring ourselves to think of not 
just escaping death but living into the eternal future, we quick- 
ly sense how alien such an existence would be. We cannot flesh 
out this fantasy, for it is not human, it has no shape or propor- 
tions, indeed it appears more like a nightmare of a bliss that is 
limitless, numbing, boring. The striking irony in comparing 
these two types of existence is that it is the very limitedness of 
our existence that makes life imaginable and precious. Death 
stamps our being as limited, fragile, and vulnerable, but the 
sense of limits that death conveys to us is what gives us a sense 
of proportion and a sense of priorities. Unlimited life, we may 
intuit, would inevitably render us callous and indifferent 
about both time and people. Seasons would come and go 
unremarked upon. The pull to take people and life in general 
for granted would be irresistible. If we took seriously the 
prospect of immortality (of the untransfigured variety at 
least), we would begin to see death as an appropriate part of 
human existence that gives it form and meaning, rather than 
as a cruel and absurd joke that deprives existence of all mean- 
ing. To realize that death unmistakably terminates our lives is 
also to realize that death frames our lives. In having only a 
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limited number of years and days, we are goaded to establish 
priorities about what is truly important to us. 
Socrates thought that the key difference between humans 
and other animals is the awareness of mortality because that 
awareness is an inducement to live an examined life. In his 
Penstes, Pascal traces nobility in humans to the fact that "they 
know that they die." Philosopher Peter Koestenbaum expres- 
ses this fact with a stark revision of Descartes's cogito: "I die 
therefore I am." Koestenbaum sees mortality as the essential 
confirmation of life and consciousness: "Understanding the 
meaning of death is the beginning of all philosophical wis- 
dom ."3 
It is true that legions of people, with powerful encourage- 
ment from a consumer-oriented society, resist the goad to set 
priorities and to examine life. But it is, nevertheless, probably 
an essential ingredient of an appreciation of life that one make 
a firm determination as to what is important and valuable to 
oneself. As Koestenbaum puts it: "Once he has recognized 
death, the individual is on the way to becoming decisive. . . . By 
remembering death, man concentrates on essentials" (11). 
Psychiatrist Victor Frankel considers the claim that death 
decreases the meaningfulness of life, and he responds: 
What would our lives be like if they were not finite in time, but 
infinite? If we were immortal, we could legitimately postpone every 
action forever. It would be of no consequence whether or not we did a 
thing now; every act might just as well be done tomorrow or the day 
after or a year from now or ten years from hence. But in the face of 
death as absolute finis to our future and boundary to our possibilities, 
we are under the imperative of utilizing our lifetimes to the utmost, 
not letting the singular opportunities-whose finite sum constitutes 
the whole of l i f epass  by unused.4 
Novelist John Fowles argues that one needs death as a fact of 
life in order to have pleasure as well as significance in life: 
"The function of death is to put tension into life; and the more 
we increase the length and the security of individual existence 
then the more tension we remove from it. All our pleasurable 
experiences contain a faint yet terrible element of the con- 
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demned man's last breakfast, an echo of the intensity of feeling 
of the poet who knows he is going to die, of the young soldier 
going doomed into battle."5 
Similarly, the philosopher Yaeger Hudson reacts to the 
yearning for an everlasting life with the conviction that such a 
life "could not possibly have any meaning or significance, for it 
would consist of an infinite number of meaningless moments 
or years or millennia." He argues that a life with no end would 
be no more satisfactory than a novel or play that has no end. 
"Death is the curtain on the play, the frame on the picture." Art 
that is completely continuous with its surroundings, with no 
frame to give it a definite, limited content, we recognize, he 
says, as the epitome of the trivial. "It is only finite life, life lived 
within a definitely limited span of years that can have signifi- 
cance. For in the life of a finite person there is urgency to live 
well, there are moments which are crucial, there is reason to 
act decisively and seize opportunities which will never return. 
In a life of limited duration every moment is precious, and 
there is real point in attempting to live it to the 
Hudson also calls our attention to the punishment meted 
out by the gods to Sisyphus of having to push a large boulder 
up a steep hill only to see it roll down again and having to push 
the stone up again and again. Hudson argues that what is most 
terrifying about Sisyphus's fate is that he can't die-his absurd 
ordeal must go on forever. The same may be said of the plight of 
Sartre's characters in No Exit. 
One can find a good illustration of how realizing life's limits 
leads to a deeper appreciation of life in the remarkable testi- 
mony of many people with terminal illness. The late Orville 
Kelley toured campuses in the last year of his life while his 
cancer was in remission, relating how special each sunrise was 
to him and how much the quality of his life had deepened. He 
pleaded with the members of his audience to remember that 
they were all terminal and to avoid the entrapment of a rat race 
that fosters the denial of death and the illusion of unlimited 
time. Former U.S. Senator Paul Tsongas speaks in his moving 
book, Heading Home, about gaining a similar perspective after 
the discovery that he had cancer: 
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I notice if the sky is blue now. I see that God has given us the flowers 
and the rivers and the sunshine. I realize that life is wondrous in its 
natural and human dimensions. 
There is a darkness as well. Every morning I know the fragility of 
my health and I am aware of my mortality. Every day something hurts 
somewhere, so I can never forget. There are new fears and new 
hobgoblins to come to grips with. 
But in truth my great worry is that I will lose my sense of values 
and perspective as the nightmare of October 1983 fades from memory. 
If I'm not ill for a long time, will I go back to the mindset I had before 
the "hernia?" 
I pray not. I want always to feel as I do now.' 
Besides being necessary for gaining a perspective on life, 
finiteness establishes each person's uniqueness and singular- 
ity. Jacques Choron emphasizes that the consciousness of 
death "goes hand in hand with human individualization, with 
the establishment of single individualities." In his essay, "The 
Origin of Death," George Wald points out that death seems to 
have been a late invention in evolution and that "one can go a 
long way in evolution before encountering an authentic 
corpse." The one-celled organisms at the beginning of the 
evolutionary chain did not die. Wald notes that it is "with the 
sexual mode of reproduction that death comes upon the 
scene." As sexual reproduction is a dramatic development in 
evolution, in individualizing organisms and in certifying the 
uniqueness of each organism in the genetic contribution to 
descendants, so does the singular death of an organism certify 
its uniqueness. The loss of immortality is the price paid for the 
evolution from one-celled life forms into many-celled organ- 
isms that eventually evolved into the highly differentiated, 
interdependent, singular organisms we know as human 
beings. The death of these organisms is both a demonstration 
of their biological imperfection and their uniqueness. Victor 
Frankel explains this connection between imperfection and 
uniqueness: "Just as death as a temporal, outward limitation 
does not cancel the meaning of life but rather is the very factor 
that constitutes its meaning, so the inner limits only add to the 
meaning of man's life. If all men were perfect, then every 
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individual would be replaceable by anyone else. From the very 
imperfection of men follows the indispensability and inex- 
changeability of each individual; for each is imperfect in his 
own fashion. No man is universally gifted; but the bias of the 
individual makes for his uniquene~s."~ 
It is interesting to observe that not only do death and sex- 
uality arrive together in evolution, but they are also linked 
along with labor by the sweat of one's brow in the Genesis 
creation story. After eating the forbidden fruit of the tree of 
knowledge, Adam and Eve were aware of their nakedness and 
they and their offspring were sentenced to toil and eventual 
death. Whatever lessons this story teaches on the thorny the- 
ology of Original Sin, it is hard to react to the punishment 
meted out to Adam and Eve with unalloyed regret. The inno- 
cent gambolling in the pristine garden before the Fall may 
seem attractive as a vacation from our workaday world, but is 
it an attractive existence to be lived ad infiniturn? Would any of 
us consider such an existence "paradise"? The very lack of 
limit and obstacle makes this existence unchallenging, rou- 
tine, and finally uninteresting. Children are encouraged by 
pious elders to wonder at the folly of Adam and Eve at even 
being tempted by the fruit of the one tree denied them, but is it 
any wonder that our much-maligned first parents were inev- 
itably drawn to challenge the single limit in their utopian 
existence? 
Would any of us opt for a world permanently without sex- 
uality and creative labor? In spite of the distress and crimes 
they have sometimes provoked, these forces seem too much at 
the center of what it is to be human to embrace an existence 
without them. And cannot the same be said for the third part of 
the punishment, for the Fall? In spite of all of our anxieties and 
grief, could we embrace an existence in the world without 
death? Before the Fall, Adam and Eve are simply not real per- 
sonalities for us as immortal recipients of the endless bounty 
of the Garden. It is a life without limit and imperfection, rather 
than death, that presents us with a picture of absurdity. 
Without referring directly to the Adam and Eve story, Yae- 
ger Hudson argues that "the finality of death is a necessary 
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condition for a genuinely meaningful life." His reminder that 
"the most intensely satisfying experiences are those which 
come as the result of effort and striving" raises the question 
whether Adam and Eve, before the curse of labor and death, 
were not deprived in spite of their reputed ecstasy. He con- 
cludes: "Human happiness, then, would seem to consist, at 
least in part, of episodes of striving punctuated with occasions 
of achievement and satisfaction. Eternal existence in a para- 
dise which involved no striving, or even in a paradise in which 
striving were always guaranteed success, would necessarily 
very soon lose its taste and become extremely tedious. If such a 
paradise were of eternal duration, from which one would not 
even escape by death, it would be intolerable."g 
Adam and Eve may have sinned as much from ennui as from 
pride and the presumption to rival the Creator. Still, there is no 
question that the sentence of mortality was an appropriate and 
powerful check on hubris. Along with provoking a sense of 
priorities and establishing each person's uniqueness, the third 
great benefit of mortality is its undoing of the pretensions of 
egoism and solipsism. There is good cause to rail against death 
if we want to celebrate not simply our uniqueness but our su- 
periority over others, especially if we attribute whatever 
power and position we might have to our own abilities. For 
death equally limits the hopes and the schemes of both the 
high and the lowly. Although each person's encounter with 
death is singular, death stamps a broad equality over human- 
ity and demonstrates a profound common vulnerability. This 
commonness dwarfs the distinctions that some seek as barri- 
ers in defense of privilege or national preference to separate 
them from others. 
To state the matter more positively, death powerfully af- 
firms our identity and connection with others during life, and 
is a prod to discover how this connection transcends death's 
biological separation from life and loved ones. It is here that 
we have the most important contribution of death and the 
most important reason not to deny but to affirm our mortality. 
In squashing our pretensions to individual wholeness and self- 
containment, death thrusts us back upon each other and im- 
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poses the realization that it is only the recognition and accep- 
tance of human interdependence that give meaning to death 
and life. 
The link between confronting death and seeing through the 
charade of heroic individualism is eloquently chronicled by 
historian Gerda Lerner in describing how she and her late hus- 
band faced his impending death from cancer. In her book, A 
Death of One's Own, Lerner observes that the process of nurs- 
ing a dying loved one taught her that "dependency is terrible 
only for those who live in the illusion of self-sufficiency and 
independence." For both the ill and the well, she discovered, 
"dependence on others can be an act of grace, an acceptance of 
our common human weakness. . . . Acceptance of help with- 
out false pride is the last gift the dying can make the living. It is 
a handshake, a handhold, celebrating our mortality and our 
transcendence of it through kindness."'O 
Though Lerner realizes that it may sound embarrassingly 
sentimental to some, she finds new meaning in life from the 
relationship of the nursing and the dying: "Once at least, in 
each lifetime, we are meant to be a blessing to another. There is 
nothing more to know than that. The rest is just blindly sub- 
mitting and bearing whatever life dishes out to us" (1 33). That 
this statement applies to both the caregiver and the patient 
underlines how our vulnerability and incompleteness are, par- 
adoxically, sources of our empowerment to make life richer for 
another and, reciprocally, for ourselves. 
What can we affirm, then, about our finiteness, regardless of 
whether we accept a religious perspective on life? Death, if we 
will look it in the face, demands the realization that life makes 
sense only as it is shared with others. It compels us to yoke our 
ego and observe our indebtedness not only to parents and 
families but to eons of faceless, ordinary people who have 
made it possible for us to live, whether biologically, physically, 
culturally, or spiritually. If we consider our existence as part of 
the life and history of a huge family, we realize that it doesn't 
matter that our life will eventually be unknown to those who 
come after us. Nor does it matter if our life is unimposing to 
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our contemporaries. The admonition of Scripture that one 
should not let the left hand know what the right is doing not 
only teaches against arrogance and puffery but also reassures 
that acts done on behalf of others are, in themselves, justifica- 
tions and rewards only embarrassed by acclaim. As previously 
argued, all that matters is that we extend ourselves and make 
an effort to enrich the lives of others. That act transcends our 
mortality and endures beyond death. The motive for sharing 
life with others is not the unavailability of other absorptions 
because of death, but rather that death provides powerful 
evidence of the emptiness of those absorptions and of the 
reality of our identity with others. 
In facing death in common, we know we are all incomplete 
and fragile and experience a neediness that has been the basis 
of community throughout history. We know deep within us the 
anxiety and struggle each other person has to go through in 
coming to terms with death and affirming life. Sadly, many 
people shy away from this struggle and seek to resolve the 
tension between life and death by denying death or by vic- 
timizing others or resorting to some other illusion of power 
over death. But the capacity for real empathy and connection 
is in every person, and this capacity confirms an enormous 
potential in humanity for community and social conscience. 
We are not talking about duty here but the discovery of our real 
identities, and it is this discovery that makes death bearable 
and valuable. 
The fear of death, fed by the image of the Grim Reaper 
callously and capriciously terminating life and mocking hu- 
man strivings and attachments, is dramatically affected by 
appreciating our linkage to a universal family. Consider the 
difference it makes whether we see a void after our death or we 
see others taking our place. In numerous instances parents, 
despite the sway of death anxieties and the survival instinct, 
risk their lives to save their children or even children not their 
own. Every person who has ever lived has made the passage 
from the womb at great pain and often danger to the mother. 
We don't find it abnormal or even unusual that a parent should 
unhesitatingly face death for the life of a child by, for instance, 
Benefits of Human Vulnerability 57 
entering a burning house or undergoing a perilous operation to 
donate a life-sustaining organ. What dissolves anxiety about 
death in these instances is the love the parent has for the child 
and the parental desire to go to any length to secure the gift of 
life for the child. Also, the parent knows almost instinctively 
that his or her life will be continued in the child. 
For very few of us will the encounter with death appear so 
dramatically appropriate as a confirmation of life and love, 
but it is not far fetched to imagine that we can all view life and 
death as having the same characteristics of being natural and 
life enriching. Our mortality stamps us as vulnerable relatives 
who are alike in fears, hopes, creative potential, and, above all, 
physical and psychic neediness that has only been relieved by 
the combined actions of countless other needy people. 
For this very reason, death is the strongest sign of human 
vulnerability, but it is also a very powerful reminder of our 
capacity to enhance life and make it more fruitful. Not a 
person who has ever lived, however wealthy or impoverished, 
could have survived for more than a day without being cared 
for by other people. Not a person who has ever lived, however 
briefly, has not had a significant impact on others' lives, for 
better or worse. Precisely because all people are mortal and all 
people are therefore needy, all people have the opportunity to 
contribute to the lives of others. Even the infant who dies at 
birth has already had a profound effect upon the parents' lives. 
With the development of purposeful action that is only poten- 
tial in the infant, the effect on others' welfare is more conscious 
and more significant. The extent of our interdependence is 
only frighteningly glimpsed in our society when we see the 
enormous capacity for destruction of a single hotel arsonist or 
airplane terrorist. Less directly, the life expectancy of everyone 
in the world is affected by decisions on nuclear arms, indus- 
trial pollution, and nuclear power. 
We may dimly perceive how much the manner in which we 
die is influenced by the actions of others, but modern societies 
in general have a blind spot when it comes to grasping how 
thoroughly the manner in which we live is dependent on the 
efforts and contributions of a myriad of other people. That we 
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cultivate this illusion of independence is unfortunate for the 
hubris it creates in the successful and the sense of failure it 
forces on the downtrodden, but the myth is even more injur- 
ious for all in masking the real creative power we have to reach 
beyond ourselves and to leave a permanent mark on human- 
kind. 
Here we find a most important response to those who argue 
that death makes an absurdity of life or that it renders life 
hollow and fear-ridden without the consolation of religion. The 
fact is that no one leaves this world without increasing or 
diminishing the vast web of human experience and promise. 
Norman Cousins summarizes this point well: "No man need 
fear death; he need fear only that he may die without having 
known his greatest power-the power of his free will to give of 
his life to others. If something comes to life in others because of 
you, then you have made an approach to immortality."" 
This vision is not essentially utopian because no claim is 
made that human history is inevitably getting better. If the 
twentieth century teaches us anything, we can perceive that it 
takes enormous effort merely to keep history alive and to keep 
civilization and the planet from coming apart. This vision is 
not the preserve of an "elitist, fortunate few," as John Hick 
describes humanist doctrines that seek to take the sting out of 
death.'* This perspective on death not only relates to the life of 
the poor as well as the sick but is more harmonious with the 
views on ancestors of tribal civilizations and family-centered 
societies than with those of affluent, competitive societies. The 
chance of a camel passing through the eye of a needle con- 
tinues to reflect the chances of transcending mortality for one 
absorbed in possessions. 
This vision of how human beings live beyond death in the 
lives of others is also not romantic. This view of transcending 
mortality does not hide from the horrible suffering that marks 
the life and death of so many human beings. People of all ages 
and descriptions are cut down, with their dreams and poten- 
tial unfulfilled, by disease, natural disasters, and, more horri- 
bly, the schemes and whims of other people. No view of death 
can dull the pain of cancer or soften the mugger's blows or 
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mute the screams in the madman's gas chamber. Death in all 
its forms is a threatening, capricious reality that routs easy 
formulas for success and happiness and that allows for no one 
a dodging of pain and suffering in this life. But neither is death 
the grim extermination of all meaning of life and the bleak 
enforcer of constant anxiety. No life is without sorrow, but one 
can gain a perspective on death that allows, indeed inspires, an 
affirmation of life. 
It makes a big difference if we see death as having a neces- 
sary place in nature. It makes a big difference if we see death 
not as the bitter enemy of mankind but as essential to the 
survival of the human species. As jolted as we are by the 
awesome finality that death represents, if death as a limit 
pushes us to set priorities and consciously pursue a higher 
quality of life, can we renounce death? We are outraged by the 
randomness and capriciousness with which death arrives, and 
yet conception appears just as capricious; why should we 
disown and flail at the one end of our lives but take the appro- 
priateness of the other for granted? 
As we take a longer look at death, much of its terrifying and 
aggravating caprice and unfairness begin to dissipate. Some 
people die in ways that are horrible, painful, and inhuman, but 
the more fundamental fact about death is that no one escapes 
it. Regardless of the advantages showered so unevenly by life, 
no one can buy or fake his or her way out of death or out of the 
knowledge that he or she will eventually "walk that lonesome 
valley." Besides serving as the Great Equalizer and concretely 
demonstrating the common identity all mortals share, the 
universality of death also diminishes the dread of death. It is 
perhaps the most powerful political insight of Jean Jacques 
Rousseau that fair treatment is far more important to people 
than easy or even favorable treatment. He sees that citizens are 
capable of enormous labor and self-sacrifice so long as they are 
assured that they are not singled out for burdens. Perfect free- 
dom and obedience are consistent for Rousseau because the 
law is totally depersonalized in his theoretical society; in obey- 
ing a law that applies equally to all citizens, the individual is 
subservient to no person and thus is free. It is a lack of fairness, 
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rather than responsibility, commitment, or work, that is the 
origin of unfreedom for Rousseau. 
When this insight is applied to death, the cold capricious- 
ness and indifference of death are qualified in the realization 
that the ever-present threat of death and the loss of loved ones 
have been, and are, the fate of everyone who has ever lived. It 
has been fully documented by sociologists that higher rates of 
infant mortality and malnutrition and inadequate medical 
care in general relate directly to income level. The significant 
differences in life expectancy in this society because of income 
continue to be an embarrassment to our claims of fairness and 
equality. But though some people may be able to afford better 
medical care and may live to a full four score and ten, this 
comparative unfairness is minor in the light of the reality that 
all humans must die and they do not know when they will die. 
The very thoroughness of death's caprice should reduce our 
resentment and fear of being singled out by death, for everyone 
is singled out. Once we see that there are no comparative 
advantages or disadvantages when it comes to mortality, that 
death means nothing personal by its sting, then we are better 
able to accept death at any time as natural and as not a 
negation of freedom; the caprice of death is democratic in its 
thoroughness. This does not at all mean we should accept the 
caprice of other people who are agents of death, whose deeds 
are an outrage to freedom and justice, and who ought to be 
countered in every instance by the human community. 
There are still two main sticking points about the fairness of 
death. The first has to do with the fact that some people die 
quietly in their sleep while others face death in terror and 
agony. I do not presume to dispel this troubling disparity, but I 
do advance considerations that might qualify this unfairness. 
To begin with, we might draw consolation from the arguments 
of some physicians that the act of dying, even violently, is not 
as traumatic for the dying person as observers might think. 
Jacques Choron reminds us of Sir Walter Raleigh cheerfully 
examining the sharpness of his executioner's ax and Sir 
Thomas More calling attention to the thickness of his neck. As 
for those suddenly facing accidents, Choron reports that "re- 
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cent studies show that the state of mind of those facing death in 
accidents or natural catastrophes is characterized by a senti- 
ment of beatitude, an unusual rapidity of thought and imag- 
ination, anesthesia to touch, absence of feeling of sadness, and 
finally a 'review' of past life."13 
The obverse of this toning down of the undeserved grue- 
someness of violent death is the realization that the seeming 
unfairness of the gentle death of those who were vicious in life 
is also a misperception. That Josef Stalin died quietly in his 
sleep or that Hitler died by his own hand hardly constitutes an 
escape from a life of diabolical oppression of others. It is said 
that both of these men were terrified for years by constant 
fears of assassination. Their lives fit well Plato's classic re- 
sponse to Thrasymachus in The Republic on whether the just or 
unjust are happier. Plato argued that the unjust live a life of 
constant fear, both from having made enemies and from hav- 
ing no reason to expect that people will treat them any dif- 
ferently than they are prepared to treat others. The gentle 
death of a person like Stalin should caution us against seeing 
the circumstances of one's death as a commentary either on 
the quality of one's life or the unfairness of death. The seeming- 
ly gentle deaths of the oppressors are hardly a vindication of 
their deeds, any more than a violent end for the just is a 
repudiation of their lives. Death is terrifying under any cir- 
cumstances if the goal of one's life is to take more and more, 
but death is not frightening under any circumstances if one 
can affirm the quality of one's life. 
Our way of dying is appropriate to our way of living in the 
sense that our life is a preparation for accepting or denying 
death. Those persons who attempt to treat life as a gift, an 
opportunity to share life with others, have the basic assurance 
that their lives are fruitful and consequential. They have the 
additional assurance that the circumstances of their deaths 
will not be a rebuke to their lives, or a source of abject distress 
and grief for family and friends, because the circumstances of 
death will be seen as irrelevant. Pain and suffering cannot 
negate the life-giving power each person has or the fact that 
one's life rather than one's death is a person's true legacy. As 
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survivors, we do grieve more when the cause of a death can be 
laid to human device or human indifference than when it is 
brought on by nature, but our grief is for ourselves and for our 
society, whose flaws are manifested by such acts of inhumanity 
and injustice. We are galled by deaths by other-than-natural 
causes because they seem unnecessary, outrageously exploita- 
tive, wasteful, and untimely. Yet it is presumptuous as well as 
unavailing to declare any person's death untimely. For sur- 
vivors, death is never timely; it comes often too soon and some- 
times too late. Each life has its particular contours and dimen- 
sions, its good and bad fortune, its successes and failures, and 
it is not for others, even loved ones, to declare what joys or 
sorrows death has preempted or to demand that a life be more 
full than death allows. Such a demand wrongfully focuses on 
the death rather than the life of the person and neglects the 
prime importance of the quality rather than quantity of life. 
This consideration necessarily leads to the other sticking 
point about the fairness of death: the death of the young. The 
same perspective that applies to painful or violent death ap- 
plies to the extraordinary sorrow we feel when the young are 
taken by death. Children are supposed to bury their parents, 
not parents bury their children, and when the young meet 
death we feel the world is out of kilter and are numbed by the 
unfairness. But both death and life are perhaps more fair than 
we allow. If we examine our outrage at the experiences and 
potential that are cut short when the young die, we might see 
that it is more our expectations than the potential of the dying 
person that are cut short. The death of the young is a very cruel 
blow to families, but loved ones can endure this loss much 
better when they realize that the young life they mourn has 
fulfilled its potential, regardless of its age, simply by its im- 
pact on that family. Such an impact on other people endows 
any life with significance, wholeness, and beauty. If family and 
friends can realize, in their sense of loss, that they are the real 
objects of grief, then they need not feel that their inevitable and 
profound sorrow must be like death in its permanence and 
isolation. Gaining perspective on the death of the young is 
particularly difficult precisely because we have great expecta- 
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tions for the young and are inattentive to the remarkable 
effects their lives have upon us. But if the measure of achieve- 
ment in any life is the sharing of life with others, a young 
person's life can be as full and complete as anyone's. This 
perspective will hardly rout the pain and terrible sense of loss 
we feel at the death of the young, but it can keep us from being 
absorbed and defeated by the apparent unfairness of death, 
and it can move us to celebrate that brief yet fruitful life. 
Anyone who comments on these most profound human sor- 
rows must be wary of sounding presumptuous or appearing to 
be a Pollyanna who finds solace at a time of immense human 
grief only because he or she is unaware of the depths of that sor- 
row. The obverse of chancing this pitfall, however, is to main- 
tain a silence that enshrouds the pervasive denial of death and 
that leaves grieving people isolated and unconsoled. I have 
attempted here to see how we might accept death under any 
conditions for the freedom it gives the individual and for the 
changed attitudes toward life it may provoke in society. We 
need to change the way we support people in regard to death, 
and we need to reinforce a sense of their life-giving power to 
affect other people. If we can develop the cultural support in 
our society that honors the contribution each person can make 
to the well-being of others, we will not only die more easily but 
live more freely. 
This chapter began as an effort to meet head-on the assump- 
tion that without the consolation of religion and an afterlife 
the threat of death is totally enervating and demands the wide- 
spread attempts we see at denying and masking it. In seeking 
to show that it is one of religion's smug illusions that "there are 
no atheists in foxholes" and to show that a secular perspective 
can find meaning, achievement, and wholeness in life despite, 
and perhaps because of, death, I do not mean to imply that this 
perspective is necessarily antagonistic to a religious world 
view, so a brief treatment of the relation of these views seems 
appropriate. 
The argument that the meaning of people's lives is rendered 
invulnerable to death and time by their effect on others' lives 
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does clash severely with fundamentalist religious convictions 
that see life on earth as only a passage to another life, before 
which human efforts at justice amount to merely a vain recon- 
struction of the Tower of Babel. In such a view, one's life in soci- 
ety is only a distraction from the path of individual righteous- 
ness. But the perspective on life and death I have argued for is 
not inconsistent with other, less rigid, religious positions. 
Krister Stendahl, former dean of the Divinity School at Har- 
vard, argues that the "whole long and glorious Christian tradi- 
tion of speaking about the immortality of the soul is only a 
period of the Judeo-Christian tradition, and that period may 
now be coming to an end." He observes that the "whole world 
that comes to us through the Bible, Old Testament and New, is 
not interested in the immortality of the soul." He notes that the 
only immortality for Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob was "in the 
loins," or as George Wald puts it, in the germ plasm. Stendahl 
cites the famous passage from Ecclesiastes, "the dust returns 
to earth, whence it came, and the spirit returns to God who 
gave it" (12:7), and he observes: "Here the spirit is not the 
individual's little identity spirit, but the life-giving power of 
God, the ruach, the wind which is withdrawn and so man 
disintegrates into dust. Dust to dust, ashes to ashes. . . . That's 
not much of immortality of the ~ o u l . " ' ~  
As for the New Testament, Stendahl argues that there is no 
preoccupation with immortality, that the word is used only 
twice in the New Testament, and that the New Testament 
"speaks constantly about resurrection as against immortal- 
ity." The question to which resurrection is the answer is not the 
question about what is going to happen to man when he dies: 
"The question is not: What is going to happen to little me? Am I 
to survive with my identity or not? The question is rather 
whether God's justice will win out" (77). 
Concern for the power of Christ's resurrection, Stendahl 
says, was "a concern for where the world is going, not a con- 
cern for ourself" (78). This is why the "whole concern for 
individual identity, which is the technical meaning of immor- 
tality of the soul, is not to be found in the Good Book because 
its concern and its focus [are] elsewhere" (81). Stendahl finds 
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promising that "an increasing number of men and women are 
less and less concerned about the immortality of the soul, 
especially their own" (78). The concern with the future of 
justice, with whether the Kingdom is a dream worth believing 
in, is "a sign of ethical and religious seriousness," and Sten- 
dahl concludes: "As a biblical scholar I must note how that 
concern is in many ways similar to the concerns of the first 
Christians as they prayed for the coming of God's kingdom 
rather than for their own immortality. . . . The concern for 
immortality appears much too little, too selfish, too preoc- 
cupied with myself or even my family, my race, my species. The 
question of prolonged identity somehow doesn't fit to what is 
really bothering us as we ask the questions of meaning and we 
seek the rays of hope" (31). 
Stendahl is not alone in seeing the hollowness of religious 
solipsism that views the world, in the words of John Robinson, 
as "a vast transit camp, in which the Church's job is to issue 
tickets for heaven and pack people off to paradise."15 There is a 
strong movement in much of contemporary religion that turns 
away from the egoistic love of God to save one's skin but toward 
a concern for what Norman Cousins calls a "higher immor- 
tality" of the human spirit that is "a richer and deeper concept 
than the more limited form of personal immortality."16 
Stendahl blames the Platonic streak in Western religions for 
the absorption with individual immortality, but it is impor- 
tant to recall that in The Republic Plato insists on defending the 
just life against the unjust life purely in terms of happiness in 
this world. His treatment of the aged Cephalus at the begin- 
ning of The Republic-as a troubled, fearful man, despite his 
dabbling in philosophy and his pious confidence that he has 
paid off the gods with sacrifices-is a subtle but classic por- 
trait of the vapidity of a religion that has no concern for justice. 
Whatever the source of self-interested religion, it is enough 
for our purpose to note that this chapter's perspective on death 
is not necessarily in conflict with the religious spirit; in fact, 
the search for wholeness in our relations with others, whether 
it's called a search for the Kingdom or a search for justice, is an 
effort that can bring together people with very diverse back- 
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grounds. Seeing the need for human connection as a way of 
overcoming the isolation of death ought to provoke both secu- 
lar and religious people to reinterpret and revitalize tradi- 
tional religious messages. For instance, Christian teaching and 
liturgy can be looked upon as primarily concerned with foster- 
ing a sense of community that is not defeated by death. Quite 
apart from the controversies about Christ's divinity, Christ is a 
hero because he was courageous about death and did not allow 
the fear of death to deter him from sharing life with everyone 
that he met. Christ's spirit lives on and sets an example of 
immortality by entering into others' lives, an example as stun- 
ning for people who do not ponder the mystery of resurrection 
as for those who do. In this view, the saints are those who have 
grasped with special fervor the importance of this sense of 
connection and the eucharist is the family meal in which 
people reaffirm and celebrate this connection. Redemption- 
the central Christian concept-is achieved by an act of faith in 
humanity, which is left to cultivate the seeds that represent the 
contribution of each human life. 
If we accept Paul Tillich's definition of religion as the pur- 
suit of one's ultimate concern, then coping with the certain 
prospect of death and finding meaning and fulfillment in the 
human community provide a rare basis in a pluralistic society 
for people with avowedly religious and nonreligious convic- 
tions to find a meeting ground of ultimate concern. Secular 
and religious people have profound differences on the explana- 
tion of human mortality, but they all must struggle to ensure 
that death does not finally mock life. The need and opportunity 
to unite in the pursuit of justice make particularly timely the 
moving observation of AbbC Pierre that "what matters today is 
not the difference between those who believe and those who do 
not believe, but the difference between those who care and 
those who don't."17 
5. Death and Politics 
The Clash with Capitalism 
Yes, sir, boy, the human animal is a beast that dies an' if 
he's got money he buys an' buys an' buys an' I think the 
reason he buys everything he can buy is that in the 
back of his mind he has the crazy hope that one of his 
purchases will be life everlastin'!-which it never can 
be-hear me? 
-Big Daddy, Cat on a Hot Tin Roof 
If we can now see that there is a way of regarding mortality as 
natural and necessary for life, we must inevitably ask what are 
the preconditions for, and what are the potential results of the 
spread of such a view in our society. We have seen that the 
personal rewards of this view are a beneficial stimulus to 
living freely and fully. A perspective that could so radically 
change individual lives would necessarily have the potential 
for a profound social and political impact. 
One cannot help but feel the tension between a view of life 
that recognizes and appreciates finitude and limits, finding 
the meaning of existence in the giving and sharing of life, and 
the view of life that is proclaimed in the dominant political 
systems in the world today. The oppressive state socialism of 
the Soviet Union seems devoted only to greater figures of gross 
national product and greater controls over the lives of its cit- 
izens. The official treatment of death in which deceased heroes 
are bundled off to the walls of the Kremlin, a famed few to be 
specially embalmed and displayed to the ages, reflects a denial 
of death as deep as in any culture. But because capitalism is the 
economic system in our own society and the one we know best, 
I shall focus here on portraying the clash of capitalist values 
68 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
with the recognition and acceptance of death. Through such an 
examination we may realize the profundity and seriousness of 
the deep-rooted institutional resistance to changing ideas 
about death in our society. We may also glimpse the profundity 
and seriousness of the changes that are possible in political 
attitudes when attitudes toward death change. 
Capitalism's absorption with material wealth as the indica- 
tor of success and its appeals to competitiveness as the norm in 
human relations betoken barren ground in which to plant 
seeds of hope about coming to terms with limits and death. But 
two factors mitigate the conflict between the consciousness of 
death and capitalism. One is the growing popular insistence in 
our society that no economics can justify the emotional costs 
of hiding from death. The other is that ours is not a pure 
capitalist system. Throughout our politics and economics we 
crimp the capitalist model to provide for human needs in ways 
that would have dismayed Adam Smith and do dismay many of 
his descendants. But at the very time that there is a movement 
in our culture to put an end to the denial of death, there is also 
an increasing effort to challenge deviations in our society from 
the capitalist model. It is argued that a commitment to com- 
petitive, entrepreneurial behavior and individualism is not 
only a formula for economic growth but for personal and 
spiritual growth as well. 
In examining the inhospitable relation between capitalism 
and a willingness to face death, we should first consider the 
very beginning of the capitalist period and the political phi- 
losopher who has unquestionably had the greatest impact on 
American institutions and public philosophy, John Locke. Sec- 
ond, we should consider one of the most recent and forceful 
defenders of the spiritual and moral values of capitalism, the 
philosopher and theologian Michael Novak. In attempting to 
refute Novak's key argument that capitalist economics is more 
the victim than perpetrator of flaws in our present culture, I 
will later focus on the thoughts of Daniel Bell and Christopher 
Lasch, demonstrating how much and for how long the preoc- 
cupation with competing against other people challenges and 
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is challenged by the acceptance of death as natural and bene- 
ficial. 
As a brief prelude to the thought of John Locke, it is useful to 
consider his anxious predecessor in the seventeenth century, 
Thomas Hobbes. Hobbes has not had the acclaimed impact on 
contemporary political thinking that Locke has, but Hobbes is 
particularly relevant for our inquiry because he constructed in 
his Leviathan of 1649 an entire political system based on the 
avoidance of violent death. Hannah Arendt argues that 
"Hobbes is the only political philosopher in whose work death 
. . . plays a crucial role." So dark was Hobbes's vision of mas- 
terless people in a state of nature that he was convinced the 
citizens of his Leviathan would maintain their unreserved 
allegiance to an omnipotent sovereign in order to be sheltered 
from an existence that was, in his famous phrase, "solitary, 
poor, nasty, brutish and short."' 
Hobbes's political theory allows extraordinary measures in 
response to citizens' fears of violent death, while totally ignor- 
ing their anxieties about natural death. This avoidance of 
natural death contributes to the theoretical and practical defi- 
ciency of Hobbes's prescriptions about the citizen's absolute 
obligation to obey the word of the sovereign. Having eschewed 
normative or moral inducements for the sole appeal to self- 
preservation, Hobbes cannot deal with the rebellion of dissi- 
dent citizens who conclude-perhaps impressed with the real- 
ization that they face natural death anyway-that there are 
needs and concerns more important to them than the sov- 
ereign's protection from violent death. As thorough and scien- 
tific as Hobbes is in setting down precise definitions and 
calculations of fear, he chooses to consider only violent death 
as politically relevant and to leave the citizen to confront 
natural death in isolation, outside any social context. Hobbes, 
because of his daring to reason with ordinary citizens about 
what ought to be the extent and basis of their obligation to 
obey the sovereign, no doubt deserves his reputation as the 
founder of modern political science. At this crucial juncture 
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modern political theory lost its standing as philosophy by 
treating death only as it is perpetrated by man and subject to 
control by political sanction. Plato's injunction that the pur- 
pose of philosophy is to teach men how to die had a very 
distant echo in 1649. 
For many commentators, it is amazing that only one genera- 
tion separates Hobbes's Leviathan and Locke's Second Treatise 
of Civil Government. But the stark contrasts that are usually 
made between Hobbes and Locke are greatly overdrawn. It is 
not clear that Locke had a significantly kinder view of the mass 
of people than Hobbes had. The traditional interpretation of 
Locke as an optimist about human nature and the rule of the 
law of reason in the state of nature ignores Locke's later com- 
ments, which contradict the anti-Hobbesian enthusiasm ex- 
pressed in an early chapter on the state of nature: 
If man in the state of nature be so free, as has been said, if he be 
absolute lord of his own person and possessions; equal to the greatest, 
and subject to nobody, why will he part with his freedom, this empire, 
and subject himself to the dominion and control of any other power? 
To which, it is obvious to answer, that though in the state of nature he 
hath such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain and con- 
stantly exposed to the invasions of others. For all being kings as much 
as he, every man his equal, and the greater part no strict observers of 
equity and justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is 
very unsafe, very insecure. This makes him willing to quit this condi- 
tion, which, however free, is full of fears and continual dangers.2 
In this passage Locke is not different from Hobbes in finding 
the origins of the social compact more in fear than sweet 
reasonableness, and the origin of that fear is the equal ability 
people have to threaten each other. 
In addition, the powers of Locke's government are not as 
dramatically limited in comparison to the powers of Hobbes's 
sovereign as is usually assumed. Locke speaks of the right of 
the people to dismiss tyrannical regimes, but his right of 
revolution is purely ex post facto and legitimizes revolutions 
only after they have succeeded. And his acknowledgment of 
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the panoply of powers and discretion allowed the executive on 
the invocation of prerogative in time of "emergency" would 
have been quite satisfactory to Hobbes. Locke does insist that 
government needs to have the electoral support of a majority, 
but when it is considered how few people were enfranchised at 
his time, it would be surprising if Hobbes's sovereign would 
not, with the barest prudence, have co-opted the support of a 
majority of a similar elite. 
Thus, much of the dichotomy traditionally drawn between 
Hobbes and Locke is not convincing. Yet there is a major 
difference between the two theorists that accounts for Hobbes 
having been recognized only as an innovative theoretician and 
Locke having had so vast an impact on subsequent political 
events. Locke perceived clearly that Hobbes's appeal to the 
individual's fear of violent death was simply too minimal a 
basis upon which to structure the citizen's attachment and 
obligation to the civil society. Hobbes could not escape the 
contradiction of having to ask in an emergency that the citizen 
be prepared to lay down his life for the defense of a common- 
wealth he had joined solely for his self-pre~ervation.~ To the 
protection against violent death as the raison d'&tre of civil 
society, Locke made the momentous addition of the protection 
of property. This development had great significance for the 
relation between political theory and the subject of death, 
because in an age of incipient capitalism it was sufficient to 
shore up the social contract as the basis for understanding 
social relations and political obligation without correcting 
Hobbes's unphilosophical avoidance of natural death. It con- 
firmed and hardened this avoidance into what would become a 
tradition. Even more significant was Locke's focus on the pro- 
tection of property as an essential ingredient in the social 
contract, which had the effect of finding definite social utility 
in the public avoidance of the subject of death. 
The social utility of avoiding death stemmed from the dy- 
namic innovation Locke brought to the theory of property. The 
traditional defense of private property, as for instance by Aqui- 
nas, had emphasized the greater care that would be taken of an 
individual's goods than of goods held in common, but it had 
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also called for regulations to ensure that property would be 
used for the common good. Locke argued that the world was 
given to mankind in common and that individuals appropri- 
ated private property by mixing the labor of their bodies, 
which was clearly their own, with nature. The expenditure of 
labor was the testimony of one's claim to private property. As 
Locke describes the origins of private appropriation in the 
early part of his chapter on property in the Second Treatise, he 
allows for three limits on how much property one can accumu- 
late. First, there is the obvious limit that a person's possessions 
must be attached to him by his labor. Second, he must see that 
he leaves as much and as good for others. Third, he must see 
that nothing spoils uselessly in his possession. By the end of 
the chapter on property, however, all three of these limitations 
have broken down. The critical restriction on avoiding spoil- 
age is overcome by the advent of money, which allows one to 
transform goods that might perish into durable currency. The 
requirement of labor is assumed away, as C.B. Macpherson 
puts it, by Locke's unargued acceptance of the wage relation- 
ship that allows one to claim the product of the labor of those 
in one's emp10y.~ The requirement that one leave "enough and 
as good" in nature for others simply disappears, presumably 
on the optimistic assumption, later developed by Adam Smith, 
that entrepreneurs do not deprive others by increasing their 
holdings but only make nature more bountiful for all in sub- 
jecting it to their enlightened manipulation. 
What remains by the end of Locke's treatment of property is 
the legitimization of the pursuit of unlimited acquisition. The 
size of a person's holdings is not an issue at all: "The exceeding 
of the bounds of his just property not lying in the largeness of 
his possessions, but the perishing of anything uselessly in it." 
Money, the guarantee against spoilage, has become the great 
elixir that opens up the vision of unbounded wealth. For his 
part, Locke merely assumes, again without the benefit of argu- 
ment, that such a pursuit is humanity's great fascination. He 
asks, in trying to show how money liberates the initiative to 
accumulate: 
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Supposing an island, separate from all possible commerce with the 
rest of the world, wherein there were but a hundred families-but 
there were sheep, horses, and cows, with other useful animals, whole- 
some fruits, and land enough for corn for a hundred thousand times as 
many, but nothing in the island, either because of its commonness or 
perishableness, fit to supply the place of money-what reason could 
anyone have there to enlarge his possessions beyond the use of his 
family and a plentiful supply to its consumption, either in what their 
own industry produced, or they could barter for like perishable useful 
commodities with others?5 
What Locke never considers is why, even after the advent of 
money, one would want to draw property to oneself beyond a 
plentiful supply for the present and a reasonable security for 
the future. Locke supposes that he is merely drawing on natu- 
ral human desires while, in fact, he is reflecting a peculiar view 
of human nature. 
It has been the great misfortune of our age and our country 
in particular that we have uncritically accepted, along with 
much that has been beneficial in staving off tyranny, Locke's 
doctrine on property and, seemingly, have remained unaware 
of how laden it is with assumptions about human values and 
aspirations. Acquisition far beyond one's needs has no rational 
purpose. Unlimited acquisition must derive its significance 
and lure from what it represents, and what it represents for 
Locke is the superior achievement of the new entrepreneurial 
class. For him, humanity divides into "the rational and indus- 
trious," whose labors make the earth abundant, and the "quar- 
relsome and contentious," who seek to live off the labor of 
others. The drive for superior accumulation stems from the 
drive to demonstrate superior rationality, and it is the fire of 
competition that moves one to labor and accumulate far 
beyond one's needs and that denies satisfaction or sufficiency, 
regardless of one's means. 
The unrelenting pursuit of property to which Locke calls us 
rests at base, then, on unarticulated assumptions about 
human alienation and estrangement, such as the assumption 
that the purpose and challenge of life are to be found in out- 
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producing and out-accumulating one's neighbor. Of course this 
assumption rests on the further assumption that distinctions 
in property acquisition derive from some virtu rather than 
from first occupancy. Locke does not deal with the question of 
how one becomes industrious when all the land in a society has 
been claimed by others more greedy than industrious. He 
consoles latecomers by merely pointing out that "there's al- 
ways America." 
There are at least two other premises, however, that are 
essential to Locke's description and defense of property and 
that have significant bearing on how our culture deals with 
death. First, his theory of property is based upon a very sin- 
ister view of nature. His doctrine came to be known as the 
"labor theory of value" precisely because it assumes the value 
of anything worth accumulating is derived from the labor 
people expend upon it. Locke tells us that nature is frugal 
indeed: "If we will rightly estimate things as they come to our 
use, and cast up the several expenses about them-what in 
them is purely owing to nature, and what to labour-we shall 
find that in the most of them ninety-nine hundredths are 
wholly to be put on the account of labour" (33). 
Nature is not seen as having a primordial integrity that 
mankind need respect and be tutored by. Rather, nature exists 
to be manipulated and exploited. Equality was imposed upon 
primitive societies by the inevitable spoilage of goods dictated 
by nature. It was the great boon of money that this spoilage was 
avoided by more fluid trade, so the rational and industrious 
were freed from the yoke of equality imposed by nature and 
allowed to devote their superior abilities to conquering the 
earth. 
Second, Locke's theory of property rests on a callous naivete 
about the moral primacy and self-sufficiency of the individual. 
This leads him to focus on labor, after spoilage is no longer at 
issue, as the single criterion of one's claim to private property. 
His examples of appropriation are instructive: "Though the 
water running in the fountain be everyone's, yet who can doubt 
but that in the pitcher is his only who drew it out? His labour 
hath taken it out of the hands of Nature, where it was common 
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and belonged equally to all her children, and hath thereby 
appropriated it to himself. . . .What fish anyone catches in the 
ocean, that great and still remaining common of mankind . . . 
is, by the labour that removes it out of that common state 
nature left it in, made his property who takes that pains about 
it" (24). 
What is easily missed in a ready acquiescence to these 
examples of the sufficiency of labor in establishing property is 
how dependent they are upon the fact that water and fish are 
not scarce resources. How different becomes the force of 
Locke's logic, for example, in a time of drought or overfished 
seas or endangered whale species. Once scarcity is confronted, 
the question of need becomes an indispensable issue in estab- 
lishing property, as do the questions of the individual's depen- 
dency upon (for example, for furnishing the well), and respon- 
sibility to, society. It is Locke's perhaps unwitting strategy that 
he gains our assent to labor as the basis of property with 
examples in which there is abundance of goods for all, and 
then he holds us to this assent when dealing with such scarce 
resources as, for example, land. The effect of his argument is to 
mythologize the achievement and sufficiency of individual 
effort. Along with Locke's disparaging view of nature, the myth 
both stems from and contributes to the passion for unlimited 
acquisition. 
These values and assumptions in Locke's thought would 
have only a historical interest were it not for the fact that they 
survive today in his doctrine on property, which has profound- 
ly influenced the rationale for capitalism, our legal system, 
and the notions of personal achievement propagated by our 
culture. When we compare his premises with the insights that 
emerge from an effort to deal openly and humanly with death, 
we can appreciate why the Lockean legacy has affected so 
significantly our culture's critical failure to help people deal 
with death. 
Of all the lessons that facing death teaches, Locke's thought 
clashes perhaps most centrally with the value of recognizing 
and accepting the finiteness of human existence. His espousal 
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of a contest to pursue unlimited wealth must deny death and 
any other notion of limits. Madison Avenue's steady reminder 
to people of their incompleteness and unacceptability, 
whether in their automotive horsepower or their deficient 
antiperspirants, is but one contemporary manifestation of the 
Lockean gospel of infinite needs and infinite goals. The sense 
of proportion and perspective on what is enough that a respect 
for limits provokes are precisely what the call to the race for 
unlimited acquisition must avoid. 
Similarly, the common identity people can find in their 
common mortality clashes with the alienation intuited by 
Locke. Wealth and status are revealed as ephemeral in the 
shadow of death. But for Locke, the struggle for wealth and 
status makes life interesting and confirms one's designation as 
rational and industrious. Further, his portrait of individuals as 
definitive wholes who create their personal wealth and welfare 
collides with the recognition of how fragile is our existence 
and how much it is by the actions of others that we both live 
and die. It was previously emphasized that as we come to 
appreciate, in regard to timing and circumstances, how ca- 
priciously we die, we appreciate how capriciously we live and 
how various are the advantages and disadvantages we receive 
from nature and from society. In seeking to legitimize spec- 
tacular individual appropriation of the earth's resources with- 
out regard to social need, Locke has to ignore and avoid these 
insights that issue from taking our mortality seriously. 
If there is so serious a conflict between the perspectives that 
stem from dealing honestly with death and the views and 
values promoted by a contributor to the capitalist theory as 
influential and seminal as Locke, we may expect that this 
conflict continues today and defines the challenge and oppor- 
tunity for changing attitudes toward death in the present. The 
most vigorous and learned arguments made today against the 
idea that capitalism is at odds with spiritual and communal 
values come from Michael Novak. Particularly in his influen- 
tial book, The Spirit ofDemocratic Capitalism, he seeks to break 
the connection between capitalism and the malaise of contem- 
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porary hedonism. A response to Novak is crucial to an argu- 
ment that a new popular consciousness about death would 
lessen the defensive competitiveness of people. His claims for 
capitalism would, in effect, make the treatment of death mere- 
ly a personal matter, for he maintains that contemporary 
capitalism already provides the best avenue to a communitar- 
ian and caring society. I shall look closely at Novak's argu- 
ments and later at those of two other major evaluators of 
contemporary capitalism and culture, Daniel Bell and Chris- 
topher Lasch. Bell's classic book on capitalist culture, The 
Cultural Contradictions o f  Capitalism, presents a balanced 
analysis of the barriers erected by our culture to the search for 
a personal identity. Lasch's The Culture of Narcissism presents 
a dispiriting portrait of the moral chaos in contemporary cul- 
ture and seriously challenges the high expectations of Novak 
and others about the spiritual values of capitalism. An exam- 
ination of these views will, I think, reveal that the inheritance 
taxes we continue to pay on our patrimony from Locke are very 
great. 
As the single author who has taken the largest role in the 
recent debate on capitalism and values, Novak exhibits both 
the insights of thorough scholarship and the fervor of a recent 
convert to conservatism. In several recent books, he has cham- 
pioned the idea that capitalism is not devoid of spiritual values 
but has been a convenient b&te noire for various social perspec- 
tives not compelling enough to compete in the free market of 
ideas. Novak's own essays in two books he edited, Capitalism 
and Socialism and The Denigration of Capitalism, present a 
perspective on capitalism and values in which spiritual values 
are taken very seriously and capitalism's contribution to these 
values is seen as uneven but generally positive. In his essay 
"Seven Theological Facets," in Capitalism and Socialism, 
Novak first acknowledges that, in the competition between 
socialism and capitalism, capitalism's claim to success usual- 
ly ignores people's moral and spiritual needs: 
Socialism has a major advantage over capitalism because its basic 
texts supply, explicitly and immediately, a moral vision. Whereas 
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capitalist writings tend to limit themselves to economic man, a cun- 
ning abstraction from human life useful for economic considerations, 
socialist writings, by and large, tend to be holistic and to assume the 
form of moral philosophy. From the beginning, socialists have de- 
scribed a moral vision, and tried to imagine a society within which 
certain moral values are preserved. That is an important advantage. 
A second advantage of socialism over capitalism lies in its stress on 
sociality and fraternity-an important corrective of the Anglo-Scot 
tradition.6 
Novak tries hard to be fair to socialism. He speaks against 
the American instinct to be simplistic and reductionist about 
socialism and stresses the importance of thinking of socialism 
"rather more as a vision, emphasizing the sociality of human 
responsibility for the social and political order, than as a set of 
specific historical programs, or a mere mechanism of political 
allocation." Nevertheless, the great advantage he sees in the 
American capitalist system over socialism is that our system 
disperses power and influence in three different realms, 
whereas socialism is monistic. Borrowing from Daniel Bell, 
Novak argues that our system is trinitarian and composed of 
systems that function together: the political system, the eco- 
nomic system, and the cultural system. Novak sees each of 
these parts, while working with the others, nevertheless exer- 
cising a check and balance on the others. The key problem for 
socialism, he argues, is that its impulse is to collapse all three 
systems into one, the inevitable result of allowing the public or 
political sphere to determine everything. 
Whatever the problem socialism has in ensuring pluralism, 
however, it is not at all clear that Novak's tripartite capitalist 
system comports with reality. Indeed, it appears that dividing 
our system into economics, politics, and culture is a conven- 
ient device for masking the power and influence of capitalism 
in all three areas and, in particular, for disassociating it from 
the alarming loss of values in our culture. Novak is very con- 
cerned about what he sees as the increasing reign of hedonism 
in our culture, but he presents a confused analysis of cap- 
italism's role in our loss of purpose and priorities. He describes 
the dawning of capitalism in the Jewish-Christian culture as 
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causing enormous dislocations that came close to destroying 
Western society. The introduction of a free market mechanism, 
he says, wreaked havoc with the ideas of community, welfare, 
and family by which earlier Jewish-Christian cultures had 
lived: 
The economic component of the system, in short, began to undercut- 
and to this very day continues to undercut-the other two compo- 
nents of the system. There are tendencies within the economic sector 
that generate desires, fulfill desires, and generate still more desires, so 
as to make plausible the notion that the pursuit of liberty is the 
pursuit of hedonism. These tendencies undercut the habits of disci- 
pline, saving, and restraint which make possible the accumulation of 
capital, wise investment for the future, and the continued health of 
the economic system. Thus, one part of the system can unleash forces 
that weaken the other two. [ I l l ]  
Novak seems here to see clearly how the inducement to 
greed and endless desires in capitalism undermines culture, 
politics, and economics, but he quickly loses this clarity and 
begins to speak of how the culture declines independently of 
economics and undermines capitalism: "Reciprocally . . . the 
spread in the cultural sector of the system of ideas hostile to 
family, hostile to local communities, hostile to the kind of 
ascetic, disciplined interior life required for Jewish and Chris- 
tian development may also undercut the political and econom- 
ic systems. Because of the spread of malicious, nihilistic, and 
destructive ideas in the cultural sector, because of the spread of 
hedonism or other abuses, the disciplines required for a demo- 
cratic politics become quite difficult to maintain" (1 11). 
One looks in vain for the basis on which Novak argues that 
the subversion of the three sectors has been "reciprocal." He 
has made abundantly clear the threat capitalism poses to a 
culture in which community, welfare, and family are key val- 
ues, but he merely assumes that other forces have indepen- 
dently pushed contemporary culture to nihilism and hedon- 
ism and that the culture, in turn, undermines the economic 
and political spheres. He sees a dire outcome in our culture 
from the changes that have occurred in this century, but his 
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assumption that the three sectors are mutually dependent 
leaves us groping in a web of interrelated changes and unable 
to locate a specific cause of this deterioration. All we know is 
that the Jewish-Christian cultural values "modified, and were 
modified by, the successive economic systems in western histo- 
ry, and that, after having been assaulted by several generations 
of hostile thinkers, the cultural preconditions for the health of 
the economic and the political components may be under- 
mined" (1 15). 
The Jewish-Christian cultural values have been assaulted 
and perilously wounded, but this assault, rather than being 
hostile to the economic system, was in the service of that sys- 
tem and was dictated by the appeal to self-interest and greed 
that are at the very historical and systemic roots of capitalism. 
It is true that the new culture that capitalism creates also 
undermines capitalism, but this phenomenon points to the 
limits of self-interest and to a contradiction within capitalism, 
rather than to an unfortunate and gratuitous wounding of 
capitalism by the culture. If Novak were not so determined to 
control the damage to capitalism's reputation and to dis- 
tribute the blame for our predicaments among the three sec- 
tors-"our tripartite system might be destroyed through the 
economic order, through the political order, or through the 
cultural order" (1 1 6 b h e  would see that if the economic sphere 
is not calling all the shots, it at least is the dynamo of change 
and clearly is faced with the results of its celebration of self- 
interest. 
Part of the reason Novak avoids this conclusion and part of 
the reason he is modest in assessing the psychological costs of 
capitalism is that he does not see the appeal to self-interest and 
even to greed as all that bad. In a fascinating major section of 
his essay, Novak examines the ways in which he feels cap- 
italism is not only not subversive of the Jewish-Christian 
values but can be affirmed by those values. Some of his argu- 
ments are truly remarkable and help to identify the al- 
chemist's formula by which capitalism is found to be relatively 
innocuous, if not even beneficial, in its impact on cultural 
values. 
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Novak first argues that a Jewish-Christian culture can af- 
firm capitalism in "its sense of experiment, openness, and 
innovation, which is captured by the word 'enterprise'." He 
sees the explosion of originality and creativity in capitalism as 
properly exciting the Jewish-Christian imagination: "The in- 
ventiveness of God is respected through respecting the inven- 
tiveness of human beings." If Novak seems to strain religious 
imagination in glimpsing it as celebrating productivity driven 
by profit, the second feature of capitalism that he finds attrac- 
tive truly wrenches that imagination. He praises capitalist 
ideology for emphasizing the humbleness of the human race 
and the fact that we are a community of sinners. As redemp- 
tion should come in the most unlikely spot, in a carpenter from 
a very poor and underdeveloped part of the Roman Empire, 
"capitalist thinkers discovered the dynamic energy to change 
the face of history not where it might be expected, in human 
nobility, grandeur, and moral consciousness, but in human self 
interest. . . . In the pettiest and narrowest and meanest part of 
human behavior lies the source of creative energy-a magnifi- 
cent and, I think, absolutely Jewish and Christian insight. 
Where no one would choose to look the jewels are to be found" 
(1 17). 
These passages demonstrate the myopic nostalgia of No- 
vak's paean to capitalist values and the basis of his optimism 
and enthusiasm that capitalism not only does not lead to a 
spiritual void but is our only hope for seriously performing the 
corporal works of mercy. The key flaw in his attempt to clothe 
capitalism in the humility of Mary Magdalene is his comfort- 
ing assurance that capitalism envisions people as a "com- 
munity of sinners," though in reality the capitalist vision has 
no sense of community at all. Capitalist incentives are built not 
on the "humbleness" of human beings but on their loneliness. 
As we saw earlier in Locke's thought, so seminal in the develop- 
ment of the capitalist vision, self-interest is not a flaw in a 
fallen humankind, it's all that's there. People are by essence 
isolated, solitary atoms who survive together by observing 
pragmatic, self-interested rules but with absolutely no sense of 
identity, either as saints or sinners, and with no sense of com- 
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munity. It is startling to witness how as learned and sophisti- 
cated a theologian and philosopher as Novak can turn the 
Judeo-Christian tradition on its head. That tradition is an 
ironic one in finding virtue and magnificence in strange 
places, but those places are in the hearts of the poor and the 
simple, whose priorities the wealthy and the mighty are chal- 
lenged to adopt, a conversion as difficult as for a camel to pass 
through the eye of a needle. To read Novak, it is as though the 
dynamism in this religious tradition comes from the Pharisees 
rather than the poor and the humble. 
Novak also calls upon us "to save the superior capitalist 
sense of sin, the capitalist sense that self-interest can be re- 
deemed, not by trying to repress it or deny it, but by trying to 
give it expression in a system of checks and balances" (122). 
These checks and balances may moderate the avarice of the 
capitalists and keep them from obliging Marx's prediction 
that they will be their own grave diggers, but how does cap- 
italism redeem self-interest? The inventiveness and productiv- 
ity of capitalism may well be beneficial by-products of self- 
interest, but is this redemption, especially when that success 
has only enticed us further into not a moderation but a cele- 
bration of self-interest and an absorption in competing with 
other people that isolates and alienates us from them? For 
Novak, the essence of capitalism is its creativity and inven- 
tiveness. The appeal to self-interest is acceptable because it is, 
after all, only realistic: "Capitalism builds the sense that, in 
Biblical terms, a kind of cosmic pessimism is not entirely out 
of keeping with human reality." Thus for Novak capitalism is a 
message of light and darkness about human nature, and he 
finds it bright and dark in just the right places. Capitalism is 
bright in its productivity and response to material needs and it 
is dark in its realism about selfishness and sinfulness. He does 
indicate some awareness of capitalism's temptation to hubris 
about material success, but he is confident that capitalism is 
faithful on the whole to a kind of cosmic pessimism. "The 
recognition of the whole dimension of evil is implicit in cap- 
italism, despite its often false rhetoric of optimism and prog- 
ress and betterment" (1 18). 
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This last passage is very important because it seems to 
capture perfectly the leap of faith in capitalism that is behind 
all of Novak's recent plaudits for our economic system. When 
he highlights capitalist pessimism about human nature and 
rejects as an incidental mistake the rhetoric of optimism and 
progress, he is truly out of phase with capitalism as we know it 
today, and we realize that much of his appreciation of cap- 
italism has to do with a nostalgia for the values and culture 
surrounding the capitalism of an earlier day. The fact is that 
"rhetoric about optimism and progress" is not incidental to 
capitalism but is its driving force. As earlier noted in the 
discussion of Locke's theories, capitalism creates visions of 
pursuing unlimited wealth and expanding power over nature 
and other people. It is a theory and vision incompatible with a 
sense of limits, a sense of priorities, and, most significantly, a 
sense of mortality. Capitalism approaches self-interest and 
hedonism with a single embrace, and Novak's attempt to drop 
hedonism from the arms of capitalism is as unavailing as it is 
confused. His failure strikingly reinforces the problem cap- 
italism has with values in general and particularly with the 
need to cope with human mortality. 
If we examine at length Novak's effort to protect capitalism 
from hedonism, we see how debilitating is this linkage with 
hedonism and how fanciful is the concern for values and com- 
munity he attributes to capitalism. His prime argument for a 
split between capitalism and hedonism reassures us more 
about the vehemence of Novak's faith in his new-found solu- 
tion to human misery than about the actual health of cap- 
italism. He argues that capitalism could not embrace hedon- 
ism because it would be so destructive of the essential under- 
pinnings of capitalism: "Democratic capitalism does not en- 
tail-indeed it could not survive if it were dependent upon- 
materialism, individualism, or laissez faire."7 Novak presents 
numerous testimonies from Tocqueville to support his in- 
sistence that American capitalism does not lead to selfishness 
and abandonment of the virtues necessary to protect the pub- 
lic interest. Toward the Future, a letter signed by a group of 
conservative lay Catholics in response to criticisms by U.S. 
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Catholic bishops of economic disparities in the U.S. economy, a 
treatise that was obviously heavily influenced by Novak, 
quotes the following from Tocqueville: 
The inhabitants of the United States almost always manage to com- 
bine their own advantage with that of their fellow citizens. . . . In the 
United States hardly anybody talks of the beauty of virtue; but they 
maintain that virtue is useful, and prove it every day. The American 
moralists do not profess that men ought to sacrifice themselves for 
their fellow-creatures because it is noble to make such sacrifices; but 
they boldly aver that such sacrifices are as necessary to him who 
imposes them upon himself, as to him for whose sake they are 
made. . . . They therefore do not deny that every man may follow his 
own interest; but they endeavor to prove that it is the interest of every 
man to be virtuous.8 
Similarly, in The Spirit o f  Democratic Capitalism Novak 
makes numerous references to Benjamin Franklin in arguing 
that the traditional pursuit of wealth in America does not de- 
tract from communal and civic responsibilities. Novak notes 
Franklin's startling rejection of traditional Christian warnings 
against riches: "Franklin praised wealth and riches. He saw in 
them goals of moral striving. His counsel revealed a shock- 
ingly new moral attitude toward the world. The cosmos itself, 
the imperatives of historical progress, the call of the Creator 
of all things, were seen by Franklin to be impelling young men 
toward ~ e a l t h . " ~  One can agree to some extent with Franklin 
and Tocqueville that the American pursuit of wealth initially 
did not destroy a sense of community and public commitment, 
without agreeing with the key argument that Novak seeks to 
make. The point is that Novak peppers his writings with re- 
assuring quotations from people like Franklin and Tocque- 
ville, seemingly oblivious to the fact that most of his sources 
go back more than a century; this fact is crucial in understand- 
ing Novak's myopia about capitalism's problems with the 
human spirit. The pursuit of wealth in the times of Franklin 
and Tocqueville was not inevitably an avenue to hedonism 
and social irresponsibility because values other than greed- 
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what we loosely describe as the Protestant ethic-were imbed- 
ded in the culture. But these values (parsimony, humility, in- 
dustry, and public service) have been steadily eroded over 
many decades by the self-aggrandizement championed by 
capitalism. It does little good now to harken back to sages 
whose counsels could be reassuring only to a far distant and 
different age. 
Novak's reliance on dated texts to affirm the harmony of 
capitalism with values that enhance the quality of personal 
and community life is not accidental; he would be hard 
pressed to find such an affirmation in authoritative contempo- 
rary sources. The reason that Novak has to rummage among 
historical sources for endorsements of the benign effect of 
capitalism on the human spirit is that he is confused about 
what is central to capitalism and what is peripheral. He is 
wrong about the relevance to today of Tocqueville's complai- 
sance about the symbiosis between self-interest and public 
interest in the same way that he is wrong in the passage quoted 
earlier in thinking that the "false rhetoric of optimism and 
progress and betterment" expressed by contemporary cap- 
italists is incidental to the true capitalist outlook. Novak over- 
looks that it was the restraint encouraged by noncapitalist 
values in Tocqueville's day that moderated the effects of an 
appeal to self-interest, and he overlooks that it is the absence of 
such restraint today that makes the "false rhetoric" of un- 
limited progress truly representative of the contemporary cap- 
italist vision. 
Novak's enthusiasm about the spirit of capitalism is based 
both on an appreciation of earlier values that were not cap- 
italist and are now receding under capitalism's sway and on a 
refusal to acknowledge how much contemporary hedonism 
represents the shrill, dangerous hubris of triumphant cap- 
italist appeals. He is impressive in his concern and sense of 
foreboding about the reign of hedonism, but he stakes much 
too much confidence on denying its kinship to capitalism 
merely because it is destructive of the industriousness and 
saving upon which capitalism depends. Hedonism, however, 
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is not destructive of capitalism's dominant appeal to self- 
interest. Should we be so surprised, given the evidence in 
Western civilization from Greek tragedy on, that a system 
championing self-interest would be blind to the ways in which 
that appeal eventually enervates and undermines that system? 
Novak worries about the effect of self-indulgence upon cap- 
italism, but basking as he does in a naive, tripartite perspec- 
tive on society, he assigns self-indulgence to the cultural 
sphere, capitalism to the economic sphere, and does not see 
how pervasively capitalism is driving all three spheres. 
The extent of Novak's misplaced confidence that capitalism 
not only avoids the morass of hedonism but also contributes to 
public-spiritedness is seen especially in his frequent argu- 
ments in recent writings that capitalism promotes coopera- 
tion among people. He insists that critics rashly misjudge the 
extent of individualism in capitalist enterprises, particularly 
the modern corporation. Unlike the sweat shops and dark 
satanic mills of an earlier time, the contemporary corporation, 
he argues, cannot succeed without cooperation and interde- 
pendence. Novak chastises both opponents and proponents of 
democratic capitalism for stressing the ideology of individu- 
alism and missing the "essential communitarian character" of 
this system (94). He stresses how necessary it is that large 
corporations operate with a sense of teamwork and interde- 
pendence: "The immense literature on the problems of man- 
agement today gives fascinating attention to human problems, 
employee relationships, and styles of personal communica- 
tion. The industrial and commercial process is long and com- 
plex; a failure at any one point is a weak link in a chain. Unity 
of purpose is a necessary ideal. Ninety percent of a manager's 
problems, the textbooks say, are human problems" (132). 
In seeking to emphasize the spirit of cooperation in cap- 
italist business life, Novak seems again to confuse enlightened 
self-interest with actual practice. That a corporation is vul- 
nerable to employees who guardedly, perhaps surreptitiously, 
pursue personal profit and self-interest, and that many em- 
ployees want to pursue more long-range and fulfilling incen- 
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tives, does not mean that most corporations are not thoroughly 
guided by the bottom line and are not prepared to forsake 
- 
cohesiveness the moment it competes with profitability. It 
may be true that a high proportion of a chief executive officer's 
time "is spent in making decisions about personnel and in 
conveying-a spirit of unity, coordination and morale through- 
out a farflung organization" (131), but that hardly means a 
corporation breeds a spirit that is "essentially communitar- 
ian." With profit as the guiding goal, the real aim for corporate 
students of human relations might be to create a myriad of 
placebo decision-sharing arrangements that do not threaten 
the company's central reason for existence. Corporate man- 
agers no doubt do steep themselves in textbooks on employee 
relations, but this may well suggest that the spirit of cap- 
italism is wily and manipulative rather than cooperative. 
To argue that enterprises would be more productive if run in 
a genuinely cooperative way that recognizes the legitimate 
rights and expertise of workers is hardly a part of capitalist 
doctrine. Novak's pipe dream that corporations are "essen- 
tially communitarian," merely because a cooperative spirit 
would be in their long-range interests, flies in the face of 
bedrock capitalist insistence on the prerogatives of ownership 
and control. Some capitalist experts on industrial relations 
argue against allowing even the appearance of worker par- 
ticipation because it leads to challenges to management pre- 
rogatives and the power of capital. In an article on "Why 
Motivation Theory Won't Work" in the Harvard Business Re- 
view, Thomas Fitzgerald, director of employee research and 
training for the Chevrolet Division of General Motors, points 
out that meaningful work reform must include the redesign of 
jobs and the production process with the participation of 
workers and with worker access to sensitive corporate infor- 
mation. Compare Novak's communitarian visions of the rela- 
tion of labor and management under capitalism with the 
worries of this real-world practitioner about how even small 
beginnings of "cooperative relationships" would lead to ser- 
ious inroads into management power: 
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Once competence is shown (or believed to be shown) in, say, rearrang- 
ing the work area, and after participation has become a conscious, 
officially-sponsored activity, participation may well want to go on to 
topics of job assignment, the allocation of rewards, or even the selec- 
tion of leadership. In other words, management's present monopoly- 
on initiating participation, on the nomination of conferees, and the 
limitation of legitimate areas of review--can itself easily become a 
source of contention.10 
One more example of Novak's unflagging optimism about 
the motives of the capitalist system is seen in his enthusiasm 
about the social benefits of decentralized power in our society: 
The economic system of democratic capitalism depends to an ex- 
traordinary extent upon the social capacities of the human person. Its 
system of inheritance respects the familial character of motivation. 
Its corporate pattern reflects the necessity of shared risks and shared 
rewards. Its divisions both of labor and of specialization reflect the 
demands of teamwork and association. Its separated churches and 
autonomous universities reflect the importance of independent mor- 
al communities. The ideology of individualism, too much stressed by 
some proponents and some opponents alike, disguises the essential 
communitarian character of its system.11 
Here, as throughout his treatment of capitalism, Novak loses 
sight of his antecedents. The various "its" in this paragraph 
refer to "the economic system of democratic capitalism." Does 
Novak seriously ascribe "separated churches" and "autono- 
mous universities" to the capitalist economic system? Appar- 
ently any attractive institutions or practices in our culture are 
results of the free market economy. Any embarrassments are 
chalked up to the separate realms of culture and politics that 
threaten to erode the spirit and discipline of a progressive 
economy. 
Democratic capitalism has no special devotion to separated 
churches or autonomous universities, any more than its sys- 
tem of inheritance reflects familial values or its specialization 
of labor responds to a concern for teamwork. Family values, 
teamwork, religious diversity, and free inquiry are not crea- 
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tures of the capitalist system and do not necessarily reflect its 
priorities. The needs of most families-and the principle of 
equal opportunity-may be far better served by greater re- 
strictions on inheritance, just as capitalist specialization of 
labor can be linked to alienation and industrial anomie. It is 
also very doubtful that churches and universities, if capitalists 
had their way, would long maintain their independence from 
an absorption with commerce and the arts of getting and 
spending. Novak forgets what Milton Friedman reminds us of 
with ringing clarity: "There is one and only one social respon- 
sibility of business-to use its resources and engage in ac- 
tivities designed to increase its profits."12 
Nevertheless, it is important that we avoid the reductionist 
tendency that Novak sometimes falls into and that we ac- 
knowledge that capitalism is not necessarily at war with the 
values he promotes. Capitalism's emphasis on efficiency and 
productivity has periodically provided an economic base to 
raise the standard of living and to allow valuable artistic and 
cultural pursuits to flourish. This is no meager accomplish- 
ment, but neither does it eradicate, as Novak seems to think, 
the underlying stigma of capitalism: that it goads individuals 
to heights of productivity by promoting a model of human 
relations that glorifies competitiveness and self-aggrandize- 
ment. It is this flaw in the appeal of capitalism that remains 
visible after all of Michael Novak's imaginative plastic surgery. 
He persuasively makes the case that there is much good in the 
basic instincts of the American people, but his persuasiveness 
ends with his assumption that most of what is attractive in our 
people and institutions reflects favorably on capitalism, or 
that most of what is unattractive is a cultural challenge to our 
economic system. 
I have focused at length on Novak's arguments because they 
dramatically play down the social significance of a greater 
acceptance of mortality in our society. In effect, Novak is 
saying that such personal attitudinal changes are irrelevant to 
the society because capitalism already embraces the commu- 
nitarian values I have emphasized in the lessons death teaches. 
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I hope we have seen enough problems in his arguments to 
glimpse the dimensions of changes in social and political at- 
titudes that can be sparked by changed attitudes about death. 
The appreciation of such changes should intensify as we dis- 
cuss Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch, who point to the 
problems in our culture that cry out for the kind of political 
consciousness that facing our mortality may provide. 
6. Death and Politics 
The Road to Narcissism 
and Back 
She thought she would live forever, but forever always 
ends. 
-Linda Thompson 
The analysis of Michael Novak's defense of the spirit of demo- 
cratic capitalism shows that the crisis of spirit and public 
values that bedevils contemporary culture and that provides 
the context for a change in attitudes toward death has no 
arbitrary or accidental origin. His inability to isolate the eco- 
nomic and cultural realms in our society or to mitigate cap- 
italist appeals to competition and greed with images of coop- 
erativeness only underlines the extent to which contemporary 
hedonism is but a full flowering of the denial of limits in capi- 
talist thinkers from Locke on. The treatment of capitalism and 
contemporary values by Daniel Bell and Christopher Lasch 
further supports this description of the cultural setting. Lasch 
more clearly connects the increasing isolation and self-absorp- 
tion in our society to an inability to deal with death and aging, 
but this linkage is also consistent with key parts of Bell's 
examination of the problems and needs of our culture. 
Michael Novak acknowledges that his division of society 
into three separate realms is inspired by Daniel Bell's thought. 
In The Cultural Contradictions of  Capitalism and other works, 
Bell does try to make the case for the disjunction of economic 
and cultural developments. But this disjunction in Bell is not 
as firm as it becomes in Novak, and in several key places Bell 
allows that the disjunction is fuzzy. Moreover, Bell's argu- 
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ments that appear to support Novak's defense of capitalism 
against the charge that it is responsible for contemporary he- 
donism are among his weakest. Most important, the changes 
Bell sees as necessary if our society is not to become totally 
demoralized cut deeply into Novak's confidence that cap- 
italism is a solution rather than a problem. Bell's changes 
definitely require transcending the moral flaws of capitalism 
and, indeed, constitute a ringing endorsement of the changes 
that could be produced by a new acceptance of human mor- 
tality. 
Bell underlines the relevance of our effort when he observes 
in The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism that culture is 
centrally concerned with "how one meets death."' Bell's de- 
scription of the interplay of economics and culture is learned, 
fascinating, and merits extensive summation and analysis. 
Basically, he disagrees with Hegelians and Marxists, who have 
a holistic view of society, and argues that society is not integral 
but disjunctive. He divides society into three distinct realms, 
the techno-economic structure, the polity, and the culture. Bell 
sees the economic order as organizing the production and the 
allocation of goods and services and framing the occupations 
and stratification systems of the society. By culture, he means 
expressive symbolism: those efforts in painting, poetry, and 
fiction, or in the religious forms of litany, liturgy, and ritual 
that seek to explore and express the meanings of human exist- 
ence in some imaginative form. These realms have different 
rhythms of change; they follow different norms, which legiti- 
mate different, sometimes contrasting, types of behavior. The 
discordances among these realms are responsible for the con- 
tradictions within society. I focus here on the interplay Bell 
sees between the economic and cultural areas and on the 
question whether resistance to new attitudes toward death is 
to be expected only in the culture or in all three realms, 
particularly the economic area. 
Bell traces the disjunction between social structure and 
culture in the modern period in the contrast of changing moral 
tempers. The culture of modernism and the economics of the 
bourgeois entrepreneur derive from the common thread of 
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individualism that has run through Western civilization since 
the sixteenth century: "The Western ideal was the autonomous 
man who, in becoming self-determining would achieve free- 
dom. With this 'new man' there was a repudiation of institu- 
tions (the striking result of the Reformation, which installed 
individual conscience as the source of judgment); the opening 
of new geographical and social frontiers; the desire, and the 
growing ability, to master nature and to make of oneself what 
one can, and even, in discarding old roots, to remake oneself 
altogether. What began to count was not the past but the future 
(16). 
This new Western view gave rise in the economic sphere to 
the bourgeois entrepreneur who, liberated from the ascriptive 
ties of the traditional world with its fixed status and limits on 
acquisition, remakes the economic world. The free movement 
of goods and money and individual economic and social mo- 
bility become the ideal, as we saw in the thought of John Locke. 
In the development of culture, Bell points to the rise of the 
independent artist, released from church and princely patron, 
writing and painting what pleases him rather than his sponsor. 
This search for independence, not only from patrons but from 
all conventions, finds its cultural expression in modernism. 
The impulse driving both the entrepreneur and the artist is a 
relentlessness in pursuing the new, in reworking nature, and in 
refashioning consciousness. 
Whereas both impulses derived from the same surge of 
modernity, Bell argues that paradoxically "each impulse then 
became highly conscious of the other, feared the other, and 
sought to destroy it." Radical in economics, the bourgeois im- 
pulse became conservative in morals and cultural taste, and 
that impulse "was organized into a highly restrictive character 
structure whose energies were channeled into the production 
of goods and into a set of attitudes toward work that feared 
instinct, spontaneity, and vagrant impulse" (17). For its part, 
the cultural impulse turned into a rage against bourgeois val- 
ues. Bell cites, as an example, Baudelaire who damned utility, 
rationalism, and materialism as barren. Baudelaire dis- 
paraged bourgeois life as devoid of both spirit and excess, 
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showing only the "cruel implacable regularity" of industry. 
Bell sees culture thus driven further and further from the hold 
of restraint to the acceptance of impulse and to a focus on the 
self that becomes idolatrous. The hallmark of modernism be- 
comes authenticity: "this concern with the authentic self 
makes the motive and not the action-the impact on the self, 
not the moral consequence-the source of ethical and aesthet- 
ic judgments" (19). 
At this point, Bell seems on the verge of Novak's conclusion 
that the realm of culture has given rise to the selfish hedonism 
that abounds in modernity and has subverted the capitalist 
ethic; otherwise, the capitalist ethic would have maintained a 
blend between greed and social virtues. But Bell also provides 
the groundwork for rebutting Novak's conclusions, which are 
based on only a part of Bell's analysis of economics and 
culture. That part, Bell's insistence on the separateness of the 
two realms, is both brilliant and unsatisfactory. He allows a 
small elite group of artists and literati to represent the 
"culture" of a given period. Had he treated popular culture, the 
separation from the driving force of economics would be hard- 
er to show. And although Bell shows that the elite culture 
reacted viciously to the onslaught of bourgeois values, the fact 
is that it did react and that the economic realm set much of the 
agenda for the culture, even though economics was itself the 
target of the literati. Bell sees the economic structure reacting 
in turn to the challenge from the culture, but that reaction was 
similar only in its disdain. The economy clearly was the more 
forceful of these two combatants, and it clearly was the actor 
and culture the reactor. The economic and social structure had 
its own agenda-productivity, profits, power. The joust with 
elite culture remained an ancillary, rear guard action. Opposi- 
tion to instinct, spontaneity, and impulse is not primarily an 
attack on the elite culture but a dictate of economic growth 
and capital accumulation. 
Bell does not share in Novak's use of the separate realms in 
the society to lay blame for the loss of the work ethic at the feet 
of the culture. The strongest evidence for this is that Bell 
argues explicitly that "the Protestant ethic was undermined 
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not by modernism but by capitalism itself" (21). He severely 
faults the culture of modernism for its idolatry of the self, but 
Bell is convinced that "the breakup of the traditional bour- 
geois value system, in fact, was brought about by the bourgeois 
economic system-by the free market, to be precise," and "this 
is the source of the contradiction of capitalism in American 
life" (55). Bell locates "the greatest single engine in the destruc- 
tion of the Protestant ethic" in the invention of the installment 
plan and instant credit. Previously one had to save in order to 
buy; credit cards allow indulgence in instant gratification. The 
system "was transformed by mass production and mass con- 
sumption, by the creation of new wants and new means of 
gratifying those wants" (21). 
Bell directly contradicts the image Novak creates of a ro- 
bust, innovative, creative capitalist economy that uplifts both 
the material and spiritual expectations of rich and poor alike, 
and whose only impediment is the hedonism in the culture 
that threatens the parsimonious and cooperative lifestyle pro- 
moted by capitalism. For Bell, capitalism itself cast away the 
Protestant ethic, and capitalism's claims of creating greater 
freedom are at best only partially true and certainly do not 
offset capitalism's major detriment-the undermining of "ul- 
timate meanings" in a society: 
The Protestant ethic had served to limit sumptuary (though not cap- 
ital) accumulation. When the Protestant ethic was sundered from 
bourgeois society, only the hedonism remained, and the capitalist 
system lost its transcendental ethic. There remains the argument that 
capitalism serves as the basis for freedom, and for a rising standard of 
living and the defeat of poverty. Yet even if these arguments were 
true-for it is clear that freedom depends more upon the historical 
traditions of a particular society than upon the system of capitalism 
itself; and even the ability of the system to for economic 
growth is now questioned-the lack of a transcendental tie, the sense 
that a society fails to provide some set of "ultimate meanings" in its 
character structure, work, and culture, becomes unsettling to a sys- 
tem. [21] 
As vehement as Bell's indictment of capitalism's loss of 
values is, however, he does not see clearly why capitalism gets 
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into the binds that it does. He speaks of the fateful new develop- 
ments in marketing and advertising as if they are corruptions 
that the economic system just stumbled into, and he does not 
examine how much an appeal to competition and envy is at the 
heart of the capitalist reward system. He does observe that "if 
consumption represents the psychological competition for 
status, then one can say that bourgeois society is the institu- 
tionalization of envy." And in a footnote he exclaims with great 
insight about how central envy is to an economic system that 
promises unlimited acquisition: "It is surprising how little the 
idea of envy has been utilized in sociological literature as the 
source of status competition. A neglected writer, in this re- 
spect, is Adam Smith, who, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments, 
declared that if people were ruled by economic motives alone, 
there would be little stimulus to increase production above 
necessities or needs. It is because men are driven by an impulse 
for status that economic 'development' began" (22-23). 
In spite of the clarity of this insight into the psychological 
assumptions of capitalism and how closely it fits the portrait 
of Locke's undeclared value system examined earlier, Bell ex- 
hibits confusion in much of his treatment of the moral decline 
of capitalism and the role of envy and greed as qualities inher- 
ing in the economic system and leading inevitably to the 
abandonment of the Protestant ethic. 
In analyzing the difficulty of maintaining a commitment to 
the public interest under capitalism, Bell observes that "the 
problem of virtue arose because of the dual, and necessarily 
contradictory, role of the individual as both citoyen and bour- 
geois" (20). As the first, he says, the individual had obligations 
to the polity of which he or she was a part; as the second, he or 
she had private concerns that comported with self-interest. He 
sees these motives as in conflict, but Bell does not make it 
sufficiently clear that private concerns would inevitably can- 
nibalize obligations to the polity in a system founded on self- 
interest as a goal, and which advocates public virtue merely as 
a means to that goal. Bell betrays here some of the perplexity of 
his colleague Irving Kristol, who is surprised in his essay, 
"When Virtue Loses All Her Loveliness," that the twin commit- 
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ments of the American founders to personal wealth and the 
public good tilted increasingly to the former in successive 
generations. Bell sees the role of envy in the capitalist system, 
but does not appear to see it as a driving, compelling, dominat- 
ing role, and one is perhaps free to assume that "if only" the 
system hadn't come upon the device of the installment plan, or 
"if only" the invention of the automobile had not freed the 
rural majority from the local surveillance of the Protestant 
ethic, then capitalism might have continued the balancing act 
that its divines, from Locke to Smith to Kristol and Novak, 
ascribe to it. 
This mix of stunning insight and confusion is also present in 
Bell's analysis of modern culture and its interplay with cap- 
italism. This is particularly true in his brief treatment of the 
key issue that occasions this discussion of economics and 
culture, the impact on society of the acknowledgment of death 
and the sense of limits that inheres in mortality. With great 
acumen, he sees resistance to death and to limits as a crucial 
part of modernism and its absorption with the self. But like 
Ernest Becker, Bell makes the crucial mistake of assuming that 
it is death rather than the denial of death that leads to despair 
and excess: "The deepest nature of modern man, the secret of 
his soul as revealed by the modern metaphysic, is that he seeks 
to reach out beyond himself; knowing that negativity- 
death-is finite, he refuses to accept it. Behind the chiliasm of 
modern man is the megalomania of self-infinitization. In con- 
sequence, the modern hubris is the refusal to accept limits, the 
insistence on continually reaching out; and the modern world 
proposes a destiny that is always beyond: beyond morality, 
beyond tragedy, beyond culture" (49-50). 
Bell cites as a colleague in this insight Saul Bellow, who, in 
Mr. Sammbr's Planet reflects on the enemies of civilization: 
"For what it amounted to was limitless demand-insatiability, 
refusal of the doomed creature (death being sure and final) to 
go away from this world unsatisfied. A full bill of demand and 
complaint was therefore presented by each individual. Non- 
negotiable, recognizing no scarcity in any human depart- 
ment" (50). 
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The points of Bell and Bellow are important for our pur- 
poses not only because they deal with our general topic of the 
impact of death but, more particularly, because they present 
the effect of death upon culture with no reference to the role of 
capitalist values in this interface of death and culture. While it 
is possible that they are merely taking note of how unprepared 
the denizens of modern, egocentric culture are to deal with the 
issue of limits, it appears that both authors could be making 
the same mistake Becker does in seeing the issue of death as 
threatening and negative under all circumstances and as driv- 
ing people to impulsive excess. 
The point made earlier in criticism of Becker needs to be 
asserted in response to Bell's too-brief treatment of death: it is 
not some innate incapacity to deal with death that pushes 
people to an impulsive denial of limits; rather, it is a denial of 
limits that leads to an inability to deal with death. Bell and 
Bellow are correct in indicating the extreme and unfortunate 
consequences of a denial of death, but their identification of 
causes and effects is confused. This confusion is of course 
momentous in the treatment of bourgeois economics and cul- 
ture we have been pursuing, for it stems from a failure in both 
Bell and Novak to realize fully how much the denial of limits 
and the interpersonal alienation, which we see at full bloom in 
the contemporary culture of hedonism, were endemic in the 
bourgeois economic system from the start. 
Bell is correct in linking the issue of death and limits to the 
problems of our culture, but he is mistaken in not linking it 
directly with the economic system and in not seeing by this 
example how much the envy and greed promoted by the eco- 
nomic system have undermined the cultural realm and are 
responsible not only for the demise of the Protestant ethic, 
which Bell acknowledges, but also for the loss of bearings and 
the aimlessness in the culture. 
Such a view of the corruption of culture by the demands of 
the economic realm is at odds with part of Bell's analysis and 
all of Novak's. But this view gains a strong endorsement in 
Bell's conclusion to The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism. 
This conclusion also provides as urgent an endorsement for the 
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impact upon culture and society as an acceptance of human 
mortality may have. In his conclusion, he summarizes the 
development and current state of American culture with a tone 
of melancholy and alarm: 
In the United States, what gave purpose to the republic at its founding 
was a sense of destiny-the idea, expressed by Jefferson, that on this 
virgin continent God's design would be unfolded. On a virgin con- 
tinent, men could be free, prodigally so, to pursue their individual 
ends and celebrate their achievements. Its doctrine was shaped by a 
Protestantism which emphasized sobriety, work, and resistance to the 
temptations of the flesh. . . . 
In the heyday of the imperial republic, the quiet sense of destiny 
and the harsh creed of personal conduct were replaced by a virulent 
"Americanism," a manifest destiny that took us overseas, and a mate- 
rialist hedonism which provided the incentives to work. Today that 
manifest destiny is shattered, the Americanism has worn thin, and 
only the hedonism remains. It is a poor recipe for national unity and 
purpose. [28] 
Bell, nevertheless, sees emerging from our loss of innocence, 
assurance, and power a certain virtue: "the possibility of a self- 
conscious maturity (which the stoics called the tragic sense of 
life) that dispenses with charismatic leaders, ideological doc- 
trines, and manifest destinies, and which seeks to redefine 
one's self and one's liberal society on the only basis on which it 
can survive." He believes this basis must be created by joining 
three actions: "the reaffirmation of our past, for only if we 
know the inheritance from the past can we become aware of 
the obligation to our posterity; recognition of the limits of 
resources and the priority of needs, individual and social, over 
unlimited appetite and wants; and agreement upon a con- 
ception of equity which gives all persons a sense of fairness and 
inclusion in the society and which promotes a situation where, 
within the relevant spheres, people become more equal so that 
they can be treated equally" (281-82). 
Bell gives us scant indication, let alone explanation and de- 
sign, of how these three changes can be initiated and achieved. 
But his vision of what is needed in our society strikingly 
supports the major theme of this study. Surely we could have 
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no more eloquent testimony to the propensity of contempo- 
rary capitalism to blur the distinction between needs and 
wants and garble our priorities. Bell, like Novak, envisions 
society divided into the three realms of economy, culture, and 
polity; yet in his conclusion Bell presents a picture of crisis 
produced by the economy's undermining of culture, the exact 
opposite of Novak's description of society's present plight. 
Moreover, the three conjoined changes Bell hopes for as a 
way out of the chaotic rule of impulse and self-interest coincide 
closely with the changes that we earlier suggested would result 
if our culture could support an acceptance of human mortality. 
In light of Bell's conclusion, such change is not necessarily idle 
speculation, for it describes a scenario of culture merely em- 
bracing its most important charge. In some ways Bell's 
changes describe a reassertion of culture's rightful place in 
helping people find significance and purpose in their individu- 
al and social lives and, as he put it at the beginning of his book, 
lay the groundwork for "how one meets death." This is a 
crucial mission on which modern Western culture has in- 
creasingly defaulted as it has alternately defied the burgeon- 
ing capitalist economy with fits of libertarianism but also 
accommodated that economy's dictates of continuous growth 
with a narcissism and hedonism that dictated in turn an es- 
cape from reality and the denial of death. 
Although we have argued that culture has been more subser- 
vient to economics than Novak and, at times, Bell recognize, 
the core of that argument was not a deprecation of the power of 
culture but an insistence that capitalism's loss of a moral basis 
was a self-inflicted wound and not the result of attack by a 
secular, individualistic culture. For the three hundred years 
since Locke laid out the vision of unlimited acquisition for 
solipsistic, competitive individuals, culture has increasingly 
been in retreat and largely a bystander or accomplice in the 
spread of the competitive model of human relationships. What 
is different now is that capitalism is no longer the potent 
competitor it once was, as Bell demonstrates so articulately. 
The economy of growth and competition has lost the moral 
base that limited excess and extravagance but inspired capital 
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investment, so the economy is now exposed to the culture of 
impulse it has created. As Bell points out, there is grave danger 
to the society in this time of economic chaos and psychological 
drift, but there is also the opportunity for culture to reassert 
itself, to challenge the empty personal identity and values 
capitalism has spawned, and to reassert culture's mission of 
providing people with a meaning for their lives with which 
they may confront their mortality. 
Such a challenge to capitalism does not mean that the only 
avenue to the future is back toward Mam. The change espoused 
here will be most un-Marxian in that it will be pushed by a new 
human consciousness as people demand not so much econom- 
ic liberation as a culture that recognizes and respects both life 
and death. The power and urgency of such a change are 
glimpsed in how directly an increasing acceptance of death in 
our culture would lead to the three changes in our society for 
which Bell anxiously hopes: the reaffirmation of the past; a 
respect for the limits of resources and the priority of needs over 
wants; and an agreement on a conception of equity. 
We have considered how vitally an acceptance of death is 
accompanied by a realization that the most precious achieve- 
ment we can want is to give and extend life in others, and a 
realization that we live because previous generations have 
done that for us. Realizing the finality and fragility of life is a 
push toward setting priorities and examining values and 
needs. Death manifestly challenges the illusory goal of acquir- 
ing more and more wealth and power as ends in themselves 
with no concern for a hierarchy of values. Finally, death is the 
ultimate guarantor of the democracy and equality Bell seeks. 
It "happeneth to them all," and death is a prod to con- 
sciousness and understanding about life and, as such, con- 
firms not just a biological equality but a potential equality of 
insight as well. 
In perceiving what a close match there is between the at- 
titudinal changes that result from accepting mortality and the 
changes Daniel Bell finds imperative in our society, we can 
further appreciate the power and timeliness of putting an end 
to the denial of death. Why capitalist culture would encourage 
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the denial of death is evident from the severity by which this 
- - 
culture is challenged by a recognition of the inheritance from 
the past and an acceptance of limits and of equality. The 
acceptance of death would seem to have a key role in re- 
habilitating our culture and our shared visions of a good life, as 
a revitalized culture has a key role in supporting a wider 
acceptance of death. Whereas a dated confidence in capital- 
ism's effect on the human spirit keeps Michael Novak from 
appreciating the momentousness of this reciprocal develop- 
ment, the lack of that confidence in Daniel Bell provokes a 
compelling critique of capitalism and a vigorous call for the 
cultural half of this reciprocal development. For a fuller appre- 
ciation of the importance of that cultural renewal, and for an 
approach to culture that sees more explicitly its connection to 
the treatment of death, we now examine what Christopher 
Lasch makes of our society's predicament and possibilities. 
Even a brief consideration of Christopher Lasch's The 
Culture of Narcissism suffices to confirm how seriously mis- 
taken is the idea that there is nothing alarming about the 
effects of capitalism on the values of individuals and the cul- 
ture as a whole. Lasch details the terrible silence that is de- 
veloping when it comes to our culture's articulating for people 
a sense of purpose and meaning in their lives. This traditional 
mission of culture is subordinated to the economy's need for 
people to function first as economic beings and consumers in 
quest of new trappings of success. Like Daniel Bell, Lasch sees 
the economy not as the threatened victim of a confused culture 
but as the creator of a deep sense of drift and dislocation in the 
culture. Lasch also makes evident the connection of narcissism 
with an inability to deal with death, and thus gives some 
explicit indication of the significance of changed attitudes 
toward death in our culture. We can allow that Lasch's indict- 
ments do not extend to the whole of our culture, but he does 
describe poignantly the ominous direction in which we are 
heading, driven by an economic order hostile to the concept of 
limits and the concept of mortality. 
Lasch sees as the mark of a narcissistic culture the isolation 
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and aloneness of people in total competition with everyone 
else. The desperateness and absurdity of this isolated condi- 
tion is masked by the applause, early on, of society and the 
conviction that one is pursuing "pleasure." But, Lasch insists, 
contemporary hedonism originates not in the pursuit of plea- 
sure but "in a war of all against all, in which even the most 
intimate encounters become a form of mutual e~ploitation."~ 
For this reason, Lasch takes issue with Richard Sennett and 
others who blame the contemporary malaise on the invasion 
of the public realm by the ideology of intimacy. In fact, Lasch 
asserts, both the public and private realms have disintegrated: 
The cult of intimacy originates not in the assertion of personality, but 
in its collapse. . . . 
Poets and novelists today, far from glorifying the self, chronicle its 
disintegration. Therapies that minister to the shattered ego convey 
the same message. Our society, far from fostering private life at the 
expense of public life, has made deep and lasting friendships, love 
affairs, and marriages increasingly difficult to achieve. As social life 
becomes more and more warlike and barbaric, personal relations, 
which ostensibly provide relief from these conditions, take on the 
character of combat. Some of the new therapies dignify this combat 
as "assertiveness" and "fighting fair in love and marriage." Others 
celebrate impermanent attachments under such formulas as "open 
marriage" and "open-ended commitments." Thus they intensify the 
disease they pretend to cure. They do this, however, not by diverting 
attention from social problems to personal ones, from real issues to 
false issues, but by obscuring the social origins of the suffering-not 
to be confused with complacent self-absorption-that is painfully but 
falsely experienced as purely personal and private. [30] 
In demonstrating how the contemporary marketplace is as 
ruinous for individual entrepreneurs as for the culture in gen- 
eral, Lasch dispels the illusion of the cooperative spirit Novak 
dreams of in the corporate world. The narcissist has just the 
traits that make for success in bureaucratic institutions, 
which, Lasch argues, put a premium on the manipulation of 
interpersonal relations and discourage the formation of deep 
personal attachments. The management of personal impres- 
sions comes naturally to the narcissist, and he or she succeeds 
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in political or business organizations "where performance 
now counts for less than 'visibility,' 'momentum,' and a win- 
ning record." With the help of Michael Maccoby's study of 
corporate managers, Lasch describes the key goal of the con- 
temporary corporate manager as being "known as a winner, 
and his deepest fear is to be labeled a loser." As opposed to 
Novak's fantasy that the corporate executive's focus on person- 
nel motivation results in visions of cooperative team work, 
Lasch cites a recent textbook for managers that finds success 
today means "not simply getting ahead" but "getting ahead of 
others." The new executive wants "to maintain an illusion of 
limitless options" and has little capacity for "personal inti- 
macy and social commitment" (44). 
Lasch sees the economic system fueling the self-interest and 
emptying the visions of many more than its practitioners. 
Advertising has become the key vehicle for shaping and reflect- 
ing national values, and he argues that advertising in the 
twentieth century has had a dominant impact on developing a 
lifestyle of narcissism. Whereas Novak plays down the power 
of advertising and sees important competition among adver- 
tisements, Lasch agrees with Bell that mass production "re- 
quired not only the capitalistic organization of production but 
the organization of consumption and leisure as well." For- 
merly, when capitalism was still tempered by the Protestant 
ethic, advertising merely called attention to the product and 
celebrated its assets. Now, Lasch says, it also creates its own 
product: "the consumer, perpetually unsatisfied, restless, anx- 
ious, and bored." Advertising thus serves not so much to pro- 
mote products as to promote consumption as a way of life: 
It "educates" the masses into an unappeasable appetite not only for 
goods but for new experiences and personal fulfillment. It upholds 
consumption as the answer to the age-old discontents of loneliness, 
sickness, weariness, lack of sexual satisfaction; at the same time it 
creates new forms of discontent peculiar to the modern age. It plays 
seductively on the malaise of industrial civilization. Is your job bor- 
ing and meaningless? Does it leave you with feelings of futility and 
fatigue? Is your life empty? 
Consumption promises to fill the aching void; hence the attempt to 
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surround commodities with an aura of romance; with allusions to 
exotic places and vivid experiences; and with images of female 
breasts from which all blessings flow.3 
The propaganda of commodities, Lasch argues, upholds 
consumption as an alternative to protest. It provides an outlet 
by changing the more superficial areas where fashion reigns. 
Thus the discouraged worker, "instead of attempting to change 
the conditions of his work, seeks renewal in brightening his 
immediate surroundings with goods and services." The propa- 
ganda of consumption also turns alienation itself into a com- 
modity. "It addresses itself to the spiritual desolation of 
modern life and proposes consumption as the cure. It not only 
promises to palliate all the old unhappiness to which flesh is 
heir; it creates or exacerbates new forms of unhappiness- 
personal insecurity, status anxiety, anxiety in parents about 
their ability to satisfy the needs of the young. Do you look 
dowdy next to your neighbors? Do you own a car inferior to 
theirs? Are your children as healthy? as popular? doing as well 
in school? Advertising institutionalizes envy and its attendant 
anxieties" (73). 
Lasch's astute reminder of the motives and effects of adver- 
tising cuts to the quick attempts such as Novak's to sugar over 
the capitalist economic system and to pretend that that system 
does not massively affect culture and politics. Nowhere is it 
clearer than in the appeals of the advertising industry how 
much capitalism shapes the values of society, and how much 
the enticement to consume is at odds with people taking con- 
trol of their lives and setting priorities for themselves. The only 
objection that needs to be raised to Lasch's treatment of cap- 
italism is that he sees this competition and anti-social appeal 
of capitalism as of rather recent vintage. He draws a sharp line 
between the capitalism of the nineteenth century and that of 
today. Not only was advertising more direct and honest in 
simpler times, he argues, but distinction then was based on 
true achievement and the entrepreneur had to respond to true 
needs. 
Lasch emphasizes the distance between Henry Ward Beech- 
106 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
er, who believed that "work is more important than hap- 
piness," and the contemporary narcissists, who can only see 
themselves in others' eyes and who choose celebrity over 
achievement. But he deemphasizes too much the dominant 
theme in capitalism that stretches from Locke through Pur- 
itan entrepreneurs to the robber barons and to Madison Ave- 
nue today. That theme is the competitive pall cast over all 
human relations. 
When Lasch tells us that wealth is attractive only where 
there is scarcity and the opportunity to compare riches, and 
when he paints a portrait of contemporary narcissists vying 
for a "winning image" with no concept of self but a status de- 
termined by comparison with others, we are exposed to but 
variations on the same theme. The great void in the capitalist 
personality, which was only partly and insufficiently filled by 
the Protestant ethic, is the total absence of ends or norms in 
assessing either persons or possessions. Wealth is appraised 
only in comparison of one moment to another, and thus 
"growth" is the key index of virtue in the capitalist catechism. 
People are assessed only in comparison to other people, with 
amount of economic power the essential criterion for deter- 
mining worth and achievement. The aggressiveness, the envy, 
the emptiness, and the despair of the narcissist are not new, 
even if they now stand more naked and desperate than before. 
Lasch's portrait of a significant part of our culture and popula- 
tion lost in the desert of narcissism is accurate and frightening, 
but the winds that produced the desert have been blowing for a 
far longer time than he allows. 
Whatever disagreement one might have with Lasch in dat- 
ing the origins of appeals to narcissism in Western culture, his 
treatment of the subject is, nevertheless, particularly im- 
pressive in seeing the relation of narcissism to attitudes to- 
ward death. Like Bell, Lasch unfortunately does not give this 
relationship sustained detailed treatment, but Lasch's various 
and separate statements on this subject are more numerous 
and precise than Bell's or perhaps those of anyone else writing 
on the subject. Assembling Lasch's disparate observations on 
narcissism and death, we find that these insights substantially 
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advance our appreciation of both the political relevance of 
ideas about death and the potential for cultural change in a 
change of those ideas. 
Lasch links the narcissistic personality type with the "in- 
tense fear of old age and death" in contemporary culture and 
faults other social critics for ignoring this connection (33). In 
underlining the prevalence today of narcissistic disorders, 
Lasch cites the observation by Herbert Hendin that "it is no 
accident that at the present time the dominant events in psy- 
choanalysis are the rediscovery of narcissism and the new 
emphasis on the psychological significance of death" (42). In 
discussing the prime strategy of corporate managers to avoid 
too close an identification with the company and to keep all 
their options open, Lasch observes: "The fear of entrapment or 
stagnation is closely connected in turn with the fear of aging 
and death. The mobility mania and the cult of 'growth' can 
themselves be seen, in part, as the expression of the fear of ag- 
ing that has become so intense in American society. Mobility 
and growth assure the individual that he has not yet settled 
into the living death of old age" (45). 
Near the end of his book, Lasch emphasizes the lack of 
connection narcissists feel with the past, a generational lone- 
liness that Bell also sees as a telling flaw in contemporary 
hedonist culture. Lasch, however, takes this observation fur- 
ther and notes how this detachment from the past also cuts one 
off from the future and thus makes death completely terrify- 
ing. With so few inner resources, the narcissists look to others 
to validate their sense of self. Needing to be admired for beauty, 
charm, celebrity, or power, they find little to sustain them 
when youth passes them by. With Jonathan Schell and Robert 
Jay Lifton, Lasch sees abject isolation and lack of meaning in 
the face of death for one who "takes no interest in the future 
and does nothing to provide himself with the traditional con- 
solations of old age, the most important of which is the belief 
that future generations will in some sense carry on his life's 
work" (210). The sense of isolation that Locke believed could 
spur entrepreneurial competition and achievement works bet- 
ter in enlarging gross national products than in enlarging 
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freedom for individual persons: "Because the older generation 
no longer thinks of itself as living on in the next, of achieving a 
vicarious immortality in posterity, it does not give way grace- 
fully to the young. People cling to the illusion of youth until it 
can no longer be maintained, at which point they must either 
accept their superfluous status or sink into dull despair. Nei- 
ther solution makes it easy to sustain much interest in life" 
(2 1 3). 
Lasch can be forgiven for not molding these powerful but 
diverse ideas on narcissism and death into a general theory 
about dying well and living well, for few other theorists have 
even taken note of the political relevance of death and dying. 
Lasch's various insights on the inability of narcissists to cope 
with death emphasize not only what a prison free-wheeling, 
liberated hedonists ironically come to reside in; his points also 
make it stunningly clear how great a price is extracted by an 
economic system that fuels its growth by promoting competi- 
tiveness among people and denying limits. Novak is as much 
appalled by the aimlessness and shallowness of narcissism as 
anyone, and yet Lasch shows how Novak's favored solution of 
democratic capitalism is an inducement to that very com- 
bative aimlessness among consumers. Lasch finds abundant 
evidence that the avoidance of values by capitalism is not just a 
minor imperfection we have to put up with in order to secure 
the political liberty and prosperity capitalism promises. Even 
if liberty and prosperity were steady and unarguable achieve- 
ments of capitalism, which many would contest, these goals 
quickly lose their appeal when we understand that they de- 
mand a Faustian trade-off of denying our fellowship with 
others and losing our ability to cope with death. 
We are not yet a society of narcissists. Millions of Americans 
every day find satisfaction in aiding others and in activities- 
music, art, sports, schooling-pursued for their own sake, not 
merely "to get ahead." Many honest business persons and 
entrepreneurs respond to creative challenges without flirting 
with narcissism. But these people maintain a sense of values 
and comradeship in spite of the manipulation of our culture by 
the economic system. Both Bell and Lasch expose as mislead- 
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ing Novak's assumption that the capitalist economic order is 
being corrupted by the culture. They issue dire warnings of the 
spiritual desolation and psychological emptiness ahead for 
our population if our culture does not reassert itself against the 
economic system and insist on performing the central function 
of culture by providing meaning to people's lives and deaths. 
Having seen how badly our culture needs new ideas on 
coping with death and why obstacles to such ideas are likely to 
be erected, let us examine the possible political changes a 
greater acceptance of death may provoke, first in regard to 
democracy and then in regard to the nuclear arms race. Such 
political changes may be fostered by the same circumstance 
that mitigates the supposed impracticality of proposals for the 
control of nuclear arms: a drastic shrinking of alternatives. 
Just as "realists" who hardheadedly drive the arms race to- 
ward human extinction lose all claim to that title, so also 
should we question claims of political realism by those whose 
notions of what is possible do not respond to the need of people 
to confront their individual mortality and affirm their lives. 
7. Death and Enlivening 
Democracy 
Death is Nature's expert advice to get plenty of life. 
-Goethe 
Greater candor about death is bound to affect citizens' anx- 
ieties and fears, which have always been powerful engines for 
political change; what, then, would be the long-range political 
results of changing attitudes toward death? The impact of a 
more open treatment of death on participatory democracy is a 
subject that is central and vital to visions of America's future, 
but one almost absent from contemporary political analysis. I 
will briefly portray the malaise that currently besets demo- 
cratic theory, and will argue that the consciousness of mor- 
tality has its greatest political significance in bringing to life 
the senses of equality and community that are essential for 
participatory democracy. In our present culture, death and 
democracy are neglected, yet both challenge our passivity. No 
one can die for us, and no one can act as a citizen for us. As we 
all need to take responsibility for learning to die, we need to do 
the same for living. In the words of the dying poet, Ted Rosen- 
thal, death forces the realization that "it's stage center for all of 
us."l 
The twentieth century has been hard upon democratic 
ideals. The most effective challenge to the theory of wide- 
spread citizen participation in politics has not come from 
expected opponents among avowed elitists but from "realists" 
who have reluctantly lost faith in democratic visions. Realists 
argue that the democratic model must be drastically revised in 
the face of both complex technology and monumental citizen 
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apathy. This theoretical revision was first clearly articulated 
by Joseph Schumpeter, who in 1942 redefined democracy as a 
process of selecting leaders rather than a vehicle of citizen 
enlightenment and decision making: "The democratic method 
is that institutional arrangement for arriving at political deci- 
sions in which individuals acquire the power to decide by 
means of a competitive struggle for the people's vote."2 
The onslaught that then developed against the alleged illu- 
sion of an informed and interested citizenry has taken up an 
extensive portion of the political science literature over the 
last thirty years. To provide the context for assessing the politi- 
cal impact of the consciousness of death, it will be sufficient to 
deal only with a few highlights of the case that has been made 
against the "traditional" notions of democracy that emphasize 
popular parti~ipation.~ 
The survey research of Bernard Berelson and his colleagues 
showed the average voter's information about, and interest in, 
even presidential elections to be minimal. Berelson rescued 
his reader from depression over his statistics, however, by 
insisting that expectations about the mass of citizens had been 
completely unrealistic, and that the saving grace about apathy 
was that it allowed for a flexibility, even statesmanship, which 
would otherwise be restricted by a vigilant and aroused popu- 
lace: "Low interest provides maneuvering room for political 
shifts necessary for a complex society in a period of rapid 
change. Compromise might be based upon sophisticated 
awareness of costs and returns-perhaps impossible to de- 
mand of a mass society-but it is more often induced by 
indifference. Some people are and should be highly interested 
in politics, but not everyone is or needs to be. Only the doc- 
trinaire would deprecate the moderate indifference that facili- 
tates compr~mise."~ 
Similarly, Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba consoled the 
disillusioned with the observation that the myth of a scrutiniz- 
ing public had utility in those times when leaders, though 
selected only from among competing elites, might become 
grossly negligent of due process and public opinion. Maintain- 
ing the illusion that the will of the people is dominant in 
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routine matters would increase the likelihood that the public 
could be roused to discipline errant leaders in those excep- 
tional times of obvious incompetence or malfeasance when the 
equilibrium of the system is threatened. Also, the expectation 
that gross indifference to the public would invite this retribu- 
tion served as a check on the regular activities of elites, and 
this was reassuringly described by Almond and Verba as "the 
law of anticipated reactions."S 
Thus the realists' rejection of the optimistic ends of tradi- 
tional democratic theory tended generally to be accompanied 
by a contentment with democratic procedures as a way of 
ensuring both popular support for government and an ulti- 
mate check upon tyrannical or grossly incompetent govern- 
mental policies. The pluralist persuasion seems generally to 
derive an equanimity from this marginal utility of democracy, 
despite a loss of faith in the masses. Hence Robert Dahl's 
satisfaction with a model of government that allows a signifi- 
cant broker's role for elected political leaders and a dispersed 
influence of elites-an alternative to the model of a stratified 
society portrayed by C. Wright Mills, Floyd Hunter, and others. 
There are, however, telling criticisms to be registered 
against these revisionists of democracy. After more than two 
decades and much discussion, there is still great force in the 
argument by Peter Bachrach and Morton Baratz that the plu- 
ralists, in spite of their rejection of traditional democratic 
ideals, greatly overestimate the prospects of an open political 
~ y s t e m . ~  Criticizing Dahl in particular for being satisfied with 
finding competition surrounding headline controversies and 
for not considering that many issues vital to the public welfare 
may never even be raised because of the influence of a priv- 
ileged elite, Bachrach and Baratz force the question whether 
the realists' demythologizing of democracy has not given rise 
to a series of other myths. The apathy that Berelson and his 
colleagues celebrate as making for flexibility and compromise 
has that effect precisely because it is easier to compromise the 
interests of those who are uninformed and unpolitical. Sim- 
ilarly, Almond and Verba show little recognition of how signifi- 
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cantly the popular voice has been reduced by the law of antici- 
pated reactions to an after-the-fact veto, or of how far an elite 
may go in disguising its policies and protecting them from this 
reaction. Having based this theory on the general public's 
naivete in not grasping the extent to which their control has 
been eroded, why should Almond and Verba suddenly find 
hope in the public's sophistication to penetrate the public 
relations smoke screens of an offending regime? 
Unfortunately for the vitality of democracy, all of these crit- 
icisms from the revisionists attack complacency without offer- 
ing satisfying alternatives that lead to a politics of widespread 
popular participation. The critique of the practicality and 
possibility of that participation has gone almost unscathed. In 
one of the earliest and most provocative indictments of the 
realists' research methods, Jack Walker argued that the real- 
ists err in taking the lack of specifically political turmoil and 
unrest as a sign of popular contentment with an ineffective 
political role. Walker argued that indices of social unrest, such 
as crime rates, would challenge this portrait of satisfied apa- 
thy. But the criticism also goes to the revisionists' smugness 
about coping with apathy, not to their conviction that there is a 
widespread disinclination to participate in politics. Walker's 
implication is that the political system, rather than the citizen, 
is at fault. But, as Dahl was quick to point out, no concrete 
suggestions are made for changing the system so as to generate 
greater citizen parti~ipation.~ 
Among the few imaginative attempts to formulate changes 
that would increase popular participation in politics are stud- 
ies by Carole Pateman, Peter Bachrach, and Benjamin Barber. 
These authors argue that for democracy to be real and in order 
to gain the experience necessary for active citizenship, people 
must be given an opportunity to contribute to decisions that 
immediately affect them and in which they have an interest 
and some expertise. Barber notes that defenders of represen- 
tative democracy are fond of citing failure of citizen participa- 
tion where there has been no preparation and practice for 
participation. "Such a course," he argues, "in truth merely 
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gives the people all the insignia and none of the tools of cit- 
izenship and then convicts them of inc~mpetence."~ The locus 
of participation becomes the workplace, and a strong case is 
made by these authors for the political and public character of 
much supposedly private enterprise and for the legitimacy of 
significant worker input. This change, nevertheless, while at- 
tractive in at least initiating participation, by itself must be 
limited in scope because it does not open up greater participa- 
tion in the important value decisions in a society that can 
easily preempt local decisions made in the workplace. The U.S. 
Steel plant in Birmingham, Alabama, which Bachrach cites in 
an example, might well be steered by worker direction to 
having a different impact on local racial desegregation, yet 
decisions regarding actual production in the plant would be 
almost entirely dependent upon decisions made in Washing- 
ton and elsewhere. 
What is even more problematic about proposals for par- 
ticipatory democracy is that they reject without refuting the 
basic revisionist claim that the mass of people are simply not 
interested either in making these decisions or in the necessary 
expansion of what is defined as public, as opposed to private, 
business-a change that is an essential preliminary to opening 
up the political process. When one is reminded by Mulford 
Sibley of how thoroughly we have privatized such important 
events as technological change and with what disastrous effect 
upon democracy, one has a keener appreciation of the obsta- 
cles to change: "Until Americans develop the law, standards, 
practice, and organization for deliberate public introduction 
or rejection of complex technology, their supposed self-govern- 
ment will remain merely a pretence. As it is now, they allow 
Fortune and a multitude of immediate profit-motivated deci- 
sions to shape their destiny. Then within the limits of this Fate 
and those profit-motivated decisions, they make relatively 
minor choices about how they will 'adjust' to the major deci- 
sions about which they have not been con~ulted."~ 
Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis remind us that even 
with his firm pluralist roots Robert Dahl now "wonders point- 
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edly why property rights should predominate over the demo- 
cratic rights of workers in the modern corporation," and Ben- 
jamin Barber notes that Dahl "has begun to question the 
capacity of pluralism . . . to deal with questions of economic 
and social justice." Nevertheless, are we-and Dahl-left un- 
able to respond to the modern enthrallment with privacy and 
acquisitiveness? Consider his earlier description: "Typically, 
as a source of direct gratifications, political activity will ap- 
pear to homo civicus as less attractive than a host of other 
activities; and, as a strategy to achieve his gratifications indi- 
rectly political action will seem considerably less efficient 
than working at his job, earning more money, taking out insur- 
ance, joining a club, planning a vacation, moving to another 
neighborhood or city, or coping with an uncertain future in 
manifold other ways. "lo 
It is interesting and depressing to note that the contempo- 
rary political theorist most concerned with "public happi- 
ness" that comes from appearing and speaking in the public 
forum, Hannah Arendt, sees this essential activity as the prize 
of the few while the mass of other people is exiled to the 
apolitical quest of wealth and accumulation. She argues that 
"freedom and luxury have always been thought to be incom- 
patible," and she laments "the ravages with which American 
prosperity and American mass society increasingly threaten 
the whole political realm."" 
Arendt's comments are a reminder that popular participa- 
tion is losing its relevance not simply among the pluralist 
revisionists of democratic theory; among some social theorists 
who consider seriously the various crises that now beset gov- 
ernments, the prospects for democracy are even bleaker than 
they are for the revisionists. Robert Heilbroner, for example, is 
dismally convinced that meeting the challenges of nuclear 
expansion, overpopulation, and the decay of the environment 
"may be possible only under governments capable of rallying 
obedience far more effectively than would be possible in a 
democratic setting." Heilbroner envisions a postindustrial so- 
ciety that will have to enforce public over private priorities and 
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radically limit "the pleasures of political, social, and intellec- 
tual freedom" that make democracy possible and desirable.12 
With the Scylla of public indifference on the one side of 
democracy and the Charybdis of authoritarian response to 
crisis on the other, the subject of death may seem relevant to 
this discussion only as a diversion in the frustration of political 
aspirations. This is precisely Herbert Marcuse's point when he 
alleges that modern regimes promote a concern for death so 
that citizens, seeking relief from their anxieties, will embrace 
repressive policies. In one of the rare commentaries on death 
by a contemporary political philosopher, Marcuse argues that 
"the glorifying acceptance of death, which carries with it the 
acceptance of the political order, also marks the birth of philo- 
sophical morality. . . . The fearful acceptance of death has 
become an integral element of public and private morality."*3 
But this repressive effect of the association of death and pol- 
itics is not new. The paradigm of authoritarianism in modern 
political theory comes from Hobbes, who constructed his Levi- 
athan fundamentally on the fear of violent death. Mussolini 
likewise was convinced that the evidence of fascism's power 
and attraction could be found in the release it provided from 
the lonely fear of death: "that this faith is very powerful in the 
minds of men is demonstrated by those who have suffered and 
died for it." Speaking about the years that preceded the march 
to Rome, Mussolini asserted "there was much discussion but- 
what was more important and more sacred-men died. They 
knew how to die." Mussolini and other fascists saw liberal 
democracy's salient flaw in the contradiction it confronted in 
death and crisis. Alfredo Rocco, one of Mussolini's chief apolo- 
gists, saw the telling need and cost of the denial of death in 
individualist culture in a quotation from Mazzini: "The decla- 
ration of rights, which all constitutions insist on copying slav- 
ishly from the French, expresses only those of the period. . . . 
which considered the individual as the end and pointed out 
only one half of the problem. . . . Assume the existence of one 
of those crises that threaten the life of the nation, and demand 
the active sacrifice of all its sons. . . . Will you ask the citizens 
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to face martyrdom in virtue of their rights? You have taught 
men that society was solely constituted to guarantee their 
rights and now you ask them to sacrifice one and all, to suffer 
and die for the safety of the 'nation'?"14 
Finally, we recall that Ernest Becker makes perhaps the 
most striking and direct linking of death and authoritarian- 
ism. He alleges that people cannot tolerate the awareness of 
death and that their frantic effort to deny their mortality leads 
to strongly anti-democratic behavior. He argues that because 
human beings cannot deal with death, they cannot deal with 
freedom and are driven to seek the protection of a forceful 
leader, whose power in political jousts symbolizes a power 
against the great enemy, death. Competition among people 
and the pursuit of money are seen by Becker as inevitable as 
they are undemocratic, for they are the signs of the human 
demand for inequality and the power of the hero. 
These attempts from Hobbes to Becker to draw imperatives 
for authoritarianism from the consciousness of death are im- 
pressive in the simplicity with which they explain a seemingly 
compulsive avoidance of freedom and political participation. 
Yet, as we have already seen, they all rest on rather simple and 
basic oversights. Hobbes is momentously incomplete in his 
treatment of death, inasmuch as he responds only to citizens' 
fear of violent death and not natural death. This neglect of 
natural death leaves Hobbes's sovereign exposed to those dissi- 
dents who realize that since they face natural death anyway 
there are concerns more important to them than the protec- 
tion from violent death proffered by the sovereign. Becker 
assumes that the denial of death is natural and inevitable, and 
he does not consider that competition and greed may be a 
cause, rather than an effect, of the denial of death. 
Fascist literature is effective in identifying as a critical 
weakness in Lockean liberalism the avoidance of the subject of 
death, which leaves the individual to confront death in isola- 
tion and without any societal support. But if the flaw of liberal 
social contract theory lies in its exacerbating the individual's 
anxiety about death, and in its inability to expect citizens to 
risk death for the public good, then the fascists' antidote for 
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this weakness is not to confront death but rather to obliterate 
the individual. The theoretical contradictions and racist non- 
sense of fascism are devoted to lessening one's fear of death and 
to the sacrifice of life not by looking death in the face but by 
taking the individual off his lonely and vulnerable pedestal 
and creating the mythology of perpetual life through the race. 
Its dependence upon empire and war manifests classically 
what Robert J. Lifton and Eric Olson describe as the effort to 
create an illusion of immortality and of power over death by 
delivering death to other people.15 
For a similar reason, Marcuse is mistaken in assuming that 
the modern liberal state maintains its hold over its subjects by 
preoccupying them with death so as to cement their anxious 
dependence upon government. To begin with, Marcuse's argu- 
ment simply flies in the face of overwhelming evidence 
throughout the burgeoning literature on thanatology that the 
denial of death has, until very recently, pervaded modern in- 
dustrial states. Marcuse is quite right in perceiving that an 
obsessive fear of death would promote dependence on an au- 
thoritarian state, but his mistake is in not realizing that anx- 
iety about death is increased by avoidance of the subject rather 
than by confronting it. In her famous interviews with termi- 
nally ill patients, Elizabeth Kiibler-Ross discovered that it is 
only when patients can break through the masquerade of deni- 
al often maintained by physicians and family that they can 
begin to accept their condition and to find an equanimity by 
emphasizing the quality rather than quantity of their days.16 
Marcuse's linking of the awareness of death and anti-demo- 
cratic political solutions fails for the same reason the similar 
conclusions cited above fail. They all miss how acknowledging 
mortality reasserts the social dimensions of people's lives and 
the natural basis for pursuing participation in political deci- 
sions. 
The most direct impact the consciousness of death has upon 
politics and democratic theory in particular is to bring much- 
needed new life to the concept of equality. The democratic 
credentials of death have, of course, always been recognized to 
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some extent. In spite of the well-provisioned send-offs to the 
nether world historically accorded the rich and the powerful, 
the unselectivity of death has always been imposing and dis- 
ruptive of grand human designs to make permanent the sway 
of any great figure or lineage. But the grudging equality this 
leveling image of death has inspired has hardly been sufficient 
to nurture democratic hopes or visions. The equality of threat 
and vulnerability that Hobbes saw death bestowing upon hu- 
mankind did not lead him to minimize the inequality he saw 
between common humanity and people of science, like him- 
self, who could grasp the relation of cause and effect. The equal 
vulnerability of unequal people pointed for Hobbes not toward 
democracy but toward the refuge of absolute authoritarian- 
ism. 
Rather than merely deflating the presumptions of the 
mighty, the awareness of death has its most important effect 
upon equality by routing historic assumptions about the 
"masses." Critics of democracy from Plato to the contempo- 
rary revisionists have been encouraged in their adjustment to 
citizen apathy as a fact of life by the conviction that the masses 
are not intellectually capable of the insight demanded of par- 
ticipation in politics. The depressing inability of the enlight- 
ened philosopher to communicate with the denizens of the 
cave in Plato's Republic is an archetypical portrait of the mass- 
es' alleged absorption in doxa, in opinions and illusions, and of 
their incapacity for insight about what is real in life. But the 
need to come to terms with death, which is every person's 
destiny, radically challenges this elitist assumption that in- 
sight derives only from the deductions of the intellect. To 
recognize that one is going to die is to move from the world of 
illusion and to begin to ask questions about the purpose of life 
and the possibility of human happiness. Nor is there any 
reason to assume that the average person has any less need to 
cope with mortality or any less opportunity to learn its lessons 
than the philosopher. It may be true that the majority of people 
do not look death in the face, but it is not because they do not 
have the intellectual capacity. The current movement to com- 
bat the denial of death in our culture has been led less by an 
120 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
educated elite than by ordinary, courageous people who felt 
there was something terribly wrong with the price they were 
being forced to pay in order to maintain taboos on the subject 
of death. 
It is a striking paradox that the awareness of death, which is 
avoided by so many lest it rob life of meaning, can provide an 
escape from the banality of the compulsive acquisitiveness 
inspired by Lockean liberalism and can help one to discover 
the satisfaction and richness of one's social existence. The 
paradoxical connection between vulnerability and self-revela- 
tion has an important relation to democracy and a sense of 
community. In lamenting that American culture has too often 
sought to deal with social problems by merely expanding its 
frontier or its economy, William Appleman Williams begins 
his book, The Great Evasion, with a keen insight into how a 
sense of community must wait upon a recognition of inade- 
quacy: "America's great evasion lies in its manipulation of 
Nature to avoid a confrontation with the human condition and 
with the challenge of building a true community."l7 
In a more melancholy, because less prescriptive, fashion, 
Hannah Arendt ends her profound examination of the precon- 
ditions of a public life in On Revolution by describing the regret 
of a young French poet that liberation, for him and his com- 
rades in the Resistance during the Second World War, would 
mean "liberation from the 'burden' of public business as well." 
Thus "back they would have to go to the epaisseur triste of their 
private lives and pursuits, to the 'sterile depression' of the pre- 
war years." The treasure the poet had discovered in the Resis- 
tance "was that he had 'found himself,' that he no longer 
suspected himself of 'insincerity,' that he needed no mask and 
no make-believe to appear, that wherever he went he appeared 
as he was to others and to himself, that he could afford to go 
naked."18 
Williams and Arendt both grasp the powerful force for com- 
munal relationships imbedded in the recognition of incom- 
pleteness and dependence in the face of adversity. Because they 
do not relate this insight to human mortality, the cause of an 
awesome sense of vulnerability for every person, Williams is 
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left uncertain about the chances for a change in people's con- 
sciousness, and Arendt is forced to treat the opportunity for 
self-revelation in public life as both fleeting and limited to a 
fortunate few. Freedom and public space, which Arendt views 
as crucial for political life, would not be seen as the privilege of 
only an esoteric elite like John Adams and his heirs if Arendt 
could see that everyone has the need to find meaning and 
support with other people in facing up to their common mor- 
tality. 
These examples are useful because they lead directly into 
the third precondition for democracy that is profoundly af- 
fected by acknowledging mortality. As forcefully as it facili- 
tates thinking about new possibilities for equality and com- 
munity, the awareness of death drastically alters previous as- 
sumptions about democracy's lacking a starter mechanism 
that could move society from elitist to democratic institutions 
without first violating democratic values. Central to the argu- 
ments of the pluralist revisionists of democracy is the assump- 
tion that the political apathy they see in most people could be 
dispelled only by simplistic ideological appeals by dema- 
gogues. This skepticism about enlightening the masses is only 
a recent manifestation of a long-standing despair in political 
theory about popular espousal of public values. Plato's Repub- 
lic is a utopia most significantly because the demos could never 
be expected to have the insight or discipline to make a phi- 
losopher their ruler. Even with the origins of the Philosopher 
Kings' rule left unexplained, Plato sees the producer class 
embracing the common good only with the influence of myth 
and conditioning. Even on the other side of the spectrum as 
regards enlightened citizens, when Rousseau dares to estab- 
lish his social contract on each citizen's commitment to the 
general will, this remarkable democracy is possible only after 
the supremely undemocratic reliance upon the Great Legis- 
lator, who must interpret and mold the general will.19 
In rejecting dependency upon a Great Legislator or other 
master social engineer, those who also reject the pluralist 
attempt to scale down expectations of democracy and equality 
are bedeviled by the dilemma of how to shape popular con- 
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sciousness democratically. The most creative thinker to wres- 
tle recently with this conundrum is C.B. Macpherson in his 
brief, important treatise, The Life and Times ofLibera1 Democ- 
racy. He sees clearly that "the main problem about participa- 
tory democracy is not how to run it but how to reach it." The 
first prerequisite for change he sees is a change in people's 
consciousness from seeing themselves as essentially consum- 
ers to seeing themselves as exerters of their capacities "in 
conjunction with others, in some relation of community." The 
other prerequisite is "a great reduction of the present social 
and economic inequality, since that inequality . . . requires a 
nonparticipatory party system to hold the society together." 
He acknowledges that these two essential changes catch us up 
in a "vicious circle. . . . For it is unlikely that either of these 
prerequisite changes could be effected without a great deal 
more democratic participation than there is now. The reduc- 
tion of social and economic inequality is unlikely without 
strong democratic action. And it would seem, whether we 
follow Mill or Mam, that only through actual involvement in 
joint political action can people transcend their consciousness 
of themselves as consumers and appropriators. Hence the 
vicious circle: we cannot achieve the changes in social ine- 
quality and consciousness without a prior increase in demo- 
cratic par t i~ ipat ion ."~~ 
More optimistic than Macpherson, Benjamin Barber ob- 
serves this same conundrum in noting that "community grows 
out of participation and at the same time makes participation 
p~ssible."~'  Macpherson makes an imaginative and forceful 
attempt to portray how this vicious circle might be broken by 
highlighting present weaknesses in the system of consumer 
liberalism in delivering according to schedule and in satisfy- 
ing consumer consciousness. In this regard, Macpherson 
speaks of the increasing awareness of the costs of economic 
growth in the pollution of air, water, and earth as possibly 
taking people beyond sheer consumer consciousness. Other 
weak points in the vicious circle that Macpherson finds are 
demoralization from lack of democratic participation in the 
workplace and the need for corporate capitalism to avoid 
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breakdown by spreading real goods more widely, thus risking 
a reduction in social inequality. 
Without going into an analysis of the probability of change 
resulting from these tensions within the stolid status quo of 
~lural is t  democracy, it is enough for our purposes to recognize 
Macpherson's insight in appraising and seeking to cope with 
the dilemma of democratic change, and to appreciate how 
much his case for the possibilities of change could be strength- 
ened by taking note of the potential power for altering people's 
consciousness of a willingness to acknowledge human mor- 
tality. One of the most striking results of the awareness of death 
is how powerfully it affects our priorities and values; it thus 
can potentially serve as the very catalyst for changing popular 
consciousness that has eluded democratic theory. 
As I have argued in earlier contexts, recognizing our mor- 
tality, more than anything else, forces us to acknowledge not 
only our finiteness but limits in general, and that recognition 
opens up the chance to see through the smoke screen of un- 
limited acquisition and the psychologically ruinous pursuit of 
economic growth for the sake of growth. It is not by accident 
that a culture that motivates people by self-interest and a 
lusting to acquire more without any regard to need would also 
spawn cryogenics and Forest Lawn and make the very subject 
of death a taboo. As cracks begin to appear in our avoidance of 
death, however, compulsive acquisition is also threatened be- 
cause a sense of limits has the great benefit of allowing one to 
gain perspective and a sense of proportion. Just as the illusion 
that life is unlimited also devalues life, so the realization of 
life's limits helps one to value each day and to focus on the 
human relationships that give joy and meaning to life. 
It is important to reemphasize that the movement to deal 
more honestly with death has progressed in the past decade 
without the tutelage or scarcely even the awareness of govern- 
ments or educated elites. The vast change in attitudes toward 
death, already begun in American society, has been forced by 
average people who have sensed the psychological costs of 
maintaining silence about death. These people have insisted as 
a first step that the dying and the aged not be shunted off in 
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institutions simply because the infirm clash with our pre- 
sumptions and preoccupations as consumers. If Rousseau is 
correct in seeing the essence of democratic consciousness rest- 
ing in a person's ability to respond to issues as a citizen rather 
than a maximizer of self-interest, these people have already 
taken important steps toward a new democratic conscious- 
ness. They see the limits of a political and economic system 
based on self-interest, and they see how much we are social 
beings whose manner of life and death is vastly affected by the 
public values of the society.22 
It is obviously too early to say how broadly the awareness of 
mortality may serve as a catalyst for a new democratic con- 
sciousness, but that such an awareness has begun to spread at 
all is a momentous development that demands close attention 
from political and social theorists. If it is the function of 
political theory to perceive new political possibilities and to 
explore and articulate alternatives to present restrictions 
upon the human need for creativity and community, then there 
is an urgent need to take stock of the significant political 
ramifications of people's attitudes toward death. Since studies 
have found that the subject of death can be as stressful and 
fearsome for religious as for nonreligious people,23 it should be 
reasserted that in our pluralistic culture coping with death is 
one of the great challenges that unites us and whose lessons 
can serve as a unique basis for democratic consensus on what 
constitute the priorities of our society. This fact only under- 
lines our social dependency and need of support in honestly 
facing life's mysteries. Without much of this support, some 
brave people have, nevertheless, begun to confront death can- 
didly, and to insist that social values and political goals that 
ignore the human need for meaning and creativity in the face 
of death are finally worthless, regardless of the prosperity they 
offer as a distraction from a sense of vulnerability. If our 
society were to develop the customs, symbols, and other cul- 
tural reinforcements that supported increasing numbers of 
people in acknowledging the fragility of their individual exist- 
ence and the importance and satisfaction of finding communi- 
Enlivening Democracy 
ty with their fellow mortals, it may not be presumptuous or 
naive to anticipate a vastly changed political consciousness 
and vastly raised hopes for participatory democracy. 
After examining some of the long-range political con- 
sequences of a greater openness to the subject of death in our 
society, I will now consider an issue that does not allow us the 
luxury of gradual change: the crisis of the nuclear arms race. 
Certainly no issue could more severely test and challenge the 
significance of political changes I have attributed to changing 
attitudes about death, and no issue stands more in need of the 
potential of those changes. The largest change that a greater 
openness to death can make in our nuclear peril is not different 
from the effect of that openness on the prospects for democ- 
racy: the development of a new political consciousness that 
makes political changes formerly thought impossible now 
practical and necessary. 
8. Accepting Mortality and 
Rejecting Nuclear Peril 
"There's nothing serious in mortality. All is but toys." 
-Macbeth 
The coming of the nuclear age has been accompanied by a rash 
of paradoxes. The most prominent and devastating of these is 
the spectacle of human genius producing at its zenith possible 
extermination of all human life from this planet. Despite mag- 
nificent advances in science and knowledge, we seem piteously 
unsteady in trying to contain an arms race that threatens total 
catastrophe. Humanity has never been more learned and more 
powerful, and it has never been more insecure and more help- 
less. But the paradox of how accepting our mortality can 
enrich our lives may provide a basis for hope in the face of the 
nuclear peril that bedevils our age. Though it is largely over- 
looked, the threat of nuclear death can change our view of 
death in general, and a new perspective on mortality might 
provide humanity with the motivation, courage, and insight 
required to take concrete steps to avoid nuclear obliteration. 
In exploring the link between the acceptance of mortality 
and the rejection of our present nuclear peril, I focus on the 
remarkable books by Jonathan Schell, The Fate of the Earth and 
The Abolition. Schell's work is widely recognized as possibly 
the most powerful and influential description to date of the 
danger and destruction presented by nuclear weapons and the 
plans for employing them in both East and West. But Schell's 
books are important not only for their striking insights on the 
numbing paradoxes of the nuclear arms race but also for an 
incompleteness and a key mistake when charting a direction 
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away from the "nemesis of all human intentions, actions, and 
hopes." 
Perhaps because of the very precision and astuteness of 
Schell's description of our present danger, his speculative and 
general prescriptions in The Fate of the Earth for an alternative 
future-for "reinventing politics"-provoke heated criticism. 
He seeks to disarm critics by more pragmatic recommenda- 
tions in The Abolition. Yet the imaginative and useful proposals 
in the second book lack the theoretical grounding and vision of 
the first book. In its very inadequacies, the second book is a 
recommendation to reconsider the ideas of the first. Accord- 
ingly, I will argue that his ideas in the first book lay a better 
foundation for the personal and social changes required to 
stave off the nuclear threat than his critics, and perhaps Schell, 
realize. The danger of nuclear warfare that Schell describes 
sheds a wholly new light on individual death and the ability of 
people to reconcile themselves to mortality. Schell presents a 
crucial reinforcement for a perspective on death that reaffirms 
the meaning and power of each person's Kfe. Such a perspec- 
tive provides vital support for the changes that his critics are 
too quick to dismiss as implausible. 
Schell's first of three chapters, "A Republic of Insects and 
Grass," is a fearsome and gruesome primer on nuclear weap- 
ons and the total devastation wrought by those weapons. 
Whether relating cold, startling facts-such as that the nu- 
clear nations now possess warheads with the destructive force 
of 1.6 million times the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima- 
or acquainting his reader with thermal pulses, blast waves, 
and the three stages of radiation sickness, Schell's treatment of 
our danger is wholly convincing. One understands imme- 
diately the reason for his renown as a writer and why this book 
represents a watershed in the dawning realization of the extent 
to which we are endangered by nuclear weapons. 
The first chapter takes one through the hell of Hiroshima 
and the Simple Simon world of strategies for limited nuclear 
war. It is in the second and third chapters that Schell most 
directly considers the implications of our attitudes toward 
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nuclear war and the failure of response to our peril in which 
"both self-interest and fellow-feeling seem to have died." He 
forces us to realize how completely we passed from an age of 
innocence with the onset of nuclear weapons when he makes 
the stark point that now we can never escape a universe in 
which we have the power to end all life. As far as we are from 
dismantling all nuclear weapons and the facilities to build 
them, Schell confronts us with the fact that even if the world 
were to take these extraordinary, seemingly miraculous steps, 
we could still not destroy the scientific knowledge that, with 
sufficient provocation, could be used to rebuild the bombs. 
This perception that humanity is inescapably stuck with the 
danger of its destruction is central to all the arguments and 
theories that Schell advances. He is certain that we are in a 
new age in which no technological developments or new inven- 
tions, the source hitherto of our faith in progress and a better 
future, will guarantee us freedom from annihilation. The per- 
manence of the nuclear dilemma obviously adds significantly 
to Schell's tone of exasperation and alarm about our indif- 
ference to our danger and our wishful confidence that mere 
adjustment, and not radical change, is necessary to deal with 
the problem of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, before address- 
ing the extent of the political and social changes demanded by 
our new and permanent peril, Schell seeks to undermine the 
smug assumption that we can proceed with business as usual 
and to show how pathetically out of date are our attitudes 
about war and the justification of international conflict. A 
primary target for Schell becomes the strategy of deterrence 
upon which the nuclear powers base their security. 
Schell believes the concept of deterrence is ineffective in 
both theory and practice, and he effectively exposes the lack of 
seriousness with which both leaders and their peoples respond 
to the nuclear peril. He argues that the logical fault line in the 
doctrine of deterrence "runs straight through the center of its 
main strategic tenet-the proposition that safety is achieved 
by assuring that any nuclear aggressor will be annihilated in a 
retaliatory strike." Whereas the doctrine depends for its suc- 
cess on "a nuclear-armed victim's resolve to launch the anni- 
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hilating and second strike, it can offer no sensible or sane 
justification for launching it in the event." Schell points out 
that the logic of prenuclear deterrence was maintained by 
each side's readiness to wage war and try for victory if deter- 
rence failed. But since nuclear deterrence begins by assuming 
that victory is impossible, Schell concludes: "Thus, the logic of 
the deterrence strategy is dissolved by the very event-the first 
strike-that it is meant to prevent. Once the action begins, the 
whole doctrine is self-cancelling. In sum, the doctrine is based 
on a monumental logical mistake: one cannot credibly deter a 
first strike with a second whose raison dJ&tre dissolves the 
moment the first strike arrives. It follows that, as far as deter- 
rence theory is concerned, there is no reason for either side not 
to launch a first strike."' 
Schell's analysis of the practice of deterrence is even more 
damning than his examination of its logic. Deterrence theory 
puts a brake on any debate of its adequacy or reasonableness. 
Precisely because the appearance of credibility is so important 
to deterrence, states cannot afford to discuss whether one 
ought to retaliate after a first strike. The maintenance of this 
appearance of credibility of response can also lead nuclear 
states to be more rigid and aggressive, rather than restrained, 
in conventional conflicts in order to demonstrate their resolve 
to uphold their role in the mutual-assured-destruction strat- 
egy. Instead of frightening states away from conventional con- 
flicts, it appears that deterrence strategy could exacerbate and 
escalate the danger of those conflicts as each side seeks to 
demonstrate its credibility and will. 
Schell reminds us that this variance of nuclear deterrence 
from its stated purpose is not merely a matter of conjecture. 
Both the United States and the Soviet Union claim that it is 
only for survival that they produce and deploy weapons that 
portend the possible extinction of humanity, but "the aim of 
holding on to the system of sovereignty introduces a much less 
reassuring, much less frequently voiced, and much less defen- 
sible proposition, which is that one prepares for extinction in 
order to protect national interest" (209). Thus, both the United 
States and Soviet Union identify "vital interests" that they 
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intend to protect, if necessary, even with the use of nuclear 
weapons. This fact reflects how casual is the drift by nuclear 
nations from taking responsibility for the survival of the 
world. We subscribe to deterrence for the sake of survival, but 
then we find that we are prepared to risk the sacrifice of 
mankind for our national interests. 
Schell argues that our casualness about nuclear arms has 
serious effects upon us that are masked by the totality of our 
peril. Beneath our quest for normalcy rumble the two stark 
realities of our nuclear strategy that we strive desperately to 
ignore: one, "that at any moment our lives may be taken from 
us and our world blasted to dust"; and two, that "we are 
potential mass killers." The heavy moral cost of nuclear arma- 
ment is that "it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter 
of hundreds of millions of people and the future generations- 
an action whose utter indefensibility is not altered in the 
slightest degree by the fact that each side contemplates per- 
forming it only in 'retaliation"' (152). Schell also argues that we 
cannot find exoneration from complicity in the slaughter of 
humanity in the theoretical justification that we possess nu- 
clear arms, not in order to use them, but in order to prevent 
their use, for "the fact is that even in theory prevention works 
only to the degree that it is backed up by the plausible threat of 
use in certain circumstances." Our pretension at holding life 
sacred, a conviction we assume to be at the core of our civiliza- 
tion, is exploded in our accepting roles as the victims and 
perpetrators of nuclear mass slaughter. "Somehow, according 
to a 'strategic' logic that we cannot understand, it has been 
judged acceptable for everybody to be killed." (153). 
In steeling ourselves against recognizing the moral implica- 
tions of our nuclear strategy, we pay a price in our personal 
lives as this indifference to reality and morality trickles down: 
"In the long run, if we are dull and cold toward life in its 
entirety we will become dull and cold toward life in its par- 
ticulars-towards the events of our own daily lives" (148). This 
is the same trickling down of avoidance and despair that un- 
dermines life in society in general: "The society that has ac- 
cepted the threat of its utter destruction soon finds it hard to 
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react to lesser evils, for a society cannot be at the same time 
asleep and awake, insane and sane, against life and for life" 
(152). 
Perhaps the most profound price Schell sees us paying in 
our seeming indifference to the nuclear peril is that we are 
gradually cutting ourselves off from that "common world," 
which Hannah Arendt describes as surviving in each person 
and providing for each person connection and meaning in the 
human community. In what may be the most moving passage 
in his book, Schell sees the danger to the common world in the 
future necessarily diminishing us in the present: 
The thought of cutting off life's flow, of amputating this future, is so 
shocking, so alien to nature, and so contradictory to life's impulse that 
we can scarcely entertain it before turning away in revulsion and 
disbelief. The very incredibility of the action protects it from our gaze; 
our very love of life seems to rush forward to deny that we could do 
this. But although we block out the awareness of this self-posed threat 
as best we can, engrossing ourselves in life's richness to blind our- 
selves to the jeopardy to life, ultimately there is no way that we can 
remain unaffected by it. For, finally, we know and deeply feel that the 
ever-shifting, ever-dissolving moments of our mortal lives are sus- 
tained and given meaning by the broad stream of life, which bears us 
along like a force at our backs. Being human, we have, through the 
establishment of a common world, taken up residence in the enlarged 
space of past, present, and future, and if we threaten to destroy the 
future generations we harm ourselves, for the threat we pose to them 
is carried back to us through the channels of the common world that 
we all inhabit together. Indeed, "they" are we ourselves, and if their 
existence is in doubt our present becomes a sadly incomplete affair, 
like only one word of a poem or one note of a song. Ultimately, it is 
subhuman. [154-1551 
Arendt describes as "radical evil" the crimes that destroy 
not merely individual victims but the world that in some way 
can respond to, and in some measure redeem, the deaths suf- 
fered. This radical evil of destroying a whole community was 
what Hitler's effort to exterminate the Jews amounted to and is 
what the nuclear powers are tinkering with on a larger scale. 
Schell links genocide and nuclear holocaust as crimes against 
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the future and reminds us that the superpowers intend, if nu- 
clear war begins, "to commit genocide against one another-to 
erase the other side as a culture and as a people from the face of 
the earth." He also reminds us by this linkage of genocide and 
nuclear extinction that "insane crimes are not prevented from 
occurring merely because they are unthinkable" (146). In spite 
of our attachment to a "normal" world and a sophisticated 
realism from which we eschew dramatic language like "holoc- 
aust" and "extinction," we are jarred by Schell to realize that 
throughout history, and especially in our own progressive cen- 
tury, the unthinkable has happened. 
By the end of his analysis Schell has demolished the argu- 
ments of both the so-called realists, who seek security through 
increasing arms, and the ideologues, who would employ nu- 
clear threats to defend or advance their particular notions of 
"democracy" and "freedom." His forceful points show how 
badly the realists need to rethink what they mean by "secur- 
ity." As for the ideologues, he convincingly argues that doom 
can never be a human purpose because it ends all purposes. He 
cites the argument of Karl Jaspers in his 1958 book, The Future 
of Mankind, the "life in the sense of existence-individual as 
well as all life--can be staked and sacrificed for the sake of the 
life that is worth living." Schell then demonstrates that the 
flaw in Jaspers's position is that it "depends on an application 
to the species as a whole of a canon of morality that properly 
applies only to each individual person." Citing the examples of 
Socrates and Christ, who saw ethical commandments as abso- 
lute for the individual, Schell argues that they represent the 
conviction that "there are no ethics apart from service to the 
human community" and that the extinction of the community 
"can never be an ethical act." (130-31). 
The importance and validity of Schell's comments are un- 
derscored by a syndicated column by the renowned philoso- 
pher Sidney Hook. In response to the alternatives of being "red 
or dead," which he ascribes to George Kennan, Hook praises 
Solzhenitsyn's proclamation that some things are more impor- 
tant than mere life. and insists that Americans must be 
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"prepared to stake our lives, if necessary, on freedom." Hook 
presents the following as his credo: 
It is better to be a live jackal than a dead lion-for jackals, not men. 
Men who have the moral courage to fight intelligently for freedom, 
and are prepared to die for it, have the best prospects for avoiding the 
fate both of live jackals and of dead lions. Survival is not the be-all and 
the end-all of a life worthy of man. Sometimes the worst thing that we 
can know about a man is that he has survived. Those who say that life 
is worth living at any cost have already written for themselves an 
epitaph of infamy, for there is no cause and no person that they will 
not betray to stay alive. Man's vocation should be the use of the arts of 
intelligence in behalf of human freedom.2 
How hollow "the arts of intelligence" and "human freedom" 
sound after Schell has so persuasively shown that the use of 
nuclear weapons will be the end of human survival and the end 
of all other values and goals as well. That someone of Sidney 
Hook's stature could take a point of individual ethics on sur- 
vival as a subordinate goal and so obviously misapply it to the 
society in general and, inevitably in the nuclear age, to all 
humanity shows how unseriously even scholars can take nu- 
clear war, and how crucial to any discussion about interna- 
tional hostilities is an appreciation of the ideas in Schell's 
work. If these ideas as we have discussed them are the basis for 
the extraordinary acclaim for Schell's book, we must yet dis- 
cuss the book's central problem that has brought vehement 
criticism, which in some cases drowns out the acclaim. This 
problem arises when Schell takes up the issue of how civiliza- 
tion might save itself from nuclear devastation, the issue that 
is the prime concern of his final chapter, "The Quest." 
Schell does not present concrete strategies in The Fate of the 
Earth for a way out of the fearsome dangers he describes, and 
that fact has provoked the wrath of many critics. These crit- 
icisms are perhaps more of a tribute to the power of his por- 
trayal of nuclear peril than an indictment of his lack of solu- 
tions, since Schell never pretends to offer concrete solutions. 
He does, however, assure us that the dimensions of dangers we 
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face are so large and enduring that we must embark imme- 
diately on mind-boggling changes that amount to nothing 
short of "reinventing politics" or "revolutionizing the politics 
of the earth." Precisely because the knowledge to make nuclear 
weapons and to destroy the world will be a permanent part of 
the human legacy from generation to generation, Schell de- 
mands that we face the fact that it is not enough to eliminate 
weapons; we must eliminate conflict among nations. He insists 
that the "goals of the political revolution are defined by those 
of the nuclear revolution," and we must "lay down our arms, 
relinquish sovereignty, and found a political system for the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes."3 
If the mere dearth of concrete solutions provoked some 
critics, these last words about solutions, which are very gener- 
al, brought abuse upon Schell from early critics who displayed 
a combination of bewilderment and outrage. A Time assess- 
ment of Schell cited one critic who was distraught that Schell 
"hasn't a clue" about the practical problems of disarmament 
and that his philosophizing "flirts with the preposterous." The 
Time article cited one editorial that accused Schell of "utopi- 
anism," and another that criticized him for being "destructive 
of serious thought about how to prevent war and control the 
spread of nuclear arms" and found ludicrous his calling for 
"nothing less than to reinvent politics." Strobe Talbott in Time 
found Schell's chapter on the way out of nuclearism "by far the 
weakest part" of the book and argued that Schell seemed to en- 
dorse "simple-minded deafeatism." Max Lerner in the New Re- 
public added his conviction that the radicalness of the changes 
Schell demands is directly proportional to their shallowness: 
"What Schell fails to recognize, enthralled as he is by his 
eschatology, is that no plan for averting a nuclear holocaust is 
worth anything if it doesn't acknowledge the deeply flawed 
nature of man and his  institution^."^ 
Even a commentator such as theologian Langdon Gilkey, 
who has a fine appreciation for the peril to humanity Schell 
describes, finds himself immobilized by the call in the final 
chapter to reinvent history: "while 'history as usual' seems to 
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be insane, nevertheless history not as usual seems to be equal- 
ly insane."5 Gilkey contrasts Schell's optimism about the pos- 
sibilities of change with Robert Heilbroner's somber Inquiry 
into the Human Prospect, published a decade earlier, and notes 
that Heilbroner seeks to control science, which Schell doesn't 
think is possible, and Schell seeks to reinvent history and 
society, which Heilbroner doesn't think is possible. 
Gilkey's reference to Heilbroner is instructive, for Heil- 
broner's treatment of responses to nuclearism embodies the 
flaw that is found in most of the critics who are dumbfounded 
by Schell's "apocalyptic" demands for change. The deep mel- 
ancholy in Heilbroner's analysis stems from the conviction 
that people will not voluntarily accept the changes and disci- 
pline necessary to put an end to dangerous international rival- 
ry; thus, catastrophe can be avoided, if at all, only by authori- 
tative governments terminating freedom and coercing the 
changes that might save humanity. What I think Heilbroner 
misses, along with most of Schell's critics, is an insight that 
moves all of Schell's assessments about what is possible in 
response to the nuclear peril: the onset of nuclear weapons 
revolutionized not only our possibilities for destroying our- 
selves, but also our possibilities for saving ourselves. 
Schell's critics accept that there have been qualitative 
changes in the implements of destruction, but they just as- 
sume that the consciousness of human beings is not affected by 
the dawn of the nuclear age. Schell spends most of his book 
lamenting that humanity seems so unaware of the threat to its 
existence posed by nuclear arms, but he seems convinced that 
the reality of this threat can, quite literally, be brought home to 
people. At that moment of realization, he expects, old pri- 
orities will tumble and a new consciousness will result that 
can signal a new politics and a new history. What may have 
seemed a utopian change before nuclear weapons may not 
seem so now if such a change is our only avenue to survival. 
There is, however, a key error in the way Schell develops his 
argument in the search for a new consciousness, and while this 
error is not analyzed by his critics, I believe it seriously weak- 
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ens his case for the possibility of radical change and represents 
a missed opportunity for Schell to take full advantage of the 
compelling effects of our nuclear peril. 
Schell sees two motives that could compel a general awak- 
ening to the dangerous inadequacies of both deterrence and 
national sovereignty, and the two could compel the develop- 
ment of a new consciousness as to what constitutes "security." 
The two motives are fear and love. While these motives have 
traditionally been at odds with each other, he sees them point- 
ing to the same conclusion in the nuclear age: 
The "realistic" school of political thinking, on which the present 
system of deterrence is based, teaches that men, on the whole, pursue 
their own interests and act according to a law of fear. The "idealistic" 
school looks on the human ability to show regard for others as funda- 
mental, and is based on what Gandhi called the law of love. . . . 
Historically, a belief in the necessity of violence has been the hallmark 
of the credo of the "realist;" however, if one consistently and thor- 
oughly applies the law of fear in nuclear times one is driven not to rely 
on violence, but to banish it altogether. . . . For today the only way to 
achieve genuine national defense for any nation is for all nations to 
give up violence altogether. However, if we had begun with Gandhi's 
law of love we would have arrived at exactly the same arrangement.6 
Schell acknowledges that a real difference exists between 
the motives of love and fear when encompassing the fate of 
future generations. Because "the law of fear relies on the love of 
self," this self-love cannot "extend its protection to the future 
generations, or even get them in view" (224). Love, however, 
can reach those who would inherit the earth and "can create, 
cherish, and safeguard what extinction would destroy and 
shut up in nothingness." Nevertheless, Schell continues to 
maintain that fear can point the way away from nuclearism: 
"But in fact there is no need, at least on the practical level, to 
choose between the law of fear and the law of love, because 
ultimately they lead to the same destination. It is no more 
realistic than it is idealistic to destroy the world" (225). 
Unfortunately, Schell may well be wrong in this key assess- 
ment, and if he is, he not only weakens his case for a possible 
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transition to a demilitarized society, but he misses the oppor- 
tunity to show how many of his previous points could buttress 
a wider acceptance of the law of love. The mistake Schell 
makes at this crucial juncture is failing to see how fear and self- 
love do not provide a sufficient motive for people now alive to 
make the hard sacrifices to avoid nuclear doom when such a 
catastrophe is only a possibility. 
Is not self-love the very blinding agent that keeps us ab- 
sorbed in the moment and that makes us deny the dangers 
Schell portrays? To the extent that we do perceive our danger, 
would self-love not tempt us to bask in the illusion of power 
over fate and death that victimization represents? Fearful, 
selfish people are the least reconciled to their mortality, and 
might they not, in their resentment and impotence, be the very 
ones not only to appear casual about nuclear threats in pursu- 
ing their personal and national self-interest but also the ones 
to embrace the bomb? Schell tells us earlier in his book that 
nuclear war, in one sense, constitutes the perfect crime, be- 
cause we leave no witnesses to accuse us. He also points out 
that a nuclear holocaust represents "the death of deathn- 
perhaps a comforting thought to one who finds death the nem- 
esis of his or her self-love. This resentment about the human 
condition, now highlighted by the nuclear threat, seems exact- 
ly what is behind Heilbroner's despair of an indulgent society 
choosing to make the sacrifices necessary to save itself: 
When men can generally acquiesce in, even relish, the destruction of 
their living contemporaries, when they can regard with indifference 
or irritation the fate of those who live in slums, not in prison, or starve 
in lands that have meaning only insofar as they are vacation resorts, 
why should they be expected to take the painful actions needed to 
prevent the destruction of future generations whose faces they will 
never live to see? Worse yet, will they not curse these future genera- 
tions whose claims to life can be honored only by sacrificing present 
enjoyments; and will they not, if it comes to a choice, condemn them 
to nonexistence by choosing the present over the future?' 
Schell can be forgiven for shrinking from expectations that 
all of humanity could emulate Gandhi in his devotion to the 
138 THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
law of love, but Schell's mistake is in limiting the response to 
nuclearism to the two motives of fear and love and in not 
examining how nuclear threat engages concerns of people that 
are not as narrow as saving one's skin, or as broad, at least 
initially, as loving humanity. In compelling us to face the 
vulnerability of our world and of humanity, the nuclear peril 
also brings us face to face with our individual vulnerability 
and mortality. Increasingly, all people have forced upon them, 
with a new relevance and urgency, the need to find meaning 
and significance for their lives in the face of inevitable death. 
As with the law of fear, the need to find meaning for one's life 
affects everyone, but unlike fear it points away from self-inter- 
est and, ultimately, locates the significance of one's life in its 
impact on the lives of others. In pushing people to face their 
mortality and seek meaning for their lives, the nuclear threat 
can be a catalyst for the changed consciousness and behavior 
that Schell convincingly argues are necessary to counter the 
threat. 
It is ironic that Schell does not discuss the need to cope with 
one's personal mortality as a fulcrum for the vast societal 
changes he envisions, though he has previously laid all the 
groundwork for this discussion. He sees with great astuteness 
how dramatically the threat of universal death changes our 
perspective on individual death. If we do not act on the nuclear 
peril, our death occurs in a social void and lacks all consolation 
and redemption: "When human life itself is overhung with 
death, we cannot go peacefully to our individual  death^."^ 
But if we take the nuclear peril seriously in its threat of 
extinction, concern about our individual deaths is suddenly 
dwarfed and liberated to engage the threat to all humanity. If 
we can face down the nuclear peril and control it, Schell 
assures us, future generations will "know that their existence 
has depended on the wisdom and restraint of a long succession 
of generations before them" (171). This comment reminds us 
that henceforth life will no longer be automatic, that it must be 
skillfully and heroically preserved as a gift from one genera- 
tion to the next. But there is reciprocity: by "wisdom and 
restraint" we give survival to the future generations; they in 
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turn give back to us the reassurance that our lives and efforts 
have counted and have not been cancelled out by our individu- 
al deaths. Schell says this "inestimable gift to us, passed back 
from the future into the present, would be the wholeness and 
meaning of life" (230). 
This sense of connection with the future, which inevitably 
provides an example for connection with our contemporaries, 
Schell sees as the one positive bequest of the nuclear threat: 
"For nothing underscores our common humanity as strongly 
as the peril of extinction does; in fact, on a practical and 
political plane it establishes that common humanity" (226-27). 
Schell makes a mistake in endorsing the possibilities of the 
law of fear and misses an opportunity to describe fully, for 
those who are shocked by the extensive social changes he 
envisions, the powerful relationship of new attitudes toward 
death and new attitudes toward politics; but he does see with 
remarkable clarity the vital links between the threat of nuclear 
death and our response to, in Lifton's words, "plain old death." 
With Schell's insights and our own imagination, we can see 
how accepting our personal vulnerability and the sense of 
connection with our fellow mortals that it underscores provide 
a solid basis for doggedly seeking to protect humanity in its 
vulnerability. 
Schell's treatment of the response demanded by the nuclear 
threat creates new paradoxes as well as explicates old ones. 
Perhaps the most important contribution of The Fate of the 
Earth is found in how well he grasps the lesson contained in the 
fact that the Chinese character for "crisis" means both "dan- 
ger" and "opportunity," an ancient paradox that becomes more 
profound in the nuclear age. But in seeking to portray a more 
practical way of managing our danger in his follow-up book, 
The Abolition, Schell's vision of the opportunity for human 
solidarity becomes blurred. The theoretical problems of his 
second book appear more significant than the practical prob- 
lems of his first. Curiously, the vital linkage between the per- 
sonal acceptance of mortality and the rejection of nuclear peril 
is emphasized as much by the shortcomings of The Abolition as 
by the insights of The Fate of the Earth. 
THE POLITICS OF BEING MORTAL 
The Abolition is characterized by the same clear-headed and 
moving prose of The Fate o f  the Earth, and yet the objective and 
arguments of this book are strikingly different. Schell is ob- 
viously responding to the critics of his earlier book who found 
a contradiction between the immediacy of the nuclear peril as 
he described it and the seemingly utopian character of the 
solutions he proposed. Schell is unflinchingly pragmatic in 
The Abolition and certainly cannot be accused of being either 
apocalyptic or utopian. Yet he continues to overlook the dan- 
ger of nuclear decision makers who cannot deal with their 
personal mortality and he ignores the potential for practical 
but dramatic political change in the attitudes with which 
ordinary people regard death. To the extent to which his ear- 
lier work came close to perceiving, and depending on, the 
power of accepting individual mortality, the new directions in 
The Abolition, although a pragmatic advance on The Fate of the 
Earth, represent a loss of theoretical bearings and a missed 
opportunity to build further on some valuable foundations in 
the earlier work. 
One of Schell's principal efforts in The Abolition is to show 
that nuclear disarmament is not dependent upon world gov- 
ernment. It is the assumption that these two developments are 
inevitably linked that has scuttled attempts to control atomic 
weapons since the dawn of the nuclear age. Schell details at 
length the fate of the Acheson-Lilienthal proposal of 1946 that 
nuclear activities be placed under international control. The 
proposal did not solve the political question of how disputes 
among nations were to be decided, and neither the Americans 
nor the Soviets were prepared to trust each other. The pros- 
pects for control of nuclear weapons were lost in the cynicism 
that surrounds prospects for international government. While 
security analysts like Bernard Brodie sought a pragmatic ac- 
ceptance of political realities in the immediate post-Hiroshi- 
ma world and rejected the call by Albert Einstein and others 
for world government, Brodie saw his pragmatism as biding 
for time while the nuclear question was worked out in a world 
that would gradually adjust to the eclipse of national sov- 
ereignty. Unfortunately, the world adjusted, instead, to ever 
Rejecting Nuclear Peril 141 
more dangerous stages of the nuclear arms race, or, as Schell 
puts it, people lost the vision of a nuclear-free world and 
accustomed their eyes to darkness. 
Because world government was not thought possible, disar- 
mament also was not thought possible. With world govern- 
ment seen as the only avenue to nuclear sanity and with that 
avenue steadfastly blocked, questions about whether it was 
acceptable to annihilate whole nations or the whole human 
race were ruled out of order. We lost not only control over the 
arms race but also any sense of moral responsibility for it. 
Schell describes our accommodation to nuclear horror with 
the syllogism that "there is moral responsibility only where 
there is choice, but here no choice was seen, and therefore no 
responsibility was seen either."g 
With the issue of limiting national sovereignty vetoing all 
attempts at nuclear disarmament, Schell's prime purpose now 
is to demonstrate that disarmament is feasible without world 
government. Ironically, his vehicle for disarmament is a recon- 
ceptualized nuclear deterrence, the strategy he inveighed 
against in The Fate o f  the Earth as being logically and morally 
contradictory. Even more ironically, the lynch-pin in the re- 
habilitated deterrence he advocates is the fact that the knowl- 
edge of how to construct nuclear weapons is unlosable, a fact 
that drove him in the earlier book to conclude that humanity 
could only be safe from destroying itself by ending interna- 
tional conflict and, therefore, by ending national sovereignty. 
This once-demoralizing fact now becomes the savior of deter- 
rence, national sovereignty, and disarmament. 
Schell argues that nuclear deterrence, the mutual-assured- 
destruction strategy, has a vast disproportion between its end 
and its means. Its end is to maintain the status quo among 
sovereign nations, but its means is to threaten the obliteration 
of human life in response to an attempt to break that status quo 
by the use of nuclear weapons. Humanity is forced to pay an 
inconceivable price if deterrence fails. Not only is the limited 
option that deterrence allows intolerable, but instead of dis- 
couraging nuclear brinkmanship it has so terrified nuclear 
strategists that they have deployed more and more powerful 
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and accurate missiles so that the lead time between a sus- 
pected nuclear attack and the decision to unleash the weapons 
that will terminate life on this planet is only a few minutes. The 
possibility that mixed signals or computer error could initiate 
nuclear war is thus horrifyingly enlarged. With the survival of 
humanity dangling by such a slender thread, Schell is now 
convinced that our only option is not to junk deterrence but to 
mitigate its worst features. The worst of those features is the 
immediacy with which deterrence requires that the leaders of 
the nuclear powers make the decision to seal the doom of 
humanity. 
Schell is convinced that our situation is so precarious that 
we must seek not the improvement of human life but just the 
continuation of our world. His goal is to back the superpowers 
down the ladder of deterrence so as to win more time before 
one side or the other has to confront the choice of capitulation 
or suicide. He argues that the unlosable quality of nuclear 
knowledge has great value in seeking to encourage the super- 
powers to risk disarmament, because it assures both sides of 
the possibility of rearming and responding to an opponent that 
has cheated in disarmament. Rather than prevent the aboli- 
tion of nuclear weapons, the knowledge of how to rebuild the 
weapons is what makes abolition possible, for it keeps deter- 
rence in force. With that guarantee as a backdrop, Schell ar- 
gues that the nuclear powers can begin immediately to scale 
down their arsenals toward zero. He argues that the tradi- 
tional fear of cheating can be met by a concomitant build-up of 
weapons that have only a defensive capability. Although defen- 
sive weapons as envisioned by the Strategic Defense Initiative 
are useless against a fully armed opponent who needs only a 
few weapons to penetrate a defensive shield in order to deliver 
unacceptable damage, defense systems can be expected to be 
effective against the few missiles a cheating power might suc- 
cessfully hide. Thus, since all nuclear powers remain in a 
position to rearm and array their defensive forces to protect 
this capacity, deterrence continues; but it continues at a level 
where days and weeks, rather than minutes, are allowed before 
responding to aggression. 
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Schell seeks by his proposal "not to bring heaven to earth 
but only to preserve the earth." By suggesting a scenario in 
which untrusting superpowers can find the time to confirm 
possible computer errors and to consult their enlightened self- 
interest, he has contributed invaluably to the debate on nu- 
clear strategies and on the prospects for human survival. But 
we must consider what may be the costs of Schell's new per- 
spective, now that "not improvement but mere continuation is 
our dream" (1 1 1). 
One wants to cheer Schell on in his imaginative attempt to 
find a practical way to move the world back from the abyss of 
nuclear devastation. Yet in his effort to move away from the 
more theoretical Fate of the Earth, he loses touch with some 
keen insights in that work and, therefore, lacks a convincing 
foundation for several of his key arguments in The Abolition. 
Schell's making peace with the strategy of deterrence is a 
dramatic reversal, and it is not clear that his earlier devastat- 
ing arguments against this centerpiece of the pragmatists are 
not still convincing. It remains true that deterrence depends 
upon an unflinching nuclear response to an aggressor's nu- 
clear first strike; and yet with that first strike, deterrence has 
already failed, and it is not obvious why the victims of that 
attack then should, or would, decide to end all life in hurling 
back their missiles. This crack in deterrence theory is only 
enlarged in Schell's less-prepared state of nuclear standoff in 
which the victim must set about reconstructing nuclear weap- 
ons. Would not the logical contradiction in carrying out the 
dictates of a deterrence strategy that has already failed be only 
more apparent in those weeks required for response? And 
would not the ambiguity as to what the victim should do be 
only a greater temptation to a would-be nuclear aggressor? At 
the very least, Schell needs to answer his own assault on 
deterrence in his earlier book. 
Schell's new embrace of national sovereignty is another 
dramatic turnaround that has little rational justification. His 
pragmatic rejection of the imperative of world government, 
which he endorsed in his earlier work, certainly makes sense 
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inasmuch as his urgent goal is to begin immediately to reverse 
the perilous nuclear arms race. Less understandable are the 
enthusiasm and crudeness of his new aversion to international 
government, which he feels represents excessive controls from 
ballooning global institutions, "each one equipped to meddle 
in some new area of our lives" (87). 
Schell seems oblivious to the possibility that international 
government could centralize those decisions essential to peace 
and decentralize all others. Similarly, his parallel turnaround 
on national sovereignty, the nemesis of the first book, goes 
beyond the demands of a quick start on disarmament. He 
recants effusively and affirms that "national sovereignty in 
itself is highly desirable" (108). He is inexplicably unmindful of 
the extreme dangers of manipulative appeals to nationalism 
and ethnic chauvinism in the nuclear age, dangers he re- 
counted compellingly in the first book. It is one thing to pre- 
serve national sovereignty for urgent short-term reasons and 
quite another to disavow an imposing critique with a pledge of 
allegiance that is as rationally weak as it is gratuitous. 
Schell's unreluctant accommodation to the international 
status quo brings us to the evasion of his own earlier argument 
in The Fate of the Earth that is the most unfortunate and that 
relates most significantly to the theme of human mortality. 
Perhaps the most important insight of his earlier work was 
how the nuclear age presents not only unprecedented dangers 
but also unprecedented possibilities and opportunities. He 
saw this fact applying with special force in our acceptance or 
rejection of our link with future generations and our need to 
assure them of a chance for life. He described persuasively the 
dark effects on us in the present if we ignore our link with the 
future and the opportunity that link offers not only for re- 
nouncing nuclear weapons but for discovering the solidarity 
with present generations that would make disarmament possi- 
ble. 
Earlier I argued that Schell did not fully articulate how 
concern for future generations helps one to cope with personal 
mortality and provides a powerful motive for political change. 
He certainly was aware in The Fate o f  the Earth of what a 
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catalyst for change a new responsibility for the future can be, 
yet there is no reliance on that insight in his more realistic 
book. This is profoundly regrettable, because the influence of 
the bomb in changing our views on death and community is 
not an apocalyptic speculation-it is already happening. This 
change is taking place in the consciousness of the millions of 
"average" people who refuse simply to accept the madness of 
the arms race that has been continually escalated by their 
expert leaders. Around the globe, people are generally out in 
front of their leaders in sensing the implications of the threat 
to the future that Schell describes so movingly in The Fate of 
the Earth. 
But Schell has moved so far from that topic in his haste to 
free disarmament from the dead weight of international gov- 
ernment that he portrays world leaders as more responsible 
than his evidence warrants. In arguing that the leaders of the 
nuclear powers practice more restraint than strategic war- 
gamers expect, he cites the facts that the U.S.S.R. did not use 
nuclear weapons against China before the latter had the poten- 
tial to respond and that Britain did not even threaten the use of 
nuclear bombs against Argentina in the Falklands War. These 
examples hardly are manifestations of restraint, inasmuch as 
the danger from other nuclear powers to the perpetrators 
would have been extreme. This exaggeration of restraint sug- 
gests how far Schell is straining to depend on nuclear "insid- 
ers" for enlightened self-interest while ignoring the pressure 
for change from the untutored multitudes. It is revealing that 
he makes no mention of the recommendation of the National 
Security Resources Board that President Harry Truman con- 
sider a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union during the darkest 
days of the Korean War in January 195 1. Nor does Schell men- 
tion the firm plans of President Dwight Eisenhower's exaspe- 
rated administration to use nuclear weapons against North 
Korea if the latter refused to accept a stalemate. 
The gap between Schell's optimism about heads of state and 
his ignoring the growing potential of the mass of people to 
reject nuclear weapons is important because it underlines that 
Schell's pragmatic movement toward disarmament lacks a 
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starter mechanism. Schell failed to recognize in The Fate of the 
Earth that leaders who cannot deal with their own mortality 
lack a sensitivity to the mortality of the world and may even be 
tempted by a nuclear high. He recognizes more clearly in this 
book that fear alone is not enough for disarmament: "Fear 
cannot distinguish between a fire in one's own house and a 
nuclear holocaust-between one's own death and the end of 
the world-and is therefore useless even to begin to suggest to 
us the meaning of the nuclear peril" (5). 
But what is it that will get the superpowers to chance peace 
and the arduous path to disarmament? I suspect that beneath 
the pragmatist's surface Schell is depending on a significant 
change in popular consciousness about basic life-and-death 
issues to spur us toward disarmament. But it is a pity that he 
does not articulate this dependency and work it into the frame- 
work of his argument, instead of repeatedly asserting his con- 
tentment with the political status quo. Without relying on a 
popular change of consciousness that is attuned to our nuclear 
peril, Shell's momentum for disarmament is left with the same 
experts who have sought security in the arms race during the 
last forty years. With a reliance on changing consciousness, he 
still has a practical proposal that merely takes stock of changes 
already happening and of a crucial insight in The Fate of the 
Earth: a true realist would hardly accept the incredible danger 
we face and would not build expectations on a prenuclear 
mode of thinking. The December 1987 agreement between 
Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan, eliminating 2,400 in- 
termediate and short-range missiles in Europe, marked the 
first build-down in the history of the nuclear arms race. It is 
clear that such an initiative toward sanity would not have been 
possible without a public opinion in both the East and West 
that was broadly and fervently in favor of nuclear arms reduc- 
tion. 
I do not demean Schell's imaginative effort at a practical 
solution to the baffling and terrifying arms race. With all of its 
problems, his proposal brings crucial new ideas to the cause of 
disarmament and, like his other book, leads the way on a diffi- 
cult but essential journey that few of his critics have dared to 
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embark upon. But Schell needs to retain more from his first 
book and needs to blend his theoretical and pragmatic selves. 
It was an inadequacy in The Fate of the Earth that no plan was 
advanced that addressed the immediacy of the terrible nuclear 
plight that he so convincingly described. But neither can such 
a plan stand alone without a theory for how it can be initiated 
and supported. Schell's proposal for disarmament and a con- 
scious commitment to future generations depend on each 
other; neither can make it alone. The key omission in The 
Abolition is Schell's vision of how the nuclear peril dramatizes 
that people need to depend on each other and that our lives 
make sense only in the context of the life we preserve for 
others. 
Schell's treatment of the nuclear threat, then, is eloquent 
testimony to the vital connection between ideas on death and 
on politics and to the connection between accepting our mor- 
tality and sharing life with other people. These connections 
were central to the most important insights in The Fate of the 
Earth and to the practical problems of The Abolition. Appropri- 
ately enough in this era of paradoxes, our very survival in the 
nuclear age increasingly seems dependent on gaining a per- 
spective on death in which we see our individual deaths as far 
down our scale of concerns, compared to the preservation of 
the human species. We would then see life extending beyond 
death in the efforts we make to let others live. 
9. The Limits of 
Self-Interest 
While I thought I was learning how to live, I was 
learning how to die. 
-Leonard0 da Vinci 
I have argued against the idea that the denial of death is 
inevitable and natural. I have proposed a perspective in which 
death is seen as a natural and essential part of life and in which 
we can affirm our life despite our mortality. The key to this 
affirmation is the power we have to share life with other people 
and the fact that we all affect the ebb and tide and indeed the 
survival of humanity. I have also considered how this perspec- 
tive clashes with basic assumptions in the ethos of the compet- 
itive market society as described by John Locke in the seven- 
teenth century and by Michael Novak in the present. The lure 
of narcissism in our culture was seen as importantly related to 
an inability to deal with limits and death. And I have consid- 
ered the striking difference that accepting death makes in 
debates about the possibilities of greater democracy and of 
finding a way out of our nuclear peril. At the end of this journey 
among both profound skeptics and uneasy visionaries, I step 
back and appreciate the timeliness of thinking anew about 
human mortality. 
Throughout, I have asserted one central idea: rather than 
threatening to deprive life of all meaning, death deepens an 
appreciation of life and the capacity of every person to give life 
to others. This is no mere cerebral thesis. It is an idea whose 
implications are as broad as they are urgent and have a force 
that is emotional as well as logical. Some insightful points that 
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Glenn Tinder makes about evaluating ideas in his book Politi- 
cal Thinking have great relevance: "An idea is living and impor- 
tant only so far as it brings us into relationship with ourselves 
and with reality, so far as it pulls things together. . . . Feeling 
necessarily plays a great part in searching for the truth. Much 
that must be pulled together does not have the definite and 
conscious form of a fact or an idea. A great idea is one that 
symbolizes and unifies not only facts and beliefs that are 
clearly present to consciousness but also intuitions and im- 
pulses that have not been focused on and given form. The idea 
that does this is exciting."' 
If our intellects have been uneasy with the gaps and avoid- 
ances in our traditional treatment of death, our feelings have 
begun to convulse in response to the unsoundness and irrele- 
vance of ideas about life and about death that do not bring the 
one into relationship with the other. In appreciating the power 
and excitement in an idea that brings death into phase with 
attitudes about life, we should look again at how our society 
both discourages and lays the seedbed for the germination of 
such ideas. 
What has prepared the ground in the feelings and emotions 
in Western society for new ideas about death and human 
vulnerability is the emotional toll exacted by the old images 
we have accepted of both death and life. The old image of death 
has been horrifying and menacing. The gaunt visage glimpsed 
has been that of a Grim Reaper whose indifferent scythe is no 
respecter of seasons and capriciously cuts down new life as 
well as old. This view of death as the canceler and spoiler of life 
has forced us to try to hide from and deny death by absorbing 
ourselves in a peculiar image of life. We have seemed con- 
vinced that we could avoid the nightmare by never sleeping, so 
our image of life could not be a placid one of measured effort 
and rest but one of a restless contest or quest that demanded 
all of our energies and commitments to constant activity and 
growth. Without ever really considering what the point of it all 
was, we became absorbed in a contest to expand ourselves and 
those attached to us. In the effort to conquer nature and to 
surpass in wealth and power as many other people as we could, 
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we felt a respite from the nightmare and a fragile sense of 
power. 
But if our image of death has been a nightmare for us, our 
image of life that excludes death and achieves power and 
freedom has become an illusion. With a focus on expanding 
power and self-interest, modern Western culture since Adam 
Smith has achieved dazzling economic and technological re- 
sults. In our increasing enthusiasm for competition for status 
and celebration of self-interest as the genie that has made 
possible all of our inventions and conveniences, we have slid 
into a number of critical oversights. For one, we ignore the 
unevenness of our splendid inventions and the fact that self- 
interest can divert our ingenuity into finding new fragrances 
for the perfume industry or lightweight throw-away cigarette 
lighters rather than wrestling with a 50 percent drop-out rate 
in urban schools. In our giddiness about the power of self- 
interest, we have ignored the point in John Stuart Mill's cau- 
tion that "one person with a belief is a social power equal to 
ninety-nine who have only interests." 
A classic example of our extravagant expectations of the 
compensations of self-interest can be seen in a New York Times 
column in which William Safire recites an "Ode to Greed." 
Always brash and provocative, Safire becomes fervent in this 
attempt to demonstrate that it is only by exhorting the wealthy 
to greed that the needy will be effectively helped: 
Greed is finally being recognized as a virtue. Dressed in euphemism- 
"the profit motive" or "growth incentives" or "the entrepreneurial 
spiritn+ur not so deadly sin turns out to be the best engine of 
betterment known to man. 
The world has learned that to concentrate on divying-up dimin- 
ishes us all, while scrambling to help ourselves helps others; without 
Greed, there is no wherewithal for Generosity. 
By hustling to improve our station, by indulging the desire for 
necessities that becomes a lust for luxuries, by competing to make our 
pile bigger, we engage in the great invisible handshake that enlarges 
pies, lifts all boats and enriches us without impoverishing our neigh- 
bor.2 
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It is revealing that Safire rests his case on citing examples of 
the inefficiencies in state control rather than examples of how 
the achievements of greed trickle down "[to lift] all boats." The 
fact is, as in our discussion of John Locke, there is a built-in 
brake on how much the greed for more in one class can allevi- 
ate the needs of another class; for having more, once one gets 
past necessities and security for the future, is not interesting 
unless others have less. This is what Edmund Burke meant 
when he said "the characteristic essence of property . . . is to 
be u n e q ~ a l " ~  and what Ernest Becker was pointing to when he 
claimed that the allure of gold is that it separates us from other 
people. 
But besides being ineffective as a feeder of the needy, so- 
ciety's unleashing of a "lust for luxuries," which seems so 
natural and innocuous to Safire and many others, is increas- 
ingly disturbing the good-life dreams of those who heed this 
siren call. Individuals and societies alike, whose singular am- 
bitions are material growth and affluence, are becoming more 
aware every day of how vulnerable they are to the disillusioned 
and disaffected people and nations who do not compete suc- 
cessfully. Terrorism is proving a vicious, destructive, and, alas, 
effective threat for spoilers who are resentful at what they 
perceive as the avarice and arrogance of these eager accumu- 
lators. We are all increasingly hostages to desperate people 
and their states of mind. Any social theory that today focuses 
our attention on the interests of those with "the entrepre- 
neurial spirit" and ignores the interests, attitudes-and fury- 
of everyone else is not only blindly elitist but unrealistic and 
dangerous. 
Quite apart from the state of mind of those who can't com- 
pete in the pursuit of "more," however, the celebration of self- 
interest does perhaps its greatest damage to the states of mind 
of the very people who buy into this ambition for competition. 
Adam Smith and William Safire may be right in arguing that 
competition for a bigger pile increases, however indifferently, 
the gross national product, but they seem never to consider 
what it does to the competitors themselves. They celebrate a 
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tragic, Faustian swap of productivity for purpose, of quantity 
for quality, and, in Mill's terms, of interest for belief. The 
biggest toll in the invitation to getting and spending is that it 
forbids us to glance at that limited side of our nature man- 
ifested by death, the side that would question the significance 
of a bigger pile. Unconfronted and unexamined, death is forced 
to remain as a nightmare that intrudes upon us indirectly but 
pervasively in feelings of insecurity. This insecurity infects 
even our most precious relationships. We push our children 
from the cradle to achieve and excel because we are so unsure 
of what the future holds for either them or ourselves. Because 
we are presented with a portrait of human behavior that em- 
phasizes how everyone is trying to get ahead of everyone else, 
we can rely on no one else for comfort and support. 
It is interesting that the one time in life when we come 
closest to recognizing this insecurity and to questioning our 
priorities and absorptions is called a mid-life crisis. It's called 
a crisis because we seem to lose our grip and stray from 
normalcy by abruptly noticing that our individual life is at 
least half gone and by coming close to admitting the night- 
mare into our consciousness. In our society enough of us get 
through this crisis to maintain productivity and Little League 
championships, but in the process we glimpse what a price 
individuals pay to maintain "growth incentives" and how our 
dream of life is not securely insulated from our nightmare of 
death. As Christopher Lasch makes clear, much of the drive in 
the culture of narcissism is fueled by a determined avoidance 
of the subject of aging and death. 
Fortunately for us, however, death will not be denied. It 
continues to assert itself and continues our opportunity to 
catch sight of how insignificant is the issue of how big our pile 
is. Of course giving death its due is not the only way of coming 
to realize the emptiness of a culture built upon greed. One 
dramatic example of the chaos and weakness of a society 
where self-interest rules can be seen in the "Crisis Relocation 
Instructions," published by the Federal Emergency Manage- 
ment Agency. These instructions, meant to be distributed to 
citizens when our country is on the brink of nuclear war, have 
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provoked much derision for their bizarre tone of normalcy as 
they advise evacuees to remember to take with them to shel- 
ters their insurance policies, wills, credit cards, and post office 
change-of-address cards. But amid the macabre humor of 
these instructions are some vital lessons on what any society 
needs to survive. 
One paragraph of the instructions that has been largely ig- 
nored by commentators is titled "Postattack Situation." Here 
citizens receive the following dispassionate reminder: "A ma- 
jor problem in the postattack situation would be the control of 
exposure to fallout radiation. Yet, to do essential work after a 
massive nuclear attack, many survivors must be willing to 
receive much larger radiation doses than are normally per- 
missible. Otherwise work that would be vital to national recov- 
ery could not be done."4 
What is stunning about this statement is that it comes from 
unsentimental realists who do not shrink from preparing for 
nuclear war, presumably because nations and people in the 
"real world" are too self-interested to avert provocation and 
catastrophe. Yet these realists, who would think it utopian for 
people to yoke their egos and self-interest to avoid nuclear war, 
are nevertheless forced to expect people after such a war to 
sacrifice all concern for individual survival on behalf of so- 
ciety's survival. Given the minuscule chances for any survivors 
of "a massive nuclear attack," one can only lament that these 
realists do not challenge people's egos and short-range inter- 
ests on behalf of society before a nuclear war, the only time they 
can realistically promote survival. 
This example seems to underline both our unexamined ac- 
ceptance of the rule of self-interest and the realization, by even 
those most reluctant to acknowledge it, that in crises societies 
cannot survive if people are not accustomed to transcend their 
self-interests. There are a variety of circumstances like this in 
which we can perceive rationally the limits and contradictions 
in a society's promoting greed and self-interest among its 
citizens, but at no time are these contradictions more evident, 
both rationally and emotionally, than when we truly acknowl- 
edge our mortality. Face to face with the reality of death, we 
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see and feel the absurdity of finding self-esteem or consolation 
or refuge in how large our pile of possessions is. In the light, 
rather than the proverbial shadow, of death, we see the true 
terms of the bargain offered by an economy driven by greed: 
the growth and productivity of the system at the expense of the 
individual's finding meaning in life and acceptance of death. 
We can hardly wonder why societies that accept the spur of 
greed should promote the denial and avoidance of death. 
Yet the denial of death that has been prevalent for almost a 
century in our society is already beginning to soften. A bur- 
geoning literature on death and dying, death education class- 
es, the hospice movement, and a greater honesty by physicians 
with patients are just some of the developments that are push- 
ing our society away from the denial of death. These develop- 
ments did not have a spontaneous generation but are remind- 
ers that, in spite of the imperatives of their economic system, 
Americans have never bent entirely to the incentives of self- 
interest. Right alongside the hustling Horatio Algers, promo- 
tion-hungry narcissists, and Madison Avenue's push to frantic 
consumption (perhaps best captured in the ever-youthful beer 
ad: "Who says you can't have it all?") has been the steadfast 
resolve of generations of people from all economic strata not to 
be bought away from some activity that was vital to them. 
Whoever does something for its intrinsic value as opposed to 
what or where it can get him or her, whoever delights in 
anything from Bach to frisbee simply for the enjoyment of the 
activity puts a crimp in the incentive of greed and is, in some 
degree, receptive to regarding life in qualitative, rather than 
quantitative and materialistic, terms. The millions of people 
who play in community orchestras, who volunteer their time 
in hospitals, who play recreational sports and can be con- 
tented losers, who backpack into nature to find a richness that 
could never be purchased-these people are evidence that the 
incentive of greed does not simply own the soul of America. 
Many of these same people do find a real tension between the 
unacquisitive side of their lives and their roles in the mar- 
ketplace as producers and consumers. I do not suggest that 
people should be angelically devoidof all self-interest, but only 
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that the persistent appeal to greed as the dominant human 
motivation beckons people to a lonely and artificial obsession. 
It is not a purpose to live or die for. 
Given the mixture of motives in most people's lives, to hope 
for a greater acceptance of mortality is not to advocate revolu- 
tion. Rather, it is to build on needs and desires already in 
people, and to insist that the promotion of unlimited acquisi- 
tion cannot be allowed to preempt the need everyone has to 
come to terms with death. The long-range economic fallout of 
such a priority would hardly be disastrous. The market system 
would continue to operate, but without the artificial demand 
for the extraneous and the extravagant, whose only utility is 
the appearance of superiority they bestow on competitive ac- 
cumulators. Instead of feeding the illusion that the advantaged 
people in our society are self-made and have no responsibil- 
ities to a larger community, an economy with new qualitative 
priorities would produce to fulfill human needs across the 
population rather than concentrating on the privileged elite. It 
is one of the great self-righteous and blinding myths of that 
elite that people will work hard and economies will be produc- 
tive only when there are material, individual rewards for effort 
and work. Since a crucial part of our liberation from the 
numbing fear of death is the realization that death does not 
exterminate us if we give life to others, there are inducements 
for us to labor more tirelessly and to produce more valuable 
goods than the incentives of individual economic gain could 
ever achieve. 
A liberation from the fear of death can also point us toward a 
greater democracy and toward an iron will to put an end to 
nuclear weapons. With these developments we would not be on 
our way to a new Jerusalem but would become a society freed 
from dire threats to its survival in the desperation it has 
tolerated in the lives of its "losers" and in the hollow prizes it 
has accorded its alleged "winners." Such a society would not 
be a utopia, for we would still have to face disasters and 
disappointments, pathos and tragedy. We would also have to 
contend with age-old individual inclinations to avarice, pride, 
and greed. But the big difference is that society would not be 
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cheering on the temptation to egoism; instead it would be 
concretely reassuring people that such defensiveness is no 
more necessary than spending our lives hiding from death. 
In short, people would be able to relax a bit and feel a calm 
empowerment in diverting their energies to meet real needs. 
They would know that death testifies to life's fragility and pain 
but that it finally does not mock life. They would know that 
death prods us to value life and our precious power to share life 
with others. 
Afterword 
On October 26,1987, seven weeks after I completed the revised 
manuscript for this book, our sixteen-year-old daughter, Mari, 
was in an accident on her way to school and was killed. Since 
so many of the ideas in this book were inspired by the pleasure 
and joy I took in Mari's life and that of her brother Joe, I am 
moved to share two insights forced on me by the experience of 
losing Mari. 
I argue in the book that although death causes enormous 
grief and pain it does not extinguish the meaning and signifi- 
cance of any person's life. The existence of every one of us 
affects others' lives, and this spiritual effect ripples through 
time to all future generations, despite the fact that we die and 
our bodies return to nature. I have not changed anything in the 
book in the two months since my daughter's death, and I would 
certainly not change this central argument. I have a deepened 
awareness of how cold and cruel fate can be and of how ex- 
cruciatingly lonely and joyless the world can appear, a condi- 
tion gentled at times by generous, comforting friends. I 
nevertheless know viscerally that my daughter remains a part 
of me and that her life will always affect my priorities and 
commitments. I do not shrink from the pain that I now know 
bereaved parents never lose, because the pain is a confirmation 
of my closeness with my daughter and the continuing evidence 
of her wonderful spirit. And I know that she will continue in 
the lives of many friends and family members. Her classmates 
in a crowded architectual drawing class insist on keeping her 
stool and drawing table unoccupied. In the future, long after 
they have perhaps stopped thinking of the shy, perceptive 
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young woman they lost in their senior year, they may make 
choices that arise from a deeper respect for beauty and hu- 
mane values because Mari touched their lives at a formative 
time. 
The second insight I have to share is also a point that is 
treated theoretically in the book but has been seared into my 
emotions in the aftermath of my daughter's death. I find it 
incredible that so many people in our society seek fulfillment 
and meaning in their lives by competing for a larger pile of 
possessions. The only thing that has allowed my wife and me to 
bear so far the loss of our child is the conviction that she knew 
that we loved her and that we know that she loved us. The 
ideology of quantity, of increase, of winning that one hears so 
much trumpeted in America today seems piteously irrelevant 
to the real life events that try people's hearts and souls. I can 
only conclude that this ideology has no place for people who 
lose loved ones-that is for the "losers"-and it has no place for 
death. The significance of the struggle between those who 
would deny death and and those who would affirm love-and 
the risk, indeed certainty, of suffering and grief that comes 
with love-has never seemed more momentous to me than in 
the last two months. The struggle seems to be about sanity 
itself. To acquire more and to love less is no protection from 
death. With a pained vision of a mountain of my own smashed 
precautions, I know that death will have its way whatever we 
do. But in spite of the agony and bitter tears it exposes us to, all 
of my recent education discovers that there is one power that 
can stand up to death, and that is love. 
Kingston, Rhode Island 
January 1988 
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